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Abstract

Integration of Deep Hashing and Channel
Coding for Biometric Security and Biometric Retrieval

Veeru Talreja
In the last few years, the research growth in many research and commercial fields are due to
the adoption of state of the art deep learning techniques. The same applies to even biometrics
and biometric security. Additionally, there has been a rise in the development of deep learning
techniques used for approximate nearest neighbor (ANN) search for retrieval on multi-modal
datasets. These deep learning techniques knows as deep hashing (DH) inte-grate feature
learning and hash coding into an end-to-end trainable framework. Motivated by these factors,
this dissertation considers the integration of deep hashing and channel coding for biometric
security and different biometric retrieval applications. The major focus of this dissertation is
biometric security, wherein deep hashing is integrated with channel coding to develop a secure
biometric authentication system. In this system, multiple biometric modal-ities of a single user
are combined at the feature level using deep hashing (binarization). A hybrid secure
architecture that combines cancelable biometrics with secure sketch techniques is integrated
with the deep hashing framework, which makes it computationally prohibitive to forge a
combination of multiple biometrics that passes the authentication. The integration of deep
hashing and channel coding not only finds application in biometric security but it can also be
extended to different biometric applications. To this end, the integration of deep cross-modal
hashing and error correcting codes has been extended to improve the efficiency of attributeguided face image retrieval.
Additionally, the dissertation also presents a framework for cross-resolution (low-resolution
to high-resolution) face recognition, and profile-to-frontal face recognition. A novel attributeguided cross-resolution (low-resolution to high-resolution) face recognition system that leverages a coupled generative adversarial network (cpGAN) structure with adversarial training to
find the hidden relationship between low-resolution and high-resolution images in a latent
common embedding subspace is developed and presented. A similar framework that leverages
cpGAN structure has been developed for a profile-to-frontal face recognition system. Finally,
the performance of this cpGAN architecture for profile-to-frontal face recognition system has
been evaluated and compared with a coupled convolutional neural network (cpCNN) and an
adversarial discriminative domain adaptation (ADDA) network.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter provides an introduction to the contributions presented in this dissertation.
A conceptual background is provided to give context to the underlying goals and contributions. A contextual description and literature review is provided for the fundamental
technical concepts.
Biometrics are difficult to forge, and unlike in traditional password-based access control
systems, they do not have to be remembered. As much as these characteristics provide
an advantage, they also create challenges related to protecting biometrics in the event of
identity theft or a database compromise as each biometric characteristic is distinct and
cannot be replaced by a newly generated arbitrary biometric. There are serious concerns
about the security and privacy of an individual because of the proliferation of biometric usage.
The security and privacy concerns cannot be alleviated by using conventional cryptographic
hashing methods as in the case of alpha-numeric passwords because the cryptographic hashes
are extremely sensitive to noise and are not suitable for the protection of biometrics due to
inherent variability and noise in biometric measurements.
The leakage of biometric information to an adversary constitutes a serious threat to
security and privacy because if an adversary gains access to a biometric database, he can
potentially obtain the stored user information. The attacker can use this information to gain
unauthorized access to the system by reverse engineering the authentication process and
creating a physical spoof. Furthermore, an attacker can abuse the biometric information for
unintended purposes and violate user privacy [2].
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Multimodal biometric systems use a combination of different biometric traits such as face
and iris, or face and fingerprint. Multimodal systems are generally more resistant to spoofing
attacks [3]. Moreover, multimodal systems can be made to be more universal than unimodal
systems, since the use of multiple modalities can compensate for missing modalities in a small
portion of the population. Multimodal systems also have an advantage of lower error rates
and higher accuracy when compared to unimodal systems [2]. Consequently, multimodal
systems have been deployed in many large scale biometric applications including the FBI’s
Next Genration Identification (NGI), the Department of Homeland Security’s US-VISIT, and
the Government of India’s UID. However, Multimodal systems have an increased demand for
integrity and privacy because the system stores multiple biometric traits of each user. The
main focus of this dissertation is the development and analysis of a secure multibiometric
system.
In biometrics systems, the biometric characteristics of an individual are encoded into a
data structure that is commonly referred to as a template. Because templates may contain
personally identifiable information, it is essential that they be protected in order to preserve
privacy. For a template to be secure, it must satisfy the important properties of noninvertibility and revocability. Noninvertibility implies that given a template, it must be computationally difficult to recover the original biometric data from the template. Revocability
implies that if a template gets compromised, it should be possible to revoke the compromised template and generate a new template using a different transformation. Moreover, it
should be difficult to identify that the new template and the old compromised template are
generated from the same underlying biometric data.
The fundamental challenge in designing a biometric template protection scheme is to
manage the intra-user variability that occurs due to signal variations in the multiple acquisitions of the same biometric trait. With respect to biometric template protection, four main
architectures are widely used: fuzzy commitment, secure sketch, secure multiparty computation, and cancelable biometrics [1]. Fuzzy commitment and secure sketch are biometric
cryptosystem methods and are usually implemented with error-correcting code (ECC) and
provide information-theoretic guarantees of security and privacy (e.g., [4–8]). Secure multiparty computation architectures are distance based and use cryptographic tools. Cancelable
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biometrics use revocable and non-invertible user-specific transformations for distorting the
enrollment biometric (e.g., [9–12]), with the matching typically performed in the transformed
domain.
Fuzzy commitment, a classical method of biometric protection, was first proposed by Juels
and Wattenberg [5] in 1999. forward error correction (FEC) based fuzzy commitment can also
be viewed as a method of extracting a secret code by means of polynomial interpolation [6].
An implementation example of such a fuzzy commitment scheme appears in [8], wherein a
BCH code is employed for polynomial interpolation; experiments show that when the degree
of the interpolated polynomial is increased, the matching becomes more stringent, reducing
the false accept rate (FAR), but increasing the false reject rate (FRR).
Cancelable biometrics was first proposed by Ratha et al. [9], after which, there have
been various different methods of generating cancelable biometric templates. Some of the
popular methods use non-invertible transforms [9], bio-hashing [10], salting [11] and random
projections [12]. Literature surveys on cancelable biometrics can be found in [1], and [13].

1.0.1

Secure Biometric System Model

In this section, we describe a generalized biometric framework within which we can
evaluate and analyze secure biometric system. Consider the general model of secure biometric
system given in Fig. 1.1 [1]. This system consists of a suitable procedure to encode the
enrollment biometric signal into data that can be stored on the access control device. The
other important part of the system entails a decoding procedure to use the probe biometric
signal and combine it with the stored data to generate an authentication decision. Note that
this is an authentication system where the probe biometric is matched against the enrollment
of a claimed user. This authentication system differs from an identification system, in which
a probe biometric is matched against each enrollment in the database to find the identity
associated with the probe [1].
Biometric Feature Vectors: The enrollment feature vector A = (A1 , A2 , ....An ) is
extracted from the biometric measurement provided by the user using a feature extraction
algorithm. This feature vector is used to generate the secure template that is stored on
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Figure 1.1: Generalized biometric secure framework (from [1])
access control device. During authentication, the user provides a biometric measurement,
from which a probe feature vector B = (B1 , B2 , ....Bn ) is extracted using the same feature
extraction algorithm. This probe feature vector is decoded by the decoding procedure on access control device to authenticate the user. An important note here is that most theoretical
analyses of secure biometric systems work with the feature vectors as a conceptual model for
the biometric signals [1] and omit the feature extraction algorithm. Another important note
is that it is easier to analyze the models where the feature vectors are binary with certain
statistical properties. In general, the bits extracted from the biometric measurements are
neither independent nor identically distributed. However, it is possible to convert biometric
readings to bits that are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) as equiprobably
(p=0.5) Bernoulli random variables by designing specific feature extraction algorithms for
this purpose [14].
Enrollment: In Fig. 1.1, the Encoding block entails an encoding function F (.), which
takes in the enrollment feature vector A as input. The output of the function F is
• A biometric template S, which is retained by the access control device, and
• An optional key vector K which can be returned to the user or can also be stored in
the cloud, smart card or the access control device.
Thus, the encoding function is given by F (A) = (S, K) and is governed by conditional
distribution PS, K|A . Such systems are called as two-factor systems because both the factors
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(biometric and the key) are required for authentication. We can even set K to be null. In
such a case, where K is set to be null is called as a one-factor or a keyless system and does
not require a separate key storage (cloud, smart card).
Authentication: During authentication, a legitimate user provides the biometric feature
vector B and the key K in a two-factor system. An attacker, on the other hand, provides
a stolen or artificially synthesized biometric feature vector C and the stolen or artificially
synthesized key J. The binary parameter θ indicates presence of the legitimate user or the
attacker. The (feature vector, key) pair that is provided during the authentication step is
denoted by (D,L).

(B, K), if θ = 1,
(D, L) =
(C, J), if θ = 0.

(1.1)

The authentication decision is computed by the binary-valued decoding function as θ̂ =
g(D, L, S). In a keyless system, the procedure remains the same with K, J, and L removed
from the above description.
To keep the explanation of the system simple, we have considered only a single biometric
measurement but this could be similarly extended to include multiple biometric measurements and build a multibiometric secure system. The secure biometric frameworks have
been extended to include multiple biometric traits of a user [2, 15–17]. In [15] face and
fingerprint templates are concatenated to form a single binary string and this concatenated
string is used as input to a secure sketch scheme. Kelkboom et al. [18] provided results
for decision-level, feature-level, and score-level fusion of templates by using the number of
errors corrected in a biometric cryptosystem as a measure of the matching score. Nagar et
al. [2] developed a multimodal cryptosystem based on feature-level fusion using two different
security architectures, fuzzy commitment and fuzzy vault.

1.0.2

Issues with the Secure Biometric System Model

One important issue for multimodal systems is that the multiple biometric traits generally
do not have the same feature-level representation. Furthermore, it is difficult to characterize
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multiple biometric traits using compatible feature-level representations, as required by a
template protection scheme [2]. To counter this issue there have been many fusion techniques
for combining multiple biometrics [2, 15, 16]. One possible approach is to apply a separate
template protection scheme for each trait followed by decision-level fusion. However, such
an approach may not be highly secure, since it is limited by the security of the individual
traits. This issue motivated our proposed approach of using multimodal biometric security
to perform a joint feature-level fusion and classification.
Another important issue is that biometric cryptosystem schemes are usually implemented
using ECC. In order to apply ECC, the biometric feature vectors must be quantized, for
instance by binarizing. One method of binarizing the feature vectors is thresholding the
feature vectors, for example, by thresholding against the population mean or thresholding
against zero. However, thresholding causes a quantization loss and does not preserve the
semantic properties of the data structure in Hamming space. In order to avoid thresholding
and minimize the quantization loss, we have used the idea of hashing [19, 20], which is used
in the image and data retrieval literature to achieve fast search by binarizing the real-valued
image features. The basic idea of hashing is to map each visual object into a compact binary
feature vector that approximately preserves the data structure in the original space. A key
principle of hashing is to map visually similar samples to similar binary codes. Owing to its
storage and retrieval efficiency, hashing has been extensively used in approximate nearest
neighbor search for large scale visual search and image retrieval.

1.0.3

Deep Hashing

Deep structured learning, or more commonly called deep learning, has emerged as a new
area of machine learning. Deep learning is being extensively applied to solve problems that
have resisted the best attempts of the machine learning and artificial intelligence community
for many years. It has turned out to be very good at discovering intricate structures in
high-dimensional data and is therefore applicable to many domains of science, business, and
government.
Recent progress in image classification, object detection, face recognition, speech recog-
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nition and many other computer vision tasks demonstrates the impressive learning ability
of convolutional neural networks (CNNs) [21–29]. The robustness of features generated by
the CNNs has led to a surge in the application of deep learning for generating binary codes
from raw image data [30, 31]. Deep hashing [32–35] is the technique of integrating hashing
and deep learning to generate compact binary vectors from raw image data. Xia et al. [32]
adopted a two-stage learning strategy wherein the first stage computes hash codes from the
pairwise similarity matrix and the second stage trains a deep neural network to fit the hash
codes generated in the first stage. The model proposed by Lai et al. [33] simultaneously
captures the intermediate image features and trains the hashing function in a joint learning process. The hash function in [33] uses a divide-and-encode module, which splits the
image features derived from the deep network into multiple blocks, each block encoded into
one hash bit. Liu et al. [35] present a deep hashing model that learns the hash codes by
simultaneously optimizing a contrastive loss function for input image pairs and imposing a
regularization on the real-valued outputs to approximate the binary values. Zhu et al. [36]
proposed a deep hashing method to learn hash codes by optimizing a pairwise cross-entropy
loss and a quantization loss to preserve the pairwise similarity and minimize the quantization
error simultaneously.
There also exist methods (eg., [37, 38]) which adopt deep learning for cross-modal hashing (CMH) and are known as deep cross-modal hashing (DCMH) methods. DCMH techniques give improved performance over other CMH techniques which use handcrafted features [39, 40]. Jiang et al. were the first to propose an end-to-end DCMH framework to
learn the binary hash codes in DCMH [38]. However, they just utilize the inter-modal relationship ignoring intra-modal information. In contrast, Yang et al. exploit this intra-modal
information by using pairwise labels to propose Pairwise Relationship Guided Deep Hashing
(PRDH) method [37].
In addition to the regular DCMH techniques [38, 41, 42], which exploit entropy maximization and quantization losses in the objective function of the DCMH, an ECC decoder
can also be used as an additional component to compensate for the heterogeneity gap and
reduce the distance between the different modalities of the same subject in the Hamming
space in order to improve the CMH and retrieval efficiency. We presume that the hash code
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generated by DCMH is a binary vector that is within a certain distance from a codeword of
an ECC. The hash code generated by DCMH can be passed through an ECC decoder, then
the closest codeword to this hash code is found. which can be used as a final hash code for
the retrieval process.

1.0.4

Neural Error Correcting Decoder

Recent work has shown that the same kinds of neural network architectures used for
classification can also be used to decode ECC [43–45]. Motivated by this, we have used a
neural error-correction decoder (NECD) [43] as an ECC decoder to improve the cross-modal
retrieval efficiency. In [43], the belief propagation (BP) algorithm, which is commonly used
for decoding of low-density parity check (LDPC) codes, is formulated as a neural network
and it is shown that a weighted BP decoder implemented using deep learning methods can
improve the BP decoding of codes by 0.9 dB in the high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) region.
Later, Lugosch et al. [45] proposed a neural-network architecture with reduced complexity by leveraging offset min-sum algorithm and achieved similar results to [43]. Gruber et
al. [46] used a fully connected architecture to propose a neural network decoder that gives
performance close to a maximum likelihood (ML) decoder for very small block codes. Additionally, in [47], a communication system has been formulated as an autoencoder for small
block codes.

1.1

Outline and Contributions

Based on the above few technical concepts, we have developed a novel system that integrates deep hashing with neural error-correction decoder for biometric security and biometric
retrieval applications. Below is the summary of the contributions described in this dissertation. All of the contributions listed have either been peer-reviewed or are under review
at the time of this writing. The chapters where each is developed are listed. The specific
contributions are:
1. In Chapter 2, a novel architecture that integrates a deep hashing framework with a
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neural network decoder (NND) for application to face template protection is presented
[48]. It improves upon existing face template protection techniques to provide better
matching performance with one-shot and multi-shot enrollment.
2. In Chapter 3, a deep learning framework is developed for feature-level fusion of each
user’s multiple biometrics to generate a secure multimodal template [49, 50]. A deep
hashing (binarization) technique is integrated with the fusion architecture to generate
a robust binary multimodal shared latent representation. Additionally, a hybrid secure architecture is developed by combining cancelable biometrics with secure sketch
techniques, and it is integrated with the deep hashing framework and make it computationally prohibitive to forge a combination of multiple biometrics that passes the
authentication.
3. Continuing the multibiometric model, in Chapter 4, a novel multimodal deep hashing
neural decoder (MDHND) architecture is developed, which integrates a deep hashing
framework with a NND to create an effective multibiometric authentication system
[51]. The MDHND consists of two separate modules: a MDH module, which is used
for feature-level fusion and binarization of multiple biometrics, and a NND module,
which is used to refine the intermediate binary codes generated by the MDH and
compensate for the difference between enrollment and probe biometrics (variations in
pose, illumination, etc.).
4. Chapter 5 presents a novel CMH architecture — deep neural decoder cross-modal
hashing (DNDCMH), which uses a binary vector specifying the presence of certain
facial attributes as an input query to retrieve relevant face images from the database
[52–54]. The DNDCMH network consists of two separate components: an attributebased deep cross-modal hashing (ADCMH) module, which uses a margin (m)-based
loss function to efficiently learn compact binary codes to preserve similarity between
modalities (i.e., facial attribute modality and image modality) in the Hamming space,
and a NECD, which is an error-correcting decoder implemented with a neural network.
5. Chapter 6 introduces a novel attribute-guided cross-resolution (low-resolution to high-
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resolution) face recognition framework that leverages a cpGAN structure with adversarial training to find the hidden relationship between the low-resolution and highresolution images in a latent common embedding subspace [55]. The coupled generative
adversarial network (GAN) framework consists of two sub-networks, one dedicated to
the low-resolution domain and the other dedicated to the high-resolution domain.
6. In Chapter 7, a framework similar to the cpGAN structure used in chapter 6 has been
developed for a profile-to-frontal face recognition system [56]. The performance of this
cpGAN architecture for profile-to-frontal face recognition system has been evaluated
and compared with a coupled convolutional neural network (cpCNN) and an adversarial
discriminative domain adaptation network (ADDA).

11

Chapter 2
Zero-Shot Deep Hashing and Neural
Network Based Error Correction for
Face Template Protection
In this chapter, we present a novel architecture that integrates a deep hashing framework
with a NND for application to face template protection. It improves upon existing face
template protection techniques to provide better matching performance with one-shot and
multi-shot enrollment. A key novelty of our proposed architecture is that the framework can
also be used with zero-shot enrollment. This implies that our architecture does not need to
be re-trained even if a new subject is to be enrolled into the system.

2.1

Introduction

The leakage of biometric information, such as a stored template, to an adversary constitutes a serious threat to security and privacy because if an adversary gains access to a
biometric database, he can potentially obtain the stored user information [53, 57–59]. The
attacker can use this information to gain unauthorized access to a system, abuse the biometric information for unintended purposes, and violate user privacy [2,60,61]. Hence, biometric
template protection is an important issue and the main focus of this chapter.
For a template to be secure, it must satisfy the important properties of noninvertibility
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and cancelability. Noninvertibility implies that it must be computationally difficult to recover
the original biometric data when a template is given (e.g., compromised). Cancelability
implies that if a template gets compromised, it should be possible to revoke the compromised
template and generate a new template using a different transformation.
Prior work in face template protection has tried to decrease the intra-user variability and
increase the inter-user variability by using multiple acquisitions of the user’s biometric trait
(multi-shot) during enrollment [62–64]. Pandey et al. [63] provide a face template protection
algorithm, where unique maximum entropy binary (MEB) codes are assigned to each user
and these MEB codes are used as labels to train a CNN and learn the mapping from face
images to MEB codes. The MEB code assigned to each user is cryptographically hashed
and stored as a template in the database. This algorithm [63] suffers from a high FRR for
higher matching accuracy and moreover, it is only compatible with multi-shot enrollment.
To improve upon this algorithm, Jindal et al. [64] use a deeper and better CNN for robust
mapping of face images to binary codes with significantly better matching performance and
compatibility with both one-shot and multi-shot enrollment.
In one-shot enrollment, strictly only one image is used during enrollment and training,
while in multi-shot enrollment, multiple images are used during enrollment and training of
the network. However, both the deep learning based methods [63, 64] are not compatible
with zero-shot enrollment, wherein a subject not seen during training needs to be enrolled
into the system. For both of the above cited methods, whenever a new subject needs to be
enrolled, the complete network needs to be retrained with the new subject included into the
training database.
To address the above problems, we propose an architecture for face template protection
by integrating a DH framework with a NND. Deep hashing is the application of deep
learning to generate compact binary vectors from raw image data and is generally used
for fast image retrieval [34–36, 52, 65–70]. In addition to using deep hashing to generate
binary codes, we use ECC as an additional component. ECC is used to compensate for the
difference in enrollment and probe biometrics (arising from variation in pose, illumination,
noise in biometric capture). In this work, we integrate a NND [43] into our deep hashing
architecture as an ECC component to improve the matching performance.
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Specifically, our proposed architecture consists of two major components: a DH component, which is used for robust mapping of face images to their intermediate binary codes,
and a NND component, which corrects errors in the intermediate binary codes that are
caused by differences in the enrollment and probe biometrics due to factors such as variation in pose, illumination, and other factors. The final binary code generated by the NND
component is then cryptographically hashed and stored as the secure face template in the
database. We have used SHA3-512 as the cryptographic hash function, since it is a current
standard for string-based passwords and provides strong security. The template generated
after cryptographic hashing has no correlation with the binary codes generated at the output
of the NND. To improve the template security, we have also optimized our deep hashing
architecture by using an additional loss function to maximize the entropy of the binary codes
being generated, which also helps to minimize the intra-user variability and maximize the
inter-user variability.
The advantage of using a NND instead of a conventional ECC decoder is that implementing the decoder as a neural network provides the benefit of using a similar architecture
as the DH component that generates the binary code, and hence, it can be more efficiently
jointly optimized and implemented within a common framework. Another advantage of using the NND is that it provides an opportunity to jointly learn and optimize with respect to
biometric datasets, which are not necessarily characterized by Gaussian noise as is assumed
by a conventional decoder. Motivated by this, in this chapter, we have integrated our DH
network with the NND by using a joint optimization process to formulate our novel face
template protection architecture. This proposed architecture can also be used with zeroshot enrollment while still offering the potential to improve the matching performance with
one-shot and multi-shot enrollment.

2.2

Proposed Architecture

In this section, we present a system overview of the proposed architecture, which is
shown in Fig. 2.1, and also present the enrollment and authentication procedure. The
architecture consists of two important components: a deep hashing component and a neural
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Figure 2.1: Block diagram of the proposed system. The NND is shown in the figure. The
DH is shown in Fig. 2.2
network decoder component. In this chapter, we have implemented this architecture for face
biometrics. However this system could also be extended for use with other biometrics such
as iris or fingerprint or a combination of multiple biometrics.

2.2.1

Deep Hashing Component

The main function of the deep hashing (DH) component (which can interchangeably be
called a deep hashing network) is to map the input facial images to binary codes. These
binary codes are not pre-defined as in [63, 64] but rather are generated as an output of the
DH component. This is one of the reasons why this framework can be used with zero-shot
M N
enrollment as well. Let X = {xi }N
i=1 denote N facial images and Y = {yi ∈ {0, 1} }i=1 be

their associated label vectors, where M denotes the number of class labels. Basically, yi is an
M -dimensional binary vector and Y is a matrix formed by such M -dimensional N vectors.
An entry of the vector yi is 1 if an image xi belongs to the corresponding class and 0 otherwise.
The goal of the DH component is to learn a mapping or a hash function G : X −→ {0, 1}K×N ,
which maps a set of images to their K-bit binary codes C = {ci } ∈ {0, 1}K×N , while
preserving the semantic similarity among image data. Specifically, in the DH component, we
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Figure 2.2: Proposed Deep Hashing network.
deploy a supervised hashing algorithm that exploits semantic labels to create binary codes
with the following required properties: (1) The semantic similarity between image labels is
preserved in the binary codes; images that share common class labels are mapped to same
(or close) binary codes. (2) The bits in a code are evenly distributed, which means that the
value of each bit is equally likely to be 0 or 1, leading to high entropy and discriminative
binary codes.
With recent advances in deep learning, hash functions can be constructed using a CNN
that is capable of learning semantic representations from input images. Our approach is
built on the existing deep VGG-19 model [22]. The advantage of our approach is that it
can be implemented using other deep models as well, such as AlexNet [21]. We introduce
our approach based on VGG-19. For our architecture, we use only the first 16 convolutional
layers of pre-trained VGG-19. To the 16 convolutional layers, we add our own fully connected
layer fc1 and an output softmax layer. The length of the fc1 layer depends upon the size
of the binary code K that we want to use for template generation. These 16 convolutional
layers and the 1 fully connected layer fc1 will be termed as “Face-CNN”.
The output of the Face-CNN at fc1 is a feature vector of unquantized values. This output
at fc1 can be directly binarized by thresholding at any numerical value or thresholding at
the population mean. However, this kind of thresholding leads to a quantization loss, which
results in sub-optimal binary codes. To account for this quantization loss and incorporate
the deep representations into the hash function learning, we add a latent layer called hashing
layer H with K units to the top of layer fc1 (i.e., the layer immediately before the output
layer), as illustrated in Fig. 2.2. This hashing layer is fully connected to fc1 and uses the
sigmoid activation function so that the outputs are between 0 and 1. The main purpose of
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the hashing layer is to capture the quantization loss incurred while converting the extracted
face features (output of fc1 layer) into binary codes.
Let W(H) ∈ Rd×K denote the weights between fc1 and the latent layer. For a given
(f c1)

image xi with the feature vector vi
(H)

is given as vi

(f c1)

= σ(vi

∈ Rd in layer fc1, the activations of the units in H
(H)

W(H) + b(H) ), where vi

is a K-dimensional vector, b(H) is the

bias term and σ(.) is the sigmoid activation defined as σ(z) = 1/(1 + exp(−z)), with z a real
value.
The combination of the Face-CNN, the hashing layer and the output softmax layer forms
the DH network. The details about the training of the DH network are given in Sec. 2.3.1

2.2.2

Neural Network Decoder Component

After training the DH network, we can directly binarize the output of the hashing layer
using a threshold of 0.5 and use the result as a binary code. Henceforth, we will refer to
the output of the hashing layer from the DH component as an intermediate binary code.
At this stage, we can cryptographically hash the intermediate binary code and store it as a
secure template. However, cryptographic hashes are extremely sensitive to noise and there
is always some inherent noise and distortion in biometric measurements such as variations in
pose, illumination, or noise due to the biometric capturing device, leading to differences in
enrollment and probe biometrics from the same subject. Due to these differences, enrollment
and probe biometrics from the same subject may lead to different intermediate binary codes
at the output of the hashing layer, which may result in the cryptographic hash mismatch
and excessive false rejections. We need to compensate for this distortion in biometric measurements to make the system more robust, improve the matching performance, and provide
another layer of security. This is achieved by using ECC. ECC can compensate for the
biometric distortion by forcing the enrollment and probe biometric to decode to the same
message, making the system more robust to noise in the biometric measurements, which
helps in improving the matching performance.
While we could use a conventional ECC decoder at the output of the hashing layer, such
a decoder is only suitable when the codewords are corrupted by Gaussian noise. Generally,
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the distortion in biometric measurements may not necessarily be characterized by Gaussian
noise. For this reason, we need to be able to train our ECC decoder to be optimized for
biometric measurements.
Recent research in the field of ECC has focused on designing a neural network architecture
as an ECC decoder [43, 45]. We can adapt such a neural network based ECC decoder, train
it, and use it as an ancillary component to refine the intermediate binary codes generated by
hashing layer in the DH component. The advantage of using NND instead of a conventional
decoder is that it allows for a common architectural framework to be used for both the
hashing framework (i.e., the DH) and the decoder, and it provides an opportunity to jointly
learn and optimize with respect to biometric datasets, which are not necessarily characterized
simply by Gaussian noise as is assumed by conventional decoders. For our application, we
have chosen the NND described in [43] as the basis for our neural network ECC decoder
to be integrated with the DH component. Due to space limitations, we do not provide full
details on the operation of NND, as details can be found in the original paper. Rather, we
focus our discussion on how the NND decoder is integrated with our architecture and also
discuss the differences in training the NND relative to [43].

2.2.3

Enrollment and Authentication

During enrollment, the facial image of the user is captured, resized and is given as input
(xi ) to the trained DH network as shown in Fig. 2.1. The intermediate binary code vi (H) for
the user is generated at the output of the hashing layer of the DH network. This intermediate
binary code is fed through a trained NND network and the final binary code ci for a given
user is generated by simple thresholding of the output of NND at 0.5. The final binary code
is cryptographically hashed using SHA3-512 to create the enrollment face template Te to
be stored in the database. The final binary code is not provided to the user or stored in
an unprotected form. Only the cryptographic hash of the final binary code is stored as a
template in the database. During the authentication phase, a new sample of the enrolled user
is fed through the DH network and the output of the hashing layer is fed through the NND
to get the final binary code cp for the probe. This final binary code is cryptographically
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hashed using SHA3-512 to generate the probe template Tp , which is compared with the
enrollment template Te in the matcher to generate a binary score of accept/reject nature.

2.3

Training of the Proposed Architecture

The architecture described in Sec. 2.2 is trained in three stages. In Stage 1, we use
a novel loss function to train and learn the parameters of the DH component to generate
intermediate binary codes at the output of the hashing layer; in Stage 2, the intermediate
binary codes from Stage 1 are passed through a conventional ECC decoder to generate the
ground truth, which will be used to fine-tune a NND; in Stage 3, the NND decoder is trained
using the ground truth from Stage 2 and this NND is then integrated with the DH component
followed by a joint optimization of the overall system.

2.3.1

Stage 1: Training the DH component

As discussed in the Sec. 2.2, the DH component consists of Face-CNN (Conv1-Conv5 +fc1 ),
hashing layer H and the output softmax layer. Before adding the hashing layer to the
DH component, the Face-CNN with the output softmax layer is trained with the CASIAWebface [71], which contains 494,414 facial images corresponding to 10,575 subjects. For
training the Face-CNN, all the raw facial images are first aligned in 2-D and cropped to a size
of 224 × 224 before passing through the network [72]. The only other pre-processing is subtracting the mean RGB value, computed on the training set, from each pixel. The training
is carried out by optimizing the multinomial logistic regression objective using mini-batch
gradient descent with momentum. The number of nodes in the fully connected layer fc1 before the softmax layer depends upon the size of the binary code K as we want to gradually
reduce the size of the feature vector from high dimensions to the required size of the binary
code K. Therefore, if K is 255, then the length of fc1 is 512, and if K is 1023, then the
length of fc1 is 2048.
After the training of Face-CNN, the hashing layer is added on top of the fc1 layer (i.e.
just before the output softmax layer) to form the DH component. The database used for
training the DH component have been discussed in detail in Sec. 2.4.1. For training the
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full DH component, we have used a novel objective function, which helps in reducing the
quantization loss and also maximize the entropy to generate optimal and discriminative
binary codes at the output of the hashing layer. The objective function used for training
the DH component is a combination of classification loss, quantization loss and entropy
maximization loss. The classification loss has been added into the DH network by using the
softmax layer as shown in Fig. 2.2. E1 (w) denotes the objective function required to fulfill
the classification task:
N
1 X
Li (f (xi , w), yi ) + λ||w||22 ,
E1 (w) =
N i=1

(2.1)

where the first term Li (.) is the classification loss for a training instance i and is described
below, N is the number of training images in a mini-batch. f (xi , w) is the predicted softmax
output of the network and is a function of the input training image xi and the weights of
the network w. The second term is the regularization function where λ governs the relative
importance of the regularization. Let the predicted softmax output f (xi , w) be denoted by
ŷi . The classification loss for the ith training instance is given as:
Li (ŷi , yi ) = −

M
X

yi,m ln ŷi,m ,

(2.2)

m=1

where yi,m and ŷi,m is the ground truth and the prediction result for the mth class (out of
total M classes) for the ith training instance, respectively and M is the number of output
units.
(H)

The output of the hashing layer is a K-dimensional vector denoted by vi , correspond(H)

ing to the i-th input image. The n-th element of this vector is denoted by vi,n (n =
(H)

1, 2, 3, · · · , K). The value of vi,n is in the range of [0, 1] because it has been activated
by the sign activation. To capture the quantization loss of thresholding at 0.5 and make the
codes closer to either 0 or 1, we add a constraint of binarization loss between the hashing
P
(H)
layer activations and 0.5, which is given by N
− 0.5e||2 , where N is the number of
i=1 ||vi
training images in a mini-batch and e is the K-dimensional vector with all elements equal
to 1. Let E2 (w) denote this constraint to boost the activations of the units in the hashing
layer to be closer to 0 or 1 and this constraint needs to be maximized in order to push the

Veeru Talreja

Chapter 2. Zero-Shot Face Template Protection

20

binary codes closer to 0 and 1:
E2 (w) = −

N
1 X (H)
||v − 0.5e||2 ,
K i=1 i

(2.3)

In the state-of-the-art face template protection methods [63, 64], pre-defined maximum entropy binary codes have been used as labels to train the deep CNNs. Maximum entropy an
important requirement for improving the discrimination as well as improving the security.
To include this requirement into our architecture, it is important that the binary codes at
the output of the hashing layer have equal number of 0’s and 1’s, which maximizes the binary
entropy of the discrete distribution and results in binary codes with better discrimination.
It provides more discrimination because the codewords are further apart in the Hamming
space from one another compared to other choices of codewords. Let E3 (w) denote the loss
function that forces the output of each node to have a 50% chance of being 0 or 1; E3 (w)
needs to be minimized to maximize the entropy:
E3 (w) =

N
X
(H)
(mean(vi ) − 0.5)2 .

(2.4)

i=1

The overall objective function to be minimized for a semantics-preserving efficient binary
codes is given as:
αE1 (w) + βE2 (w) + γE3 (w),

(2.5)

where α, β, and γ are the tuning parameters of each term.
The objective function given in (2.5) can be minimized by using stochastic gradient
descent (SGD) efficiently by dividing the training samples into batches.

2.3.2

Stage 2: Generating the Ground Truth for Training the Neural Network Decoder

As already mentioned, we have used the NND from [43] as our ECC component for added
security and also to make the system robust to variations in biometric measurements, which
would make the architecture applicable even for zero-shot enrollment. The NND in [43]
is optimized for a Gaussian noise channel and the database used for training the NND
reflects various channel output realizations when the zero codeword has been transmitted.
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However, for our proposed system, the NND needs to be optimized for use with biometric
data, where the channel noise is characterized by the image distortions (e.g., pose variations,
illumination variations and noise due to biometric capturing device) in different biometric
images of the same subject. We can create the input dataset for training the NND by using
the different facial images for the same subject. However, there is a major issue that needs
to be addressed for training the NND with the facial images, and that is we do not have the
labels or the ground truth codewords that these input images need to be mapped to. An
external conventional ECC decoder can be used to generate the ground truth codewords for
this input dataset of facial images.
After training DH network in Stage 1, a number of facial images of subjects disjoint from
the subjects used for training the DH network are used for generating the ground truth for
training the NND. First, we use the trained DH network to extract the binary vectors at
the output of the hashing layer (threshold the sigmoid activations at 0.5) for this disjoint
dataset. These extracted binary vectors are used as input to a conventional ECC decoder
for soft-decision decoding. Hard-limiting the output of the ECC decoder generates ground
truth codewords that are used as labels for optimizing the NND in Stage 3. While usually
all the binary vectors of a given subject are mapped by the decoder to the same codeword,
it is possible that the vectors could be mapped to different codewords. This is especially the
case when there are substantial differences in the variations of the facial images for a given
subject, or when the ECC code is not sufficiently strong. In the case that the input binary
vectors get mapped to a plurality of codewords, the most common of these codewords is used
as the ground truth for that subject.

2.3.3

Stage 3: Joint Optimization of Deep Hashing and Neural
Network Decoder

In Stage 3 of the training, first we train the NND using the same procedure and database
outlined in the original paper [43]. Next, the NND is fine-tuned for our facial biometric
data. For fine-tuning the NND, we use the same disjoint dataset that was used for the ECC
coventional decoder in Stage 2. Similar to Stage 2, the input to NND is given by the feature
vectors generated at the output of the hashing layer of the DH network and the labels are
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provided by the decoded codewords generated by the conventional ECC decoder in Stage 2.
We have used sigmoid activation for the last layer of NND so that the final network output is
in the range [0, 1]. As the network output layer is activated by sigmoid function, it generates
continuous output, which is probability that a particular output component is equal to 1.
Due to the continuous output activation function, we cannot use Hamming distance as a
loss function. Therefore, we train and fine-tune the NND using binary cross-entropy loss
function:

N
1 X
(yi log(oi ) + (1 − yi ) log(1 − oi )) ,
L(o, y) = −
N i=1

(2.6)

where oi , yi are the actual ith component of the NND output and ground truth codeword
(label), respectively.
After fine-tuning the NND, we integrate DH and NND by discarding the softmax layer in
the DH network and connecting the output of the hashing layer from DH as input to NND
to create an end-to-end face template protection architecture. This overall system is then
optimized end-to-end using the same dataset as used for fine-tuning NND and also the same
cross-entropy loss function given in (2.6).
Indeed a key benefit of using NND over conventional ECC decoding is that the NND
can be trained to force all the binary vectors of the same subject to be decoded to the
corresponding common codeword. This also helps for zero-shot enrollment, where, even for
the subjects not seen during training, the trained NND will generally compensate for the
biometric distortion by forcing the enrollment and probe biometric of a subject to decode to
a common codeword.

2.4
2.4.1

Implementation and Evaluation
Databases and Data Augmentation

We use the following databases for our training and testing of our proposed system.
The first 3 datasets have been used for a fair comparison with the state-of-the-art in face
template protection. The last dataset is used to test our system on a modern large scale face
recognition dataset:
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1. The CMU PIE [73] database consists of 41,368 images of 68 subjects. These images
have been taken under 13 different poses, 43 different illumination conditions, and 4 different
expressions. We use 5 poses (p05, p07, p09, p27, p29) and all illuminations variations for
our training and testing. We have used 50 subjects for training the DH network with the
hashing layer. Out of the remaining 18 subjects, 12 subjects have been used for training
the NND and fine-tuning the overall system end-to-end, and the remaining 6 subjects (1458
images) have been used for testing of zero shot enrollment. For one shot and multi-shot, the
train and test data split is consistent with [64] for the 50 subjects.
2. The extended Yale Face [74] database contains 2,432 images corresponding to 38
subjects with frontal pose and under different illumination conditions. We have used the
cropped version of the database as used in [63]. Out of the 38 subjects, we have used
22 subjects for training the DH network with the hashing layer. Out of the remaining 16
subjects, 10 subjects have been used for training the NND and fine-tuning the overall system
from end-to-end, and the remaining 6 subjects (400 images) have been used for testing of zero
shot enrollment. Again, for multi-shot enrollment, the train and test data split is consistent
with [63] for the 22 subjects.
3. For the CMU Multi-PIE [75] database, we have just used it to test the robustness of
our overall system to change in session and lighting conditions as in [63]. CMU Multi-PIE
database contains 750,000 images corresponding to 337 subjects under 4 different sessions,
15 view points and 19 illumination conditions. As in [63], we have used the session 3 and
session 4 with total of 198 common subjects. We have chosen session 3 for enrollment and
session 4 for testing. We have used 125 subjects for training the DH network with the
hashing layer. Out of the remaining 73 subjects, 53 subjects have been used for training
the NND and fine-tuning the overall system from end-to-end, and the remaining 20 subjects
have been used for testing of zero shot enrollment.
4. The WVU multimodal dataset1 was collected at West Virginia University in year 2012
and 2013. The data for the year 2013 and 2012 contain 61,300 and 70,100 facial images in
different poses corresponding to 1063 and 1200 subjects, respectively. There are 294 common
subjects in year 2012 and 2013 data. The unique 769 (1063-294) subjects from 2013 dataset
1

http://biic.wvu.edu

Veeru Talreja

Chapter 2. Zero-Shot Face Template Protection

24

are used for training the DH component. The remaining 294 common subjects from 2013
dataset are used for training the NND and fine-tuning the overall system from end-to-end.
For one shot, we randomly select one image per user for training and the rest are used for
testing. For multi-shot, 10 images are randomly chosen for training and the rest are used for
testing. A subset of 50 subjects of the unique 900 subjects from the 2012 dataset are used
for testing of zero shot enrollment.
In order to have sufficient data for training our deep learning algorithm, we use data
augmentation [76]. For each facial image, we apply horizontal flip, scaling to 60%, 70%, 80%,
and 90% to generate five augmented images [77,78]. For each augmented image of size m×m
we extract all possible crops of size n × n yielding a total of (m − n + 1) × (m − n + 1) crops.
Therefore, data augmentation yields a total of 5 × (m − n + 1) × (m − n + 1) images for each
face image. For our experiments, we have chosen value of m = 224 and n = 221.

2.4.2

Details of the Code and Decoder

The intermediate binary code generated at the output of hashing layer of the DH network
is considered to be the noisy codeword of some ECC that we can select and this noisy codeword can be decoded using the NND to generate the final hash code that is cryptographically
hashed and stored as template in the database. We have used a BCH code as an ECC for
our experiments. The size of the BCH code that we can use for NND depends upon the
size of the intermediate binary code that we want. For comparison with the state-of-the-art
methods in [63, 64], we have used 255 and 1023 as the size of the intermediate binary codes,
which is also the size of the final binary code used. The BCH codes that we have used for
NND are BCH(255,187), and BCH(1023,933). A code used for decoder is normally described
in terms of (N, k), where N signifies the codeword length (i.e. input to the decoder), and
k signifies the actual message size (output of decoder). Therefore in our case, if N = 255,
k = 187, and if N = 1023, k = 933. For the external ECC decoder, we have used the BCH
decoder from the communication toolbox in MATLAB® .
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Figure 2.3: ROC curves with One-Shot and Multi-Shot enrollment for different datasets for
K=255. GAR and FAR are reported in %.

2.4.3

Experimental Set Up and Results

We use the genuine accept rate (GAR) at different FAR as the evaluation metric and we
also report the equal error rate (EER). Since the train-test splits are randomly generated,
we report the mean and standard deviation of the results for 5 random splits.
As discussed in Sec. 2.2.3, authentication is based on binary accept/reject by comparing
the probe template Tp with the enrolled template Te . However, this is not an ideal scenario
for an experimental testing of biometric authentication system as we need a tunable metric
to adjust the FAR and FRR of the system. For this reason, we use several augmented images
(as described in Sec. 2.4.1) of each image presented for authentication, and Tp is calculated
for each augmented image, yielding a set of templates T . Therefore, as given in [63], the
final matching score can be defined by the number of templates Tp in T that match the
stored template Te , scaled by the cardinality of T . A threshold can then be applied to the
matching score to achieve a desired value of FAR/FRR.
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Table 2.1: Authentication results for different datasets.
Database

Enrollment Type
Zero-Shot

PIE

One-Shot
Multi-Shot
Zero-Shot

Yale

One-Shot
Multi-Shot
Zero-Shot

Multi-PIE

One-Shot
Multi-Shot
Zero-Shot

WVU Multimodal

One-Shot
Multi-Shot

K

GAR@0.01%FAR

EER

255

83.6 ± 2.1%

14.71 ± 0.83%

1023

82.8 ± 1.83%

14.89 ± 0.77%

255

96.2 ± 0.98%

0.99 ± 0.12%

1023

96.0 ± 1.12%

1.32 ± 0.40%

255

99.9 ± 0.06%

0.051 ± 0.022%

1023

99.0 ± 0.88%

0.078 ± 0.016%

255

87.4 ± 1.46%

12.5 ± 0.98%

1023

85.1 ± 1.98%

14.65 ± 1.23%

255

99.9 ± 0.03%

0.052 ± 0.023%

1023

99.1 ± 0.18%

0.072 ± 0.034%

255

99.98 ± 0.005%

0.049 ± 0.015%

1023

99.8 ± 0.09%

0.039 ± 0.012%

255

81.4 ± 2.32%

15.43 ± 1.08%

1023

81.2 ± 2.18%

16.69 ± 1.21%

255

98.7 ± 0.99%

0.263 ± 0.10%

1023

97.4 ± 0.94%

0.34 ± 0.13%

255

99.8 ± 0.17%

0.93 ± 0.11%

1023

98.5 ± 0.43%

1.14 ± 0.13%

255

88.7 ± 1.87%

10.32 ± 0.83%

1023

88.1 ± 1.68%

11.32 ± 0.92%

255

97.5 ± 0.98%

0.42 ± 0.14%

1023

97.23 ± 0.89%

0.51 ± 0.11%

255

99.7 ± 0.16%

0.11 ± 0.02%

1023

98.5 ± 0.57%

0.48 ± 0.10%

For our experiments, the mean and standard deviation of the EER, and the GAR at 0.01%
FAR for 5 different train-test splits, with zero-shot, one-shot, and multi-shot enrollment,
using binary code dimensions K = 255, 1023 have been reported in Table 2.1. With zeroshot enrollment, we achieve GARs up to ≈ 83% on CMU-PIE, ≈ 86% on Extended Yale,
≈ 81% on Multi-PIE, and ≈ 88% on Multi-PIE with up to K = 1023 at the strict operating
point of 0.01% FAR. We also get high GARs in the range of 98 − 99% for one shot and
multi-shot on all the datasets. It can be observed from the Table 2.1 that the results are
stable with respect to parameter K as there is not drastic change in GAR or the EER as K
changes from 255 to 1023. Therefore, this makes the parameter K totally selectable purely
on the basis of the required template security. The verification performance using receiver
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(b) Dictionary attack 2

(c) Dictionary attack 3

Figure 2.4: Genuine and impostor distribution of different dictionary attacks for K=255.
operating characteristic (ROC) curves is also shown in Fig. 2.3 for all the datasets using
one-shot and multi-shot.
A comparison of our results with other face template protection algorithms on PIE
dataset is shown in Table 2.2. Our proposed method values are all shown in bold. For security
level, we compare our code dimensionality parameter K to the equivalent parameter in the
shown approaches. It can be noted that we get a better matching performance and a lower
EER when compared to the other face template protection schemes for both one-shot and
multi-shot enrollment. For one shot enrollment, we achieve 96.0%GAR@0.01%FAR for K =
1023, which is ≈ 4.5% improvement in matching performance compared to 91.34%GAR@0.1%FAR
reported in [64]( [64] does not report the GAR@0.01%FAR, however, our proposed system
still provides better matching performance at even lower FAR). Even with zero-shot enroll-
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Table 2.2: Performance comparison for PIE dataset
Method

Enrollment Type

K

GAR@FAR

EER

Hybrid Approach [79]

Multi-Shot

210

90.61%@1%FAR

6.81%

BDA [80]

Multi-Shot

76

96.38%@1%FAR

-

MEB Encoding [63]

Multi-Shot

256

93.22%@0%FAR

1.39%

1024

90.13%@0%FAR

1.14%

256

97.35%@0%FAR

0.15%

1024

96.53%@0%FAR

0.35%

256

91.91%@0.1%FAR

4.00%

1024

91.34%@0.1%FAR

3.60%

255

99.9%@0.01%FAR

0.051%

1023

99.0%@0.01%FAR

0.078%

255

96.2%@0.01%FAR

0.99%

1023

96.0%@0.01%FAR

1.32%

255

83.6%@0.01%FAR

14.71%

1023

82.8%@0.01%FAR

14.89%

Multi-Shot
Deep CNN [64]
One-Shot
Multi-Shot
Our Method

One-Shot
Zero-Shot

Table 2.3: EER comparison with other variations for WVU dataset for 1023 bits
Enrollment Type

Method
DH

−

DH + Decoder

DH + N N D(Our)

One-Shot

8.2%

1.83%

0.51%

Multi-Shot

6.61%

1.54%

0.48%

ment, we get good matching performance and a respectable EER.
In order to show the importance of NND, we have compared our complete architecture
“DH + N N D” with two variations of our proposed system:1)Using the deep hashing component with no NND, denoted as “DH − ”. 2)DH component with an external conventional
decoder, denoted as “DH + Decoder”. We tested these variations on WVU multimodal
dataset for one -shot and multi-shot enrollment for 1023 bits. The EER results are shown
in Table 2.3. We can observe DH + N N D gives the best result followed by DH + Decoder
and lastly DH − . We can see that using an external decoder improves the performance by
reducing the EER by about 5% and using the NND further reduces EER by 1.1%. The
advantage with NND over external conventional decoder is that it provides an opportunity
to jointly learn and optimize with respect to biometric datasets, which are not necessarily
characterized simply by Gaussian noise as is assumed by a conventional decoder.
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Security Analysis

This security analysis is based on a stolen template scenario as reported in [63]. Given
the template, the attacker’s goal is to extract biometric information of the user. However,
the template is generated using a cryptographic hash function SHA-3 512 of the binary
codes generated by the deep CNN (DH + NND). Morover, the binary codes generated are
neither stored nor provided to the user. Since the SHA-3 512 is a one-way transformation,
the attacker will not be able to extract any information about the binary codes from the
protected template. The only way the attacker can get the codes is by a brute force attack,
where the attacker would need to try all possible values of the code, hash each one and
compare them to the template.
There are two scenarios that need to be explored in the case of brute force attack. The
first scenario is when the attacker has no access to the CNN parameters and the second
scenario is when the attacker has access to the CNN parameters. In the scenario where the
attacker has no access to the CNN parameters, the search space for the brute force attack
would be 2K , i.e., the number of binary codes. In this scenario, it is very important that
the final binary code should posses high entropy. The objective function required to train
the DH component also includes a loss function for maximizing the entropy, which is shown
in (2.3). Therefore, the high entropy requirement is captured in the training of the DH
component. Additionally, to make the search space larger for a brute force attack, we use a
final binary code with a minimum dimensionality of K = 255. The brute force attack in this
scenario would be computationally infeasible because even with K = 255, the search space

(due to equal number of 0’s and 1’s).
would be the order of 255
128
Now, let’s analyze the scenario where the attacker has access to both the stolen face
protected template and also the CNN parameters. In this scenario, the attacker would try
to generate attacks in the input domain and exploit the FAR of the system. To exploit
the system FAR, the attacker would try a dictionary attack using large set of faces. In the
proposed method, it is not straightforward to analyze the reduction in the search space due
to the knowledge of the CNN parameters. However, measuring the minimal FAR of the
proposed method is a good indicator of the template security. To evaluate the template
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security, we have used the genuine and impostor distribution to measure the false accepts,
where all other users other than genuine are considered as impostors. The genuine and
impostor distributions for three types of dictionary attacks are shown in Fig. 2.4. The three
attacks are:(1) CMU-PIE as the genuine database and Ext Yale as the attacker database.
(2) Ext Yale as a genuine database and frontal images of Multi-PIE as attacker database (3)
Multi-PIE as the genuine database and Ext Yale as the attacker database. It can be seen
that the impostor scores are always zero and genuines tend to one, indicating there are no
false accepts in this scenario and the proposed method does not easily accept external faces
for enrolled faces even if they are preprocessed under same conditions.

2.6

Summary

In this chapter, we presented an algorithm that uses a combination of deep hashing and
neural network based error correction to be implemented for face template protection. The
novelty of this algorithm is that it can even be used for zero-shot enrollment, where the
subject has not been seen during training of the deep CNN and still can be enrolled. Additionally, we show a matching performance improvement of ≈ 4.5% for one-shot enrollment
and ≈ 3% for multi-shot enrollment when compared to related work, while providing high
template security.
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Chapter 3
Multibiometric Secure System Based
on Deep Learning
When compared to unimodal systems, multimodal biometric systems have several advantages, including lower error rate, higher accuracy, and larger population coverage. However,
multimodal systems have an increased demand for integrity and privacy because they must
store multiple biometric traits associated with each user. In this chapter, we present a deep
learning framework for feature-level fusion that generates a secure multimodal template from
each user’s multiple biometrics. We integrate a deep hashing (binarization) technique into
the fusion architecture to generate a robust binary multimodal shared latent representation.
Further, we employ a hybrid secure architecture by combining cancelable biometrics with
secure sketch techniques and integrate it with a deep hashing framework, which makes it
computationally prohibitive to forge a combination of multiple biometrics that passes the
authentication. The efficacy of the proposed approach is shown using a multimodal database
and it is observed that the matching performance is improved due to the fusion of multiple
biometrics.

3.1

Introduction

Multimodal biometric systems use a combination of different biometric traits such as face
and iris, or face and fingerprint. Multimodal systems are generally more resistant to spoofing
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attacks [3]. Moreover, multimodal systems can be made to be more universal than unimodal
systems, since the use of multiple modalities can compensate for missing modalities in a small
portion of the population. Multimodal systems also have an advantage of lower error rates
and higher accuracy when compared to unimodal systems [2]. Consequently, multimodal
systems have been deployed in many large scale biometric applications including the FBI’s
Next Generation Identification (NGI), the Department of Homeland Security’s US-VISIT,
and the Government of India’s Unique Identity (UID). However, Multimodal systems have
an increased demand for integrity and privacy because the system stores multiple biometric
traits of each user. Hence, multimodal template protection is the main focus of this chapter.
As already pointed out in Chapter 1, there are multiple issues when implementing a multimodal biometric secure system. One issue is compatibility of feature level representations
between multiple biometrics and the template protection scheme. Another issue is related
to the quantization error when binarizing using thresholding for feature vectors. These
both issues could be addressed by using deep hashing methods for developing a multimodal
biometric secure system
Inspired by the recent success of deep hashing methods, the objective of this chapter is
to examine the feasibility of integrating deep hashing with a secure architecture to generate
a secure multimodal template.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The deep hashing secure multibiometric
framework and the associated algorithms are introduced in Section 3.2. Implementation
details of the proposed framework are presented in Section 3.3. In Section 3.4, we present
a performance evaluation of the cancelable biometric module, which is a part of the overall
proposed secure multimodal system. The performance evaluation of the overall proposed
secure multimodal system is discussed in Section 3.5. The conclusions are summarized in
Section 3.6.
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Figure 3.1: Block diagram of the proposed system.

3.2
3.2.1

Proposed Secure Multibiometric System
System Overview

In this section, we present a system overview including descriptions of the enrollment and
authentication procedures. We propose a feature-level fusion and hashing framework for the
secure multibiometric system. The general framework for the proposed secure multibiometric
system is shown in Fig. 3.1. During enrollment, the user provides their biometrics (e.g., face
and iris) as an input to the deep feature extraction and binarization (DFB) block. The
output of the DFB block is an J-dimensional binarized joint feature vector e. A random
selection of feature components (bits) from the binarized joint feature vector e is performed.
The number of random components that are selected from the binarized joint feature vector
e is G. The indices of these randomly selected G components forms the enrollment key ke ,
which is given to the user. The cancelable multimodal template re is formed by selecting
the values from the binarized joint feature vector e at the corresponding location or indices
as specified by the user-specific key ke .
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This random selection of G components from the binarized joint feature vector e helps
in achieving revocability, because if a key is compromised, a new key can be issued with a
different set of random indices. In the next step, re is passed through a FEC decoder to
generate the multimodal sketch se . The cryptographic hash of this sketch fhash (se ) is stored
as a secure multimodal template in the database.
During authentication, the probe user presents the biometrics and the key kp where kp
could be same as the enrollment key ke in the case of a genuine probe or it could be a
synthesized key in case of an impostor probe. Using the biometrics, the probe biometrics are
passed through the DFB block to obtain a binary vector p, which is the joint feature vector
corresponding to the probe. Using the key kp provided by the user, the multimodal probe
template rp is generated by selecting the values from p at the locations given by the key
kp . In the next step, rp is passed through a FEC decoder with the same code used during
enrollment to generate the probe multimodal sketch sp . If the cryptographic hash of the
enrolled sketch fhash (se ) matches the cryptographic hash of the probe sketch fhash (sp ), then
the access is granted. If the hash codes do not match, then access is denied.
The proposed secure multibiometric system consists of two basic modules: cancelable
template module (CTM) and secure sketch template module (SSTM), which are described
more fully in the following subsections.

3.2.2

Cancelable Template Module

The CTM consists of two blocks: DFB block and random-bit selection block. The
primary function of the CTM is to perform non-linear feature extraction, fusion, and binarization using the proposed DFB architecture shown in Figs. 3.2 and 3.3. The DFB consists
of two layers: domain-specific layer (DSL) and joint representation layer (JRL).
Domain-Specific Layer
The DSL consists of a CNN for encoding the face (“Face-CNN”) and a CNN for encoding
the iris (“Iris-CNN”). For each CNN, we use VGG-19 [22] pre-trained on ImageNet [81]
as a starting point and then fine-tune it with an additional fully connected layer fc3 as
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Figure 3.2: Proposed deep feature extraction and binarization (DFB) model for the FCA.
described in Sec. 3.3.2 and 3.3.3. There are multiple reasons for using VGG-19 pre-trained
on the ImageNet dataset for encoding the face and iris. In the proposed method, the VGG19 is only used as feature-extractor for face and iris modalities. It can be seen from the
previous literature [82–87] that the features provided by a VGG-19 pre-trained on ImageNet
and fine-tuned on face/iris images are very discriminative and therefore can be used for
face/iris recognition. Moreover, starting with a well-known architecture and using the same
architecture for both modalities makes the work highly reproducible.
Joint Representation Layer
The output feature vectors of the Face-CNN and Iris-CNN are fused and binarized in the
JRL, which is split into two sub-layers: fusion layer and hashing layer. The main function
of the fusion layer is to fuse the individual face and iris representations from domain-specific
layers into a shared multimodal feature embedding. The hashing layer binarizes the shared
multimodal feature representation that is generated by the fusion layer.
Fusion layer: We have implemented two different architectures for the fusion layer: (1)
FCA, and (2) BLA. These two architectures differ in the way the face and iris feature vectors
are fused together to generate the joint feature vector.
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Figure 3.3: Proposed deep feature extraction and binarization (DFB) model for the bilinear
architecture (BLA).
In the FCA shown in Fig. 3.2, the outputs of the Face-CNN and Iris-CNN are concatenated vertically using a concatenation layer. The concatenated feature vector is passed
through a fully connected layer (hereon known as joint fully connected layer ) which reduces
the feature dimensionality (i.e., the number of dimensions is reduced) and also fuses the iris
and face features. In the FCA, the concatenation layer and the joint fully connected layer
together constitute the fusion layer.
In the BLA shown in Fig. 3.3, the outputs of the Face-CNN and Iris-CNN are combined
using the matrix outer product; i.e., the bilinear feature combination of column face feature
vector fface and column iris feature vector firis is given by fface fTiris . Similar to the FCA, the
bilinear feature vector is also passed through a joint fully connected layer. In the BLA, the
outer product layer and the joint fully connected layer together constitute the fusion layer.
In addition to the two techniques (FCA, BLA) used in this chapter, there could be other
fusion techniques for combining multiple modalities [88]. The rationale behind implementing
FCA is that we wanted to use a fusion technique that involves just simple concatenation
where there is no interaction between the two modalities being fused before the joint fully
connected layer (Joint fc ). As evident from Fig. 3.2, the iris and face extracted features do
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not interact with each other and have their own network parameters before passing through
the joint fully connected layer. On the other hand, we also wanted to test a fusion technique
that involves high interactions between the two modalities feature vectors at every element
before being passed through the joint fully connected layer. That is the reason we have
used BLA, which is based on bilinear fusion [89]. Bilinear fusion exploits the higher-level
dependencies of the modalities being combined by considering the pairwise multiplicative
interactions between the modalities at each feature element (i.e., matrix outer product of
modalities feature vector). Moreover, bilinear fusion is widely being used in many CNN
applications such as fine-grained visual recognition and video action recognition [88, 89].
Hashing layer: The output of the fusion layer produces a J-dimensional shared multimodal feature vector of real values. We can directly binarize the output of the fusion layer
by thresholding at any numerical value or thresholding at the population mean. However,
this kind of thresholding leads to a quantization loss, which results in sub-optimal binary
codes. To account for this quantization loss, we have included another latent layer after the
fusion layer, which is known as the hashing layer (shown in orange in Fig. 3.2 and 3.3).
The main function of the hashing layer is to binarize (hash) the shared multimodal feature
representation generated by the fusion layer.
One key challenge of implementing deep learning to hash end-to-end is converting deep
continuous representations, which are real-valued and continuous, to exactly binary codes.
The sign activation function h = sgn(z) can be used by the hashing layer to generate the
binary hash codes. However, the use of the non-smooth sign-activation function makes
standard back-propagation impracticable as the gradient of the sign function is zero for all
non zero inputs. The problem of zero gradient at the hashing layer due to a non-smooth
sign activation can be diminished by using the idea of continuation methods [66].
We circumvent the zero-gradient problem by starting with a smooth activation function
y = tanh(βx) and making it sharper by increasing the bandwidth β as the training proceeds.
We have utilized a key relationship between the sign activation function and the scaled tanh
function using limits:
lim tanh(βx) = sgn(x),

β→∞

(3.1)
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where β > 0 is a scaling parameter. The scaled function tanh(βx) will become sharper and
more saturated as we increase β during training. Eventually, this non-smooth tanh function
with β → ∞ converges to the original, difficult to optimize, sign activation function. For
training the network, we start with a tanh(βx) activation for the hashing layer with β = 1
and continue training until the network converges to zero loss. We then increase the value
of β while holding other training parameters equal to the previously converged network
parameters, and start retraining the network for convergence. This process is repeated
several times by increasing the bandwidth of the tanh activation as β → ∞ until the hashing
layer can generate binary codes.
In addition to using this continuation method for training the network, we have used
additional cost functions for efficient binary codes. The overall objection function used for
training the deep hashing network is discussed in Sec. 3.3.1
Random-Bit Selection
One of the most prevalent methods for generating cancelable template involves random
projections of the biometric feature vector [12], in which the random projection is a revocable
transformation. Similarly, the DFB architecture is considered to be the projection of the
biometric images in a J-dimensional space. The randomness and revocability is added by
performing a random bit selection of G bits from the J-dimensional output vector e of
the DFB. After the selection, these random bits are then arranged in descending order of
reliability. The reliability of each bit is computed as ((1 − peg )pei ), where pei and peg are the
impostor and genuine bit error probabilities, respectively [2]. A different set of random bits
is selected for every user and these randomly selected G bits form the cancelable multimodal
template re and the indices of the selected bits forms the key for that user ke . This key is
revocable and a new set of random bits can be selected in case the key gets compromised.
Selecting a new set of bits requires that either the original vector e be retrieved from a
secure location or else the user is re-enrolled, thereby presenting a new instance of e. This
method of using the DFB architecture with a random bit selection is analogous to a random
projection as a revocable transformation to generate a cancelable template [12].
It is important to note that even if multiple users end up having the same key ke (i.e.,
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the same set of G random bits), their final templates will still be distinct because the final
template depends on the values at those G bits (i.e., re ) from the enrollment vector e, and
not only on the indices of the G bits. The situation when a second user happens to have the
same key ke is equivalent to the stolen key scenario, which is analyzed in Sec. 3.4.2.

3.2.3

Secure Sketch Template Module

As shown in Fig. 3.1, the cancelable template (output of CTM) re is an intermediate
template and is not stored in the database. The cancelable template is passed through the
SSTM to generate the secure multimodal template, which is stored in the database. As the
name suggests, the SSTM module is related to the secure sketch biometric template protection scheme. The SSTM contains two important blocks: FEC decoding and cryptographic
hashing. The main function of the SSTM is to generate a multimodal secure sketch by using
the cancelable template as an input to the FEC decoder. This multimodal secure sketch
(output of the FEC decoder) is cryptographically hashed to generate the secure multimodal
template, which is stored in the database.
The FEC decoding implemented in our framework is the equivalent of a secure-sketch
template protection scheme. In a secure-sketch scheme, sketch or helper data is generated
from the user’s biometrics and this sketch is stored in the access-control database. There are
many methods of implementing this secure sketch scheme. However, a common method is
to use error control coding. In this method error control coding is applied to the biometrics
or the feature vector to generate a sketch which is stored in the database. Similarly, in
our proposed framework, the FEC decoding is considered to be the error control coding
part required to generate the secure sketch. Our approach is different from other secure
sketch approaches using error correcting codes as we do not have to present any other side
information to the decoder like a syndrome or a saved message key [14].
The cancelable template re generated from the CTM is considered to be the noisy codeword of some error correcting code that we can select. This noisy codeword is decoded with
a FEC decoder and the output of the decoder is the multimodal secure sketch se that corresponds to the codeword closest to the cancelable template. This multimodal sketch se is
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cryptographically hashed to generate fhash (se ), which is stored in the database.
During authentication, the same process is performed. The probe user provides the
biometrics and the key which are used to generate the probe template rp . The probe template
rp is passed through an FEC decoder for the same error correcting code used during the
enrollment. The output of the FEC decoder is the probe multimodal sketch sp which is
cryptographically hashed and access is granted only if this hash matches the enrolled hash.
During authentication, if it is a genuine probe, the enrollment re and the probe vector rp
would usually decode to the same codeword in which case the hashes would match and access
would be granted.

3.3
3.3.1

Implementation
Objective Function for Training the Deep Hashing Network

In this section, the objective function used for training the deep hashing network is
described.
Semantics-preserving binary codes: In order to construct semantics-preserving binary codes, we propose to model the relationship between the labels and the binary codes.
Every input image is associated with a semantic label, which is derived from the hashing
layer’s binary-valued outputs, and the classification of each image is dependent on these binary outputs. Consequently, we can ensure that semantically similar images belonging to the
same subject are mapped to similar binary codes through an optimization of a loss function
defined on the classification error. The classification formulation has been incorporated into
the deep hashing framework by adding the softmax layer as shown in Fig. 3.2 and Fig. 3.3.
Let E1 denote the objective function required to fulfill the classification formulation:
N
1 X
Ln (f (xn , w), yn ) + λ||w||2 ,
E1 (w) =
N n=1

(3.2)

where the first term Ln (.) is the classification loss for a training instance n and is described
below, N is the number of training images in a mini-batch. f (xn , w) is the predicted softmax
output of the network and is a function of the input training image xn and the weights of
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the network w. The second term is the regularization function where λ governs the relative
importance of the regularization.
The choice of the loss function Ln (.) depends on the application itself. We use a classification loss function that uses softmax outputs by minimizing the cross-entropy error function.
Let the predicted softmax output f (xn , w) be denoted by ŷn . The classification loss for the
nth training instance is given as:
Ln (ŷn , yn ) = −

M
X

yn,m ln ŷn,m ,

(3.3)

m=1

where yn,m and ŷn,m is the ground truth and the prediction result for the mth unit of the nth
training instance, respectively and M is the number of output units.
Additional cost constraints for efficient binary codes: The continuation method
that has been described in 3.2.2 forces the activations of the hashing layer closer to -1 and
1. However, we need to include additional cost constraints to obtain more efficient binary
codes.
Let the J-dimensional vector output of the hashing layer be denoted by oH
n for the n-th
input image, and let the i-th element of this vector be denoted by oH
n,i (i = 1, 2, 3, · · · , J). The
value of oH
n,i is in the range of [−1, 1] because it has been activated by the tanh activation. To
make the codes closer to either -1 or 1, we add a constraint of maximizing the sum of squared
P
2
H
errors between the hashing layer activations and 0, which is given by N
n=1 ||on − 0|| , where
N is the number of training images in a mini-batch and 0 is the J-dimensional vector with
all elements equal to 0. However, this is equivalent to maximizing the square of the length of
P
PN
H
2
H 2
the vector formed by the hashing layer activations, that is N
n=1 ||on − 0|| =
n=1 ||on || .
Let E2 (w) denote this constraint to boost the activations of the units in the hashing layer
to be closer to -1 or 1:
E2 (w) = −

N
1X H 2
||o || .
J n=1 n

(3.4)

In addition to forcing the codes to become binarized, we also require that the codes satisfy
a balance property whereby they produce an equal number of -1’s and 1’s, which maximizes
the entropy of the discrete distribution and results in hash codes with better discrimination.
To achieve the balance property, we want each bit to fire 50% of the time by minimizing
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the sum of the squared error between the mean of the hashing layer activations and 0. This
P
PN
H
2
H 2
is given by N
n=1 (mean(on ) − 0) , which is equivalent to
n=1 (mean(on )) where mean(.)
computes the average of the elements of the vector. This criterion helps to obtain binary
codes with an equal number of -1’s and 1’s. Let E3 (w) denote this constraint that forces the
output of each node to have a 50% chance of being -1 or 1:
E3 (w) =

N
X

2
(mean(oH
n )) .

(3.5)

n=1

Combining the above two constraints (binarizing and balance property constraints) makes
oH
n close to a length J binary string with a 50% chance of each bit being -1 or 1.
Overall objective function: The overall objective function to be minimized for a
semantics-preserving efficient binary codes is given as:
αE1 (w) + βE2 (w) + γE3 (w),

(3.6)

where α, β, and γ are the tuning parameters of each term. The optimization to be performed
to minimize the overall objective function is given as:
w = arg min(αE1 (w) + βE2 (w) + γE3 (w))

(3.7)

w

The optimization given in (3.7) is the sum of the losses form and can be performed via the
stochastic gradient descent (SGD) efficiently by dividing the training samples into batches.
For training the JRL we adopt a two-step training procedure where we first train only the
JRL using the objective function in (3.6) greedily with softmax by freezing the Face-CNN
and Iris-CNN. After training the JRL, the entire model is fine-tuned end-to-end using the
same objective function with back-propagation at a relatively small learning rate.
For tuning the hyper-parameters α, β, and γ of the objective function (3.6), we have
utilized an iterative grid search. To start, consider a cubic grid with all possible values
for each parameter. Each point on this grid (α,β,γ) represents a combination of the three
hyper-parameters. Because exhaustively searching over all combinations is computationally
expensive, we adopted an iterative and adaptive grid search.
In the iterative and adaptive grid search, for each hyper-parameter, we considered the
set of values S = {1, 2i} for i = {1, ..., 15}; i.e., the set containing 1 and all positive even
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integers from 2 to 30. This grid search is performed iteratively, where each iteration is a
combination of 3 steps. In the first step, we fixed α, and γ to be 1 and β is chosen from the
set S. Therefore the set of points considered for this step is:
(α, β, γ) = (1, βi , 1), where βi ∈ S.

(3.8)

For each point in the above set (1, βi , 1), we trained our DFB network and calculated the
GAR for the overall system for a security of 104 bits using a 5-fold cross validation. Using
this method, we found the best value for hyper-parameter β that gave us the highest GAR
with the values of α and γ fixed as 1. This best value of β will be denoted as β t where the
superscript t signifies the iteration number.
In the second step, we repeated the same process with α and β fixed at 1 and choosing
γ from the set S:
(α, β, γ) = (1, 1, γi ), where γi ∈ S.

(3.9)

Again using a 5-fold cross validation, we found the best value for hyper-parameter γ, which
is denoted by γ 1 , that gave us the highest GAR with the values of α and β fixed as 1. In
the third step, the same procedure was performed by keeping β, and γ fixed at 1 and found
the best value for hyper-parameter α, which is denoted by α1 , from the set S. These three
steps together complete one iteration of the iterative grid search.
In the next iteration, we again performed the above 3 steps but instead of fixing the
values of the two parameters to 1, we fixed the value of the two parameters to be the best
value found in the previous iteration for those parameters. To explain this, consider the best
value of the 3 parameters found in the first iteration, denoted by α1 ,β 1 ,γ 1 . In the first step
of the second iteration, we fixed α, and γ to be α1 and γ 1 respectively and chose β from the
set S. Therefore the set of points considered for this step is:
(α, β, γ) = (α1 , βi , γ 1 ), where βi ∈ S.

(3.10)

Again, using a 5-fold cross validation, we found the best value for hyper-parameter β with
the other parameters set to α1 and γ 1 . This best value of β will be denoted as β 2 since this
is the second iteration. Similarly, we performed the second and third steps of the second
iteration to find the γ 2 and α2 respectively.
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We continued performing these iterations until the parameters converged, which implies
that the best value of each parameter did not change from one iteration to the other; i.e.,
αt = αt−1 , β t = β t−1 , γ t = γ t−1 .
Using the above procedure for hyperparameter tuning, we have found the values of αt ,
β t , and γ t to be 8, 2, 2 for FCA and 6, 4, 2 for BLA respectively. The importance of each
term will be further discussed in the ablation study in Section 3.5.4.

3.3.2

Network parameters for the Face-CNN

The network used for the Face-CNN is the VGG-19 with an added fully connected layer
fc3 (shown in Fig. 3.2). The Face-CNN is fine-tuned end-to-end with the CASIA-Webface
[71], which contains 494,414 facial images corresponding to 10,575 subjects. After finetuning with CASIA-Webface, the Face-CNN is next fine-tuned with the 2013 session of the
WVU-Multimodal face 2012-21013 dataset [90]. The WVU-Multimodal face dataset for the
year 2012 and 2013 together contain a total of 119,700 facial images corresponding to 2263
subjects with 294 common subjects. All the raw facial images are first aligned in 2-D and
reduced to a fixed size of 224 × 224 before passing through the network [72]. The only other
pre-processing is subtracting the mean RGB value, computed on the training set, from each
pixel. The training is carried out by optimizing the multinomial logistic regression objective
using mini-batch gradient descent with momentum. The batch size was set to 40, and the
momentum to 0.9. The training was regularized by weight decay (the L2 penalty multiplier
set to 0.0005) and dropout regularization for the first three fully-connected layers (dropout
ratio set to 0.5). We used batch normalization for fast convergence. The learning rate was
initially set to 0.1, and then decreased to 90% of its value every 10 epochs. The number of
nodes in the last fully connected layer fc3 before the softmax layer is 1024 for the FCA and
64 for the BLA. This implies that the feature vector that is extracted from the Face-CNN
and fused with the feature vector from Iris-CNN has 1024 dimensions for the FCA and 64
for the BLA.
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Network parameters for the Iris-CNN

The network used for the Iris-CNN is the VGG-19 with an added fully connected layer
fc3. First, the Iris-CNN has been fine-tuned end-to-end using the combination of CASIAIris-Thousand1 and ND-Iris-0405 [91] with about 84,000 iris images corresponding to 1355
subjects. Next, the Iris-CNN is fine-tuned using the 2013 session of the WVU-Multimodal
iris 2012-2013 dataset2 . The WVU-Multimodal iris dataset for the year 2012 and 2013
together contain a total of 257,800 iris images corresponding to 2263 subjects with 294
common subjects. All the raw iris images are segmented and normalized to a fixed size of
64 × 512 using Osiris (Open Source for IRIS) which is an open source iris recognition system
developed in the framework of the BioSecure project [92]. There is no other pre-processing
for the iris images. The other hyper-parameters are consistent with the fine-tuning of the
Face-CNN. As with the Face-CNN, the iris network has an output of 1024 for FCA and 64
for BLA.

3.3.4

Network parameters for the Joint Representation Layer

The details of the network parameters for the two JRL architectures are discussed in this
subsection:
Fully Concatenated Architecture
In the FCA, the 1024-dimensional outputs of the Face-CNN and Iris-CNN are concatenated vertically to give a 2048-dimensional vector. The concatenated feature vector is then
passed through a fully connected layer which reduces the feature dimensionality from 2048
to 1024 and also fuses the iris and face features. The hashing layer is also a fully connected
layer that outputs a 1024-dimensional vector and includes a tanh activation function.
For the training of the DFB model, we have used a two-step training procedure. First,
only the JRL was trained for 65 epochs on a batch size of 32. The learning rate was initially
set to 0.1, and then decreased to 90% of its value every 20 epochs. The other hyperparameters
1
2

http://biometrics.idealtest.org/
http://biic.wvu.edu
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are consistent with the fine-tuning of the Face-CNN. After training of the JRL, the entire
DFB model was fine-tuned end-to-end for 25 epochs on a batch size of 32. The learning rate
was initialized to 0.07 which is the final learning rate in the training process of the joint fully
connected layer in the first step. The learning rate was decreased to 90% of its value every
5 epochs. For this two-step training process, we have used the 2013 session of the overlap
subjects in the 2012 and 2013 sessions from the WVU-Multimodal dataset. This common
subset consists of 294 subjects with a total of 18700 face and 18700 iris images with the same
number of face and iris images per subject.
Bilinear architecture
For the BLA, we do not add fc3 (i.e., the additional fully connected layer) to either the
Face-CNN or the Iris-CNN. In addition, the number of nodes in the first and second fully
connected layers f c1 and f c2 are reduced to 512 and 64, respectively. This means that the
output feature vector of the face and iris networks have 64 dimensions rather than the 1024
dimensions of the FCA. The 64-dimensional outputs of the Face-CNN and Iris-CNN are
combined in the bilinear (outer product) layer using the matrix outer product as explained
in Sec. 3.2.2. The bilinear layer produces an output of dimension 64 × 64 = 4096 fusing the
iris and face features. The bilinear feature vector is then passed through a fully connected
layer, which reduces the feature dimension from 4096 to 1024 followed by a hashing layer
which produces a binary output of 1024 dimensions.
In the first step of the two-step training process, only the JRL was trained for 80 epochs
on a batch size of 32. The momentum was set to 0.9. The learning rate was initially set to
0.1, and then decreased by a factor of 0.1 every two epochs. The other hyperparameters and
the input image sizes are consistent with the training process used in FCA. After training
of the JRL, the entire DFB model was fine-tuned for 30 epochs on a batch size of 32. The
learning rate was initialized to 0.0015 which is the final learning rate in the training process
of the JRL in the first step. The learning rate was decreased by a factor of 0.1 every five
epochs. The other hyper-parameters are consistent with the training of the JRL in FCA.
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Parameters for the FEC Decoding

The cancelable template generated from the CTM is considered to be the noisy codeword
of some error correcting code that we can select. Due to its maximum distance seperable
(MDS) property, we have selected Reed-Solomon (RS) codes and used RS decoder for FEC
decoding in SSTM. The G-dimensional cancelable template is passed through a RS decoder
to identify the closest codeword, which is the multimodal secure sketch.
RS codes use symbols of length m bits. The input to the RS decoder is of length
N 0 = 2m−1 in symbols, which means the number of bits per input codeword to the decoder
is n0 = mN 0 . For example, if the symbol size m = 6 then N 0 = 63 is the codeword length in
symbols and n0 = 378 is the codeword length in bits. Let’s assume the size of the cancelable
template is G = 378 bits, which is the number of bits at the input to the RS decoder. This
378-dimensional vector is decoded to generate a secure sketch whose length is K 0 symbols or,
equivalently, k 0 = mK 0 bits. K 0 can be varied depending on the error correcting capability
required for the code and k 0 also signifies the security of the system in bits [49].
We have used shortened RS codes. A shortened RS code is one in which the codeword
length is less than 2m−1 symbols. In standard error control coding, the shortening of the RS
code is achieved by setting a number of data symbols to zero at the encoder, not transmitting
them, and then re-inserting them at the decoder. A shortened [N, K] RS code essentially
uses an [N 0 , K 0 ] encoder, where N 0 = 2m − 1, where m is the number of bits per symbol
(symbol size) and K 0 = K +(N 0 −N ). In our experiments we have used m = 8 and N 0 = 255.
In the case of using shortened RS codes, the size of the cancelable template is considered
equal to N symbols rather than N 0 symbols. For example, the output of the cancelable
template block could be 768 bits which equals to N = 768/8 = 96 symbols. The security
of the secure multimodal template depends on the selected value of K, implying that the
security of the system is k bits, where k = mK. The output of the decoder is a lengthk binary message, which is cryptographically hashed and stored as the secure multimodal
template in the database. When a query is presented for authentication, the system approves
the authentication only if the cryptographic hashes of the query matches with the specific
enrolled identity.
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Experimental Results for the cancelable multimodal
template

We have evaluated the matching performance and the security of our proposed secure
multibiometric system using the WVU multimodal database [90] containing images for face
and iris modalities. Note that all the experiments have been performed with optimized
hyper-parameters. We have used {α, β, γ} as {8, 2, 2} for FCA and {6, 4, 2} for BLA,
respectively.
In this section, we analyze the cancelable multimodal template, which is the output of
the CTM. Analyzing the output of the CTM helps us to gain insight into the requirements
and the strength of the error correcting code to be used in the SSTM. In the next section, we
analyze the secure multimodal template, which is the output of the overall secure multimodal
system.

3.4.1

Evaluation Protocol

For the cancelable multimodal template, EER has been used as one of the metrics to
evaluate the matching performance for various levels of random bit selection (values of G).
EER indicates a value that the proportion of false acceptances is equal to the proportion
of false rejections. The lower the equal error rate value, the higher the accuracy of the
biometric system. We have also used the genuine and impostor distribution curves along
with the ROC curves to evaluate the matching performance of the cancelable template.

3.4.2

Performance Evaluation

After fine-tuning the entire DFB, we test this network by extracting features using
the JRL of the DFB. In both the FCA and BLA architectures, the output is a 1024dimensional joint binarized feature vector. For testing, we have used 50 subjects from the
WVU-Multimodal 2012 dataset. The training and testing set are completely disjoint which
means these 50 subjects have never been used in the training set. 20 face and 20 iris images
are chosen randomly for each of these 50 subjects. This will give us 20 pairs (face and iris)
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per subject with no repetitions. These 1,000 pairs (50 × 20) are forward passed through
the DFB and 1024-dimensional 1,000 fused feature vectors are extracted. A user-specific
random-bit selection is performed using the fused feature vector to generate the cancelable
multimodal template. The number of randomly selected bits G that we have used in our
experiments is equal to 128, 256, 512, 768 bits out of the 1024 dimensional binary fused
vector to generate the cancelable multimodal template.
In this section, we present the results for the statistical analysis of the cancelable multimodal template. We have used two different architectures (FCA and BLA) for fusing the
face and iris features. The performance evaluation for each architecture is also discussed
here.
Two scenarios have been considered for the evaluation of the secure templates. One is
the unknown key scenario. In this scenario, the impostor does not have access to the key
of the legitimate user. The impostor tries to break into the system by posing as a genuine
user by presenting an artificially synthesized key (which is different from the actual key of
the genuine user) and also presenting impostor biometrics. This means that the impostor
will try to present random indices for our random-bit selection method in the CTM. These
random indices are different from the actual indices that were selected during the enrolment
for the legitimate user. The other scenario is the stolen key scenario. In this scenario the
impostor has access to the actual key of the genuine user and tries to break the system by
presenting actual key but with an impostor biometrics.
The genuine and impostor distributions for the cancelable template for FCA in the unknown key and stolen key scenarios generated by varying the number of random bits selected
by the CTM is given in Fig. 3.4. The genuine and impostor distributions shown in Fig. 3.4
have been generated by fitting a normal distribution curve to the histogram. We first observe
that there is no overlap between the inter-user (impostor) and intra-user (genuine) distributions. These distributions assume that every user employs his own key. Also plotted is
an attacker (stolen key) distribution in which a user (attacker) decides to use the key of another user (victim). In this case, the attacker distribution slightly overlaps with the genuine
distribution, but the overlap between the two is still reasonably small. In addition, we also
observe that as the number of random bits selected grows from 256 to 768, the overlap be-
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Figure 3.4: Genuine and impostor distribution of cancelable template distances using FCA
for varying number of random bits.
tween the genuine and impostor distributions reduces in both the scenarios. However, when
all the 1024 bits are used, the overlap again is increased. This clearly shows the trade-off
between the security (selection of ’G’ random bits) and the matching performance (overlap
of the distributions). Notice that there is no “stolen key” curve in Fig. 3.4(c) as all the 1024
bits are used and there is no down-selection of bits, and hence, no key.
The EER plots for FCA and BLA are given in Fig. 3.5 and Fig. 3.6, respectively. EER
plot is obtained by calculating the value of EER by varying the length of the cancelable
template (number of randomly selected bits). In general, it can be observed from the EER
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Figure 3.5: EER curves for face, iris, joint-FCA modalities in unknown key (dashed lines)
and stolen key (solid lines) scenarios using different sizes of cancelable template.
plots that there is an increase in performance by using additional biometric features and
the multimodality (joint) template performs better than the individual modalities (face and
iris).
As seen from the curves, the EER for the joint modality is lower than the EER for face
or iris. For example, the EER for joint modality using FCA and BLA at 512 bits for stolen
key scenario is 1.45% and 1.99%, respectively. Using the same settings, the EER for face
and iris is 2.6% and 7.4%, respectively. This clearly shows that there is an improvement by
fusing multiple modalities.
The ROC curves for both the architectures have been compared in Fig. 3.7 and 3.8
for unknown and stolen key scenarios, respectively, when the number of randomly selected
values (security) is 768 bits. Again, we can clearly observe that the joint modality performs
better than the individual modality. For a FAR of 0.5%, the GAR for stolen key scenario
using FCA and BLA is 98.25% and 96.33%, respectively. For face and iris, the GAR is 90.8%
and 62.5%, respectively at an FAR of 0.5%.
As observed from the plots, the matching performance is not compromised for high
security and the multimodality gives us better performance than unimodality.
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Figure 3.6: EER curves for face, iris, and joint-BLA modalities in unknown key (dashed
lines) and stolen key (solid lines) scenarios for different sizes of cancelable template.

3.5

Experimental Results for the Overall System

In this section, we analyze the performance at the output of the overall system, where
the output of the overall system is the secure multimodal template that is stored in the
database.

3.5.1

Evaluation Protocol

We evaluate the trade-off between the matching performance and the security of the proposed secure multimodal system using the curves that relate the GAR to the security in bits
(i.e., the G-S curves). The G-S curve is acquired by varying the error correcting capability of
the RS code used for FEC decoding in the SSTM. The error correcting capability of a code
signifies the number of bits (or symbols) that a given ECC can correct. The error correcting
capability of a RS code is given by

(N −K)
2

symbols or

(n−k)
2

bits. We vary the error correcting

capability of the code by using different code rates (K/N ).

Veeru Talreja

Chapter 3. Multibiometric Secure System Based on Deep Learning

53

100

GAR (Genuine Accept Rate)

99.9
99.8
99.7
99.6
99.5
99.4

Face
Iris
Joint-FCA
Joint-BLA

99.3
99.2
10 -5

10 -4

10 -3

10 -2

10 -1

10 0

10 1

10 2

FAR (False Accept Rate)

Figure 3.7: ROC curves for face, iris, joint-FCA, and joint-BLA modalities in unknown key
scenario for a random selection of 768 bits. The FAR and GAR are in %
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Figure 3.8: ROC curves for face, iris, joint-FCA, and joint-BLA modalities in stolen key
scenario for a random selection of 768 bits. The FAR and GAR are in %
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Performance Evaluation

As explained in Sec. 3.3.5, the output of the cancelable template block (n bits) is decoded
in order to generate a multimodal secure sketch of length k bits, where k also represents the
security of the proposed secure multibiometric system. This multimodal sketch is cryptographically hashed and stored as the secure multimodal template in the database. When a
query is presented for authentication, the system authenticates the user only if the cryptographic hash of the query matches that of the specific enrolled identity.
We have experimented with different values of N symbols with m = 8 and N 0 = 255
symbols using shortened RS codes. The G-S curves for different values of n bits (equivalent
to N symbols) for unknown and stolen key scenarios using FCA and BLA are given in Fig.
3.9 and Fig. 3.10, respectively. We can observe from the curves that as the size of the
cancelable template in bits (n) increases, the GAR for a given level of security in bits (k)
also increases.
Table 3.1: GARs of FCA and BLA in unknown and stolen key scenarios at a security level
of 56, 80 and 104 bits using different cancelable template size (N ).
N
(symbols)

32

64

96

n
(bits)

256

512

768

Security (K)
(symbols)

Security (k)
(bits)

(n−k)
2

7

56

10

FCA-GAR

BLA-GAR

Unknown

Stolen

Unknown

Stolen

100

82.30%

82.15%

82.25%

80.66%

80

88

31.32%

32.68%

36.67%

35.92%

13

104

76

4.3%

4.33%

6.77%

6.07%

7

56

228

99.65%

99.68%

98.95%

99.77%

10

80

216

97.85%

94.95%

94.63%

94%

13

104

204

84.63%

82.05%

84.41%

85.15%

7

56

356

99.93%

99.99%

99.55%

99.22%

10

80

344

99.37%

99.44%

99.04%

99.04%

13

104

332

98.95%

99.16%

96.51%

96.75%

For example at a security (k) of 104 bits (equivalent to K = 13 symbols) using FCA
with the stolen key scenario, the GAR for n=128, 256, 512, and 768 bits is equal to
0.62%, 4.33%, 82.05%, and 99.16%, respectively. Similarly for the unknown key scenario
and FCA, the GAR for n=128, 256, 512, and 768 bits is equal to 0.74%, 4.3%, 84.63%, and
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Figure 3.9: G-S curves using FCA in unknown key (dashed) and stolen key (solid) scenarios
for different values of n bits.
98.95%, respectively. It can be observed that the use of a larger cancelable template results
in better performance. This performance improvement can be attributed to the fact that an
increase in n at a fixed value of k (security) improves the error correcting capability of the
RS codes which is given by

(n−k)
2

and hence a better matching performance.

Table 3.1 summarizes the GAR for different values of n at security levels of 56, 80, and


(n−k)
104 bits using both FCA and BLA. The error correcting capabilities in bits
for the
2
RS codes at different security levels are also given in the table. From the Table 3.1, it can
be observed that for a given size of the cancelable template in bits (n), the error correcting
capability decreases with an increase in the required security levels in bits (k) of the system,
which results in a decrease in GAR. This implies that the code cannot correct the intra-class
variations at high code rates (k/n) (higher value of k), which results in a reduced GAR. This
is the trade-off between the matching performance (GAR) and the security (k) of the system.
We have chosen a minimum security level of 56 bits for comaprison in Table 3.1 which is
higher when compared to those reported in the literature [2].
The plot in Fig. 3.11 gives a comparison of G-S curves for face, iris, joint-FCA, and jointBLA modalities using m = 8, N 0 = 255 and n = 768 bits (equivalent to N = 96 symbols) for
unknown and stolen key scenario, respectively. The security for the iris modality in stolen
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Figure 3.10: G-S curves using BLA in unknown key (dashed) and stolen key (solid) scenarios
for different values of n bits.
key scenario at a GAR of 95% is 20 bits. However, by incorporating additional biometric
features (face), the security of the multibiometric system using FCA increases to 128 bits at
the same GAR.

3.5.3

Comparison with State-of-the-Art Hashing Techniques

As a further experiment, we compare the proposed hashing technique with other hashing
techniques. This is done by replacing our hashing method with two other hashing methods
[93] and [66], and then training and testing the multimodal authentication system using the
same WVU multimodal dataset. The rest of the system is kept the same for comparison
purposes. We have compared our hashing technique with supervised semantics-preserving
deep hashing (SSDH) [93], and HashNet [66] and evaluated the overall system to produce
G-S curves. We have used the FCA system for comparison. We denote the system with our
proposed hashing technique as “FCA”, use “FCA+SSDH” to denote the FCA architecture
with our hashing function replaced by the SSDH hashing, and use “FCA+HashNet” to
denote our FCA architecture with the HashNet hashing function. Fig. 3.12 shows G-S
curves for stolen key and unknown key scenarios. It can clearly be seen that our proposed
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Figure 3.11: G-S curves for face, iris, joint-FCA, and joint-BLA modalities in unknown key
(dashed lines) and stolen key (solid lines) scenarios for n = 768 bits.
hashing method performs better than the other two deep hashing techniques for the given
multimodal biometric security application. Compared to the other two hashing techniques,
our proposed method improves the GAR by at least 1.15% at a high security of 104 bits.

3.5.4

Ablation Study

The objective function defined in (3.6) contains 3 constraints, one for the semanticspreserving binary codes (i.e., for classification) and two constraints for efficient binary codes
(i.e., for binarization and entropy maximization). In this section, we study the relative
importance of each of these terms.
First, we measure the influence of the classification term E1 by setting α = 1, β = 0,
and γ = 0. Using this setting, we train our DFB model and evaluate the overall system by
calculating the GAR for a security of k = 56, 80, and 104 bits for n = 768 bits (similar to
Table 3.1) on the test data for the WVU-Multimodal 2012 dataset. We also study the effect
of the binarization constraint along with classification term by setting α = 1, β = 1, and
γ = 0, train our DFB model and again evaluate the overall system by calculating the GARs.
Finally, we set α = 1, β = 1, and γ = 1, and train the DFB model and evaluate the overall
system. We performed this experiment for both FCA and BLA architectures only for stolen
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Figure 3.12: G-S curves that compare the performance of the proposed hashing technique
with two other hashing techniques for FCA in unknown key (dashed lines) and stolen key
(solid lines) scenarios.
key scenario because we can see from Table 3.1 that unknown key and stolen key scenarios
give very similar results. The GAR results for this experiment are shown in Table 3.2.
It can be observed from Table 3.2 that the classification term E1 is the most important
term. However, adding the binarization and the entropy constraints E2 and E3 (i.e., α =
1, β = 1, γ = 1) definitely help to improve the matching performance (i.e., GAR) by at
least 1.25% at a high security of 104 bits in our proposed system. We also note that this
performance improvement is evident for both FCA and BLA architectures. Therefore, using
all the terms proves beneficial to improve the matching performance evident at higher level
of security for both FCA and BLA architectures.

3.5.5

Privacy Analysis

The objective of our work is to design a multimodal authentication system that maximizes
the matching performance while keeping the biometric data secure. However, the problem
is complicated by the possibility that the adversary may gain access to the enrollment key
ke , the multimodal secure sketch se , the enrollment feature vector e, or any combination
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Table 3.2: GARs of FCA and BLA in stolen key scenario showing the influence of each
term in the objective function.

Hyper-parameters

α = 1, β = 0, γ = 0

α = 1, β = 1, γ = 0

α = 1, β = 0, γ = 1

α = 1, β = 1, γ = 1

n
(bits)

768

768

768

768

Security (k)
(bits)

FCA-GAR

BLA-GAR

56

99.16%

98.71%

80

98.32%

96.87%

104

95.26%

93.29%

56

99.73%

98.76%

80

98.8%

97.14%

104

95.72%

94.72%

56

99.52%

98.70%

80

98.41%

97.02%

104

95.43%

93.98%

56

99.9%

99%

80

99.8%

97.6%

104

96.5%

95.6%

thereof. Using this information, the adversary could not only compromise the authentication
integrity of the system, but may also extract information about the biometric data. The
system should be robust in these scenarios and the system design should minimize the privacy
leakage, which is the leakage of the user biometric information from the compromised data,
and preserve authentication integrity of the system.
The G-S curves which have been discussed in Sec. 3.5.2 quantify the security of the
system. In this subsection, we will quantify the privacy leakage of the user’s biometric
information for our proposed system. The privacy of the user is compromised if the adversary
gains access to the enrollment feature vector e as we assume that the enrollment feature
vector can be de-convolved to recover the biometric data of the user. The information
leaked about the user’s enrollment feature vector e can be quantified in the form of mutual
information:
I(e; V) = H(e) − H(e|V),

(3.11)

where e represents the enrollment feature vector, and V represents the information that
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adversary has access to. V could be the enrollment key ke and/or the multimodal secure
sketch se . H(e) represents entropy of e and quantifies the number of bits required to specify
e. In particular, H(e) = J because the optimization described in Sec. 3.3.1 is designed to
ensure that the J bits in the encoded template are independent and equally likely to be 0
or 1. H(e|V) is the entropy of e given V and quantifies the remaining uncertainty about
e given knowledge of V. The mutual information I(e; V) is the reduction in uncertainty
about e given V [1].
Let’s first assume that the adversary gains access to the enrollment key ke . In this case
V = ke and mutual information is given as:
I(e; ke ) = H(e) − H(e|ke ) = 0,

(3.12)

because H(e|ke ) = H(e) = J as the key ke does not give any information about the
enrollment feature vector e. ke just gives the indices of the random values selected from e
but does not provide values at those indices.
The information leakage when the multimodal secure sketch se or the pair (ke , se ) is
compromised can be quantified using the conditional mutual information because se is dependent on re which is driven by ke . Hence, the information leakage when the secure sketch
is compromised is conditionally dependent on ke and is given as:
I(e; se |ke ) = H(e|ke ) − H(e|se , ke ),

(3.13)

where H(e|ke ) quantifies the remaining uncertainty about e given knowledge of ke and
H(e|se , ke ) quantifies the remaining uncertainty about e given knowledge of ke and se . This
conditional mutual information is measured under two scenarios discussed below.
Both se and ke are compromised: In this scenario the adversary gains access to
both se and ke . As previously discussed, H(e|ke ) = H(e) = J because knowing ke does
not provide any information about e. If the adversary knows se , the information leakage
of re due to se is equal to the length of se which is k bits. The adversary can use this
information of re with the additional knowledge of the enrollment key ke and exactly know
the indices and the values for the k bits in the enrollment vector e. However, there is still
uncertainity about the remaining J − k bits of the enrollment feature vector e, which implies
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H(e|se , ke ) = J − k. Therefore, the information leakage about enrollment feature vector
when both secure sketch and enrollment key are compromised is given as:
I(e; se |ke ) = H(e|ke ) − H(e|se , ke ) = J − (J − k) = k.

(3.14)

Only se is compromised: In this scenario the adversary gains access to only se . Even
in this case if the adversary knows se , the information leakage of re due to se is k bits.
However, the adversary does not have any information about the enrollment key ke which
means that there is added uncertainty in the information about the enrollment feature vector
e as the adversary does not know the exact locations of the k bits given by se . This added
uncertainity is measured by H(ke ) which is calculated using combinatorics and is given as:
 
J
H(ke ) = log2
,
(3.15)
n
where n is the size of the key and (3.15) provides all the combinations that n bits could be
selected from J. Therefore, the conditional mutual information is given as:
I(e; se |ke ) = H(e|ke ) − H(e|se , ke )

 
J
= J − J − k + log2
n
 
J
= k − log2
n

 
J
= max 0, k − log2
,
n

(3.16)

where the max function is applied in the last equation as information leakage cannot be
negative. We have evaluated (3.16) using different values of n and k for J = 1024 bits. We
know that n ranges from 1 to J depending on the number of random bits selected from
the enrollment feature vector e and k ranges from 1 to n depending on the rate of the error
correcting code. We found that information leakage is zero for all the values of k for n ranging
from 1 to 792 bits. However, if n is above 792, there is a positive information leakage when
value of k is taken above 780.
From (3.14) and (3.16), we can conclude that for J = 1024, the ideal value of n should
be less than 792 and ideal value of k should be small. This would make the information
leakage to be zero or small in case if se or the pair (se , ke ) gets compromised. These values
of n and k would also keep the matching performance high as shown in Fig. 3.11.
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Figure 3.13: Unlinkability analysis of the proposed system for FCA and BLA for different
quantities of security bits (104, 128).

3.5.6

Unlinkability Analysis

According to ISO/IEC International Standard 24745, transformed templates generated
from the same biometric references should not be linkable across applications or databases.
By using the protocol defined in [94], we have evaluated the unlinkability of the proposed
system. The protocol in [94] is based on mated (Hm ) and non-mated (Hnm ) samples distributions. Mated samples correspond to the templates extracted from the samples of the same
subject using different user-specific keys. Non-mated samples correspond to the templates extracted from the samples of different subjects using different keys. For an unlinkable system,
there must exist a significant overlap between mated and non-mated score distributions [94].
Using these distributions, two measures of unlinkability are specified: i) Local measure
D↔ (s) evaluates the linkability of the system for each specific linkage score s and is dependent
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upon the likelihood ratio between score distributions. D↔ (s) ∈ [0, 1] and is defined over
the entire score domain. D↔ (s) = 0 denotes full unlinkability, while D↔ (s) = 1 denotes
full linkability of two transformed templates at score s. All values of D↔ (s) between 0
sys
and 1 indicate an increasing degree of linkability. ii) Global measure D↔
provides an

overall measure of the linkability of the system independent of the score domain and is a
sys
∈ [0, 1], where
fairer benchmark for unlinkability comparison of two or more systems. D↔
sys
D↔
= 1 indicates full linkability for all the scores of the mated samples distribution and
sys
sys
D↔
= 1 indicates full unlinkability for the whole score domain. All values of D↔
between

0 and 1 indicates an increasing degree of linkability.
According to the benchmark protocol defined in [94], six transformed databases were
generated from WVU Multimodal face and iris test dataset by using different set of random
bits (enrollment key) in the CTM for each template of a subject. The linkage score we have
used is the Hamming distance between the se and sp . The mated samples distribution and
the non-mated samples distribution were computed across these six databases. These score
distributions are used to calculate local measure D↔ (s), which is further used to compute
sys
the global measure D↔
(overall linkability of the system). Fig. 3.13 shows unlinkability

curves when transformed templates are generated for joint-FCA, and joint-BLA modalities
using m = 8, N 0 = 255, and n = 768. We have tested with two quantities of security bits
k = 104 and k = 128 bits. With significant overlap, the overall linkability of the system is
sys
sys
close to zero for both joint-FCA (D↔
= 0.048) and joint-BLA (D↔
= 0.038). Based on

this discussion, the proposed system can be considered to be unlinkable.

3.6

Summary

We have presented a feature-level fusion and binarization framework using deep hashing
to design a multimodal template protection scheme that generates a single secure template
from each user’s multiple biometrics. We have employed a hybrid secure architecture combining the secure primitives of cancelable biometrics and secure-sketch and integrated it with
a deep hashing framework, which makes it computationally prohibitive to forge a combination of multiple biometrics that passes the authentication. We have also proposed two deep
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learning based fusion architectures, fully connected architecture and bilinear architecture that
could be used to combine more than two modalities. Moreover, we have analyzed the matching performance and the security of the proposed secure multibiometric system. Experiments
using the WVU multimodal dataset,, which contain face and iris modalities, demonstrate
that the matching performance does not deteriorate with the proposed protection scheme.
In fact, both the matching performance and the template security are improved when using
the proposed secure multimodal system.
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Chapter 4
Learning to Authenticate with Deep
Multibiometric Hashing and Neural
Network Decoding
In this chapter, we propose a novel MDHND architecture, which integrates a deep hashing
framework with a NND to create an effective multibiometric authentication system. The
MDHND consists of two separate modules: a MDH module, which is used for feature-level
fusion and binarization of multiple biometrics, and a NND module, which is used to refine
the intermediate binary codes generated by the MDH and compensate for the difference
between enrollment and probe biometrics (variations in pose, illumination, etc.)

4.1

Introduction

Multimodal biometric authentication systems use a combination of different biometric
traits such as face and iris, or face and fingerprint to authenticate the user. One of the
major challenges of multimodal systems is the selection of the fusion algorithm required to
combine the multiple modalities. The fusion of the modalities can be performed at sensor,
feature, score, or decision levels [3, 16, 49, 65, 95]. However, fusion-level authentication systems have better performance because they leverage the richer information available about
the biometric data in the feature-set [96]. Feature-level fusion involves combining of feature
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vectors that are obtained from multiple feature sources. Multibiometric systems can combine biometrics in many ways, including: (i) feature vectors obtained from different sensors
for the same biometric; (ii) feature vectors obtained from different entities for the same
biometric, such as combination of feature vectors obtained from left and right eyes; or (iii)
feature vectors obtained from multiple biometric traits, such as face and iris. Fusion at the
feature level is relatively difficult to achieve in practice due to incompatibility of feature sets
extracted from multiple modalities and because the relationship between different feature
spaces may be unknown [97]. To overcome this issue, we propose a feature-level fusion of
multiple biometrics using CNNs.
In this chapter, we have combined multiple modalities at feature-level using two different
CNN architectures. Similar work has been done in [98], however, the CNN features are highdimensional and real-valued, and usually require high computational cost [99]. In order to
reduce the computational complexity, in this chapter, we have also integrated a novel deep
hashing algorithm into a feature-level fusion CNN architecture to design a MDH network for
combining multiple modalities. Deep hashing is the application of deep learning to generate
compact binary vectors from raw image data [52, 53]. In addition to using deep hashing for
feature-level fusion, we have also used ECC as an additional component to compensate for the
difference in enrollment and probe biometrics (arising from variation in pose, illumination,
noise in biometric capture). Due to this difference, enrollment and probe biometrics lead to
different hash code at the output of the MDH network and therefore a failure to authenticate.
ECC can compensate for this difference by forcing the enrollment and probe biometric to
decode to the same message, then using that message for authentication, making the system
more robust to distortion in the biometric measurements, which helps in improving the
authentication performance.
Recent work has shown that the same kinds of neural network architectures used for
classification can also be used to decode ECC [100]. In this work, we integrate a NND [100]
into our deep hashing architecture as an ECC component to improve the authentication
performance. The NND is a formulation of the BP algorithm as a neural network. The input
to the NND can be considered to be a corrupted codeword of an ECC and this corrupted
codeword is within a certain distance of a correct codeword of an ECC. The corrupted
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codeword can be decoded using the NND to generate the correct codeword. It can be argued
that a conventional ECC decoder can be used instead of using a NND, however, implementing
the decoder as a neural network has the benefit of providing the same architecture as the
classifier (MDH network) that extracts the hashing code, and hence, it can be more efficiently
jointly optimized and implemented within a common framework. Another advantage with
NND is that it provides an opportunity to jointly learn and optimize with respect to biometric
datasets, which are not necessarily characterized simply by Gaussian noise as is assumed
by a conventional decoder. Motivated by this, in this chapter, we have integrated our
MDH network with NND and a joint optimization process to formulate our novel MDHND
framework for an end-to-end multimodal biometric authentication system.
To summarize the main contributions of this chapter include:
1. Conversion of the involved biometric traits into a common feature space by using
modality-specific CNNs.
2. Fusion and binarization of the individual modality features to generate a robust binary
latent shared representation.
3. Inclusion and optimization of the neural network based decoder to compensate for the
distortion in biometric measurements.
4. End-to-end joint optimization of the overall system.

4.2

Multimodal Deep Hashing Neural Decoder

In this section, we present a system overview of the MDHND shown in Fig. 4.1. MDHND
consists of two important modules: MDH module and NND module. We have considered
face and iris as the two modalities for this authentication system. However this system could
be used with other modalities and can be extended to more than two modalities.
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Multimodal Deep Hashing Module

The MDH module, which is shown in Fig. 4.2, consists of a DSL containing face and
iris CNNs and the JRL. The primary functions of the MDH module are the non-linear
feature-level fusion and binarization of the fused features.
The DSL of the MDH module consists of a CNN for encoding the face (“Face-CNN”)
and another CNN for encoding the iris (“Iris-CNN”). The output feature vectors of the face
and iris CNNs are fused and binarized in the JRL, which is split into two sub-layers: a fusion
layer and a hashing layer. The main function of the fusion layer is to fuse the individual
face and iris representations from domain-specific layers into a non-linear multimodal feature
embedding. The hashing layer binarizes the shared multimodal feature representation that
is generated by the fusion layer.
Fusion layer: We have implemented two different architectures for the fusion layer:
FCA and BLA. In the FCA, the outputs of the Face-CNN and Iris-CNN are concatenated
vertically in the concatenation layer and passed through a fully connected layer to fuse the
iris and face features. In FCA, the concatenation layer and the fully connected layer together
constitute the fusion layer. In the BLA (Fig. 4.2), the outputs of the Face-CNN and IrisCNN are combined using the matrix outer product of the face and iris feature vectors to
create bilinear feature vector. Similar to FCA, the bilinear feature vector is also passed
through a fully connected layer. In BLA, the outer product layer and the fully connected
layer together constitute the fusion layer.
Hashing layer: The output of the fusion layer is a shared multimodal feature vector of
unquantized values. The output of the fusion layer can be directly binarized by thresholding
at any numerical value or thresholding at the population mean. However, this kind of
thresholding leads to a quantization loss, which results in sub-optimal binary codes. To
account for this quantization loss, we have included another latent layer after the fusion
layer, which is known as the hashing layer (shown in orange in Fig. 4.2). The main function
of the hashing layer is to capture the quantization loss incurred while converting the shared
multimodal representation (output of fusion layer) into binary codes.
To generate the binary hash codes, we can directly use the sign activation function
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Figure 4.1: Block diagram of the proposed system. The NND is shown in the figure. The
MDH module is shown in Fig. 4.2
h = sgn(z) for the hashing layer. However, the use of the non-smooth sign-activation function
makes standard back-propagation impracticable as the gradient of the sign function is zero
for all non-zero inputs. We have used a continuation method to overcome this zero-gradient
problem by starting with a smooth activation function y = tanh(βx) and making it gradually
sharper by increasing the bandwidth β as the training proceeds. This continuation utilizes
the relationship between the sign activation function and the scaled tanh function:
lim tanh(βx) = sgn(x),

β→∞

(4.1)

where β > 0 is a scaling parameter. For training the network, we start with a tanh(βx)
activation for the hashing layer with β = 1 and continue training until the network converges
to zero loss. We then increase the value of β while holding other training parameters equal to
the previously converged network parameters, and start retraining the network. This process
is repeated several times by increasing the bandwidth of the tanh activation allowing β → ∞
until the hashing layer can generate an output very close to binary values. In addition to
using this continuation method, the overall objection function used for training the deep
hashing network is discussed in Sec. 4.3.1
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Figure 4.2: Proposed multimodal deep hashing (MDH) framework for the bilinear architecture (BLA).

4.2.2

Neural Network Decoder Module

The output of the MDH module after training can be binarized by directly using a sign
function. Henceforth, we will refer to the output of the MDH network as intermediate binary
code. Even though we still use a threshold of 0.5, the quantization loss is much lower and
authentication performance is improved when compared to values with no hashing layer.
However, there is still room to make the system more robust and improve the performance.
This is achieved by using ECC. There could be distortion in biometric measurements such
as variations in pose, illumination, or noise due to the biometric capturing device, which
leads to difference in enrollment and probe biometrics. Due to these differences, enrollment
and probe biometrics may lead to different hash codes at the output of the MDH network
and therefore a failure to authenticate. ECC can compensate for this difference by forcing
the enrollment and probe biometric to decode to the same message, then using that message
for authentication, making the system more robust to noise in the biometric measurements,
which helps in improving the authentication performance.
Recent research in the field of ECC has focused on designing a neural network architecture
as an ECC decoder [45,100]. We can adapt such a neural network based ECC decoder, train
it, and use it as an ancillary component to refine the intermediate binary codes generated
by MDH. The advantage of using NND instead of a conventional decoder is that it allows

Veeru Talreja

Chapter 4. Multimodal Deep Hashing Neural Decoder

71

for a common architectural framework to be used for both the classifier (i.e., the MDH) and
the decoder and it provides an opportunity to jointly learn and optimize with respect to
biometric datasets, which are not necessarily characterized simply by Gaussian noise as is
assumed by conventional decoders. For our application, we have chosen the NND described
in [100] as the basis for our neural network ECC decoder to be integrated with the MDH
network. Due to space limitations, we do not provide full details on the operation of NND,
details can be found in the original paper. Rather, we focus the discussion on the changes
in how the decoder is trained relative to [100].

4.3

Training Steps for Multimodal Deep Hashing Neural Decoder

The MDHND framework described in Sec. 4.2 is trained in 3 steps. In Step 1, we use
a novel loss function to train and learn the MDH parameters to generate binary shared
multimodal latent code; in Step 2, the latent binary codes from Step 1 are passed through
an ECC decoder to generate the ground truth, which will be used to fine-tune a NND; in
Step 3, the NND decoder is trained using the ground truth from Step 2 and this NND
is then integrated with the MDH network followed by a joint optimization of the overall
system MDHND. In this section, we discuss the 3 steps used during training of the proposed
MDHND system.

4.3.1

Step 1: Training of the Multimodal Deep Hashing Module

In this step, the MDH network is trained for feature-level fusion and binarization of the
multiple biometrics. For modality-specific CNNs, VGG-19 pre-trained on ImageNet dataset
is used as a starting point followed by fine-tuning the entire VGG-19 with additional fully
connected layer f c3. The Face-CNN is fine-tuned end-to-end with the CASIA-Webface [71],
which contains 494,414 facial images corresponding to 10,575 subjects. The Iris-CNN is finetuned end-to-end using the combination of the CASIA-Iris-Thousand1 and ND-Iris-0405 [91]
1

http://biometrics.idealtest.org/
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datasets with about 84,000 iris images corresponding to 1355 subjects.The Face-CNN and
Iris-CNN are also fine tuned on the 2013 face and iris subsets of the WVU-Multimodal
2012-2013 datasets2 respectively. The WVU-Multimodal dataset for the year 2012 and 2013
together contain a total of 119,700 facial images and 257,800 iris images corresponding to
2263 subjects with 294 common subjects. For fine-tuning the Face-CNN and Iris-CNN, we
have used 58,200 facial images and 121,200 iris images, respectively, corresponding to 1,060
subjects from the WVU-Multimodal 2012-2013 dataset. For fine-tuning the CNNs, we have
not used any of the common subjects from 2012-2013 WVU dataset, so that these common
subjects can be used for fine-tuning the NND and also for testing the overall system.
For the Face-CNN, all the raw facial images are first aligned in 2-D and cropped to a
size of 224 × 224 before passing through the network [72]. The only other pre-processing is
subtracting the mean RGB value, computed on the training set, from each pixel. The training
is carried out by optimizing the multinomial logistic regression objective using mini-batch
gradient descent with momentum. The number of nodes in the last fully connected layer fc3
before the softmax layer is 1,024 for the FCA and 64 for the BLA. This implies that the
feature vector that is extracted from the Face-CNN and fused with the feature vector from
Iris-CNN has 1,024 dimensions for the FCA and 64 for the BLA. For the iris-CNN, all the
raw iris images are segmented and normalized to a fixed size of 64 × 512 using Osiris (Open
Source for IRIS) which is an open source iris recognition system developed in the framework
of the BioSecure project [92]. As with the Face-CNN, the iris network has an output of 1,024
for FCA and 64 for BLA.
Next, we train the JRL, which is a combination of the fusion layer and the hashing
layer. For training the JRL we have used a novel objective function, which helps in reducing
the quantization loss and also maximize the entropy to generate optimal and discriminative
binary shared multimodal representation. For training the JRL, we adopt a two-step training
procedure where we first train only the JRL greedily by freezing the face and iris CNNs
followed by fine tuning the entire MDH module end-to-end using back-propagation at a
relatively small learning rate.
The objective function used for training the JRL is a combination of classification loss,
2
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quantization loss and entropy maximization loss. The classification loss has been added into
the MDH network by using the softmax layer as shown in Fig. 4.2. Let E1 (w) denote the
objective function required to fulfill the classification task:
N
1 X
Ln (f (xn , w), yn ) + λ||w||2 ,
E1 (w) =
N n=1

(4.2)

where the first term Ln (.) is the classification loss for a training instance n and is described
below, N is the number of training images in a mini-batch. f (xn , w) is the predicted softmax
output of the network and is a function of the input training image xn and the weights of
the network w. The second term is the regularization function where λ governs the relative
importance of the regularization. Let the predicted softmax output f (xn , w) be denoted by
ŷn . The classification loss for the nth training instance is given as:
Ln (ŷn , yn ) = −

M
X

yn,m ln ŷn,m ,

(4.3)

m=1

where yn,m and ŷn,m is the ground truth and the prediction result for the mth unit of the nth
training instance, respectively and M is the number of output units. In addition to using
classification loss and the continuation method described in Sec. 4.2.1, we add constraint of
quantization loss and entropy maximization to generate efficient binary codes at the output
of the MDH module. The output of the hashing layer is a J-dimensional vector denoted
by oH
n , corresponding to the n-th input image. The i-th element of this vector is denoted
H
by oH
n,i (i = 1, 2, 3, · · · , J). The value of on,i is in the range of [−1, 1] because it has been

activated by the tanh activation. To make the codes closer to either -1 or 1, we add a
constraint of quantization loss between the hashing layer activations and 0, which is given
P
H
2
by N
n=1 ||on − 0|| , where N is the number of training images in a mini-batch and 0 is the
J-dimensional vector with all elements equal to 0. Let E2 (w) denote this constraint to boost
the activations of the units in the hashing layer to be closer to -1 or 1:
N
N
1X H
1X H 2
2
E2 (w) = −
||o − 0|| = −
||o || .
J n=1 n
J n=1 n

(4.4)

In addition to forcing the codes to become binarized, we also require that the binary codes
have equal number of -1’s and 1’s, which maximizes the entropy of the discrete distribution
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and results in hash codes with better discrimination. Let E3 (w) denote this constraint that
forces the output of each node to have a 50% chance of being -1 or 1:
N
X
2
E3 (w) =
(mean(oH
n )) .

(4.5)

n=1

Therefore, the overall objective function that is required to be minimized to generate
discriminative efficient binary codes is given as:
αE1 (w) + βE2 (w) + γE3 (w),

(4.6)

where α, β, and γ are the tuning parameters of each term.

4.3.2

Step 2: Generating the Ground Truth for Training the Neural Network Decoder

In [100], the goal is to optimize the NND for a gaussian noise channel and the database
used reflects various channel output realizations when the zero codeword has been transmitted. However, for our proposed system, we want to optimize the NND to be used with
biometric data, where the channel noise for our database is characterized by the image distortions (e.g., pose variations, illumination variations and noise due to biometric capturing
device) in different biometric images of the same subject. We can create the input dataset for
training the NND by using the different facial and iris images for the same subject. However,
we do not have the labels or the ground truth codewords that these input images need to
be mapped to. An external conventional ECC decoder can be used to generate the ground
truth codewords for this input dataset.
After training the MDH network in Step 1, facial and iris image pairs for a different set
of subjects disjoint from the training dataset are used for generating the ground truth for
training the NND. We use the MDH network to extract the joint binary features for this
disjoint dataset. These extracted features are used as input to a conventional ECC decoder
for soft-decision decoding. Hard-limiting the output of the ECC decoder generates ground
truth codewords that are used as labels for optimizing the NND in Step 3.
For this step, we have used the facial and iris image pairs of 294 common subjects from the
2013 year of the WVU multimodal 2012-2013 dataset. This implies that we have extracted
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the features for all the face and iris image pairs of the 294 subjects using the MDH network
and decoded it using soft-decision decoding with an ECC decoder to generate the ground
truth to be used in Step 3. While usually all the joint feature vectors of a given subject
are mapped by the decoder to the same codeword, it is possible that the vectors could
be mapped to different codewords. This is especially the case when there are substantive
differences in the latent subspaces of the different face/image pairs for the subject or when
the ECC is not sufficiently strong. In the case that the feature vectors get mapped to a
plurality of codewords, the most common of these codewords is used as the ground truth for
that subject.

4.3.3

Step 3: Joint Optimization of the Multimodal Deep Hashing
Neural Decoder

In Step 3 of the training, first the NND is trained using the procedure and database
from the original paper [100]. In the next step, the NND is fine-tuned for our multibiometric
data. For fine-tuning the NND, we use the same database used for the ECC decoder in Step
2, where the input to NND is given by the feature vectors generated by the MDH network
and the labels are provided by the decoded codewords generated by the conventional ECC
decoder in Step 2. Using this database, the NND is fine-tuned for our joint biometric data.
We have used sigmoid activation for the last layer of NND. The sigmoid is added so that
the final network output is in the range [0, 1]. This makes it possible to train and fine-tune
the NND using cross-entropy loss function:
L(o, y) = −

N
1 X
yi log(oi ) + (1 − yi ) log(1 − oi ),
N i=1

(4.7)

where oi ,yi are the deep neural network output and the actual ith component of the ground
truth codeword (label), respectively.
After fine-tuning the NND, we integrate MDH and NND by discarding the softmax layer
in the MDH network and connecting the output of the hashing layer from MDH as input
to NND to create and end-to-end MDHND network. This MDHND is optimized end-toend using the same dataset as used for fine-tuning NND and also the same cross-entropy
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loss function given in (4.7). For fine-tuning the NND and end-to-end optimization of the
MDHND, we use the same 294 subjects from the 2013 year of the WVU multimodal dataset
used in Step 2. The total number of facial and iris images corresponding to the 294 subjects is
equal to 15,500 and 33, 200, respectively. We use the Adam optimizer [101] with the default
hyper-parameter values ( = 10−3 , β1 = 0.9, β2 = 0.999) to train all the parameters. The
batch size in all the experiments is fixed to 32. Our MDHND is implemented in TensorFlow
with python API and all the experiments are conducted on two GeForce GTX TITAN X
12GB GPUs.

4.4
4.4.1

Performance Evaluation
Details of the Code and Decoder

The intermediate binary code generated from the MDH module is considered to be the
noisy codeword of some error correcting code that we can select and this noisy codeword can
be decoded using the NND. We have used BCH code for our experiments. The size of the
intermediate binary codes, which is the output of the MDH network depends upon the size of
the error correcting code being used for the NND. We have experimented with a few different
sizes of the BCH code for NND including BCH(63,45), BCH(127,85), BCH(255,187), and
BCH(511,376). We have tried to keep the code rate to be around 0.7. For the external ECC
decoder, we have used the BCH decoder from the communication toolbox in MATLAB® .

4.4.2

Evaluation Protocol for Authentication

For evaluation of authentication performance, we use a disjoint dataset of 70 subjects,
which have never been seen during training with 20 facial and 20 iris images per subject
leading to a total of 1400 face and iris image pairs with no repetitions. For authentication,
all the 1400 pairs are forward passed through our proposed MDHND system and genuine
and impostor scores are calculated using Hamming distance as our score measure. Based on
the number of subjects (N = 70) and the number of image pairs (t = 20) per subject we
obtain N t(t − 1)/2 = 13, 300 genuine scores and (N (N − 1)t2 )/2 = 966, 000 imposter scores.
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We have used the ROC curve and the EER as our performance metric for authentication.
The ROC curve is plotted between the GAR and the FAR at all possible values of score
thresholds. EER indicates a value that the proportion of false acceptances is equal to the
proportion of false rejections.

4.4.3

Evaluation Protocol for Identification

We have also evaluated our system for identification application. The proposed system
can also be used for identification as long as the database of individuals is not too large
because if we make the ECC too strong, it may lead to ambiguity, where multiple users
are resolved to the same codeword and the system may not be too discriminative and may
not provide good performance. For identification performance, MDHND is trained on 294
mutual subjects from year 2013, and is tested on the same subjects from year 2012 of the
WVU multimodal dataset. The total number of image pairs in the test set for identification
is equal to 2940 corresponding to 294 subjects. For identification, the score can be calculated
against each of the 294 stored codes and the class yielding the best score can be identified
as the subject class. We have used the classification accuracy as our performance metric for
identification. The classification accuracy is defined as the ratio of the correct predictions
made to the the total number of predictions for a given testing set.

4.4.4

Baselines

We have compared our algorithms with some of the state-of-the-art score, decision, and
fusion-level algorithms. CNN-Sum is a score-level fusion algorithms, which use the probability outputs for the test sample of each modality, added together to give the final score
vector. CNN-Major is a decision-level fusion algorithm, which chooses the maximum number
of modalities taken to be from the correct class. The feature level fusion techniques include
serial feature fusion [102], parallel feature fusion [103], CCA-based feature fusion [104], and
discriminant correlation analysis (DCA/MDCA) [105] methods. For the serial, parallel and
CCA fusion techniques, we have used principal component analysis (PCA) [106] and linear
discriminant analysis (LDA) for dimensionality reduction followed by K-nearest neighbor
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(KNN) classifier [107]. To compare the results for the proposed system, with the state-ofthe-art algorithms, we extract Gabor features in five scales and eight orientations for face
and iris modalities. For each face, and iris image 31, 360, and 36, 630 features are extracted
respectively. These hand-crafted Gabor features are used only for serial, parallel, CCA and
DCA fusion techniques. For all the other algorithms being compared we have used CNN
features.
We have also compared our multibiometric system with single modality system denoted
as Iris-CNN and Face-CNN. As stated previously, we have implemented two different fusion architectures FCA and BLA in our MDH network. MDH-FCA/BLA denotes a standalone MDH network with feature level fusion using FCA/BLA and with no ECC decoder
of any kind being used. For such cases in comparison, when no error correcting code is
used, the length of the output feature vector is equal to the codeword length n of the
BCH(n,k) code. MDH-FCA+Ext.Decoder/MDH-BLA+Ext.Decoder denotes feature level
fusion using FCA/BLA in the MDH network integrated with an external conventional decoder. MDH-FCA+NND/MDH-FCA+NND denotes feature level fusion using FCA/BLA in
the MDH network integrated with a non optimized NND (NND is just trained as in [100]
with AWGN channel but not fine-tuned with biometric data) and also with no joint optimization. MDHND-FCA/MDHND-BLA denotes our proposed overall system with feature
level fusion using FCA/BLA in the MDH network integrated and jointly optimized with a
NND for biometric data.

4.4.5

Authentication Results

Table 4.1 shows a comparison of authentication performance for our proposed system with
other methods in terms of EER. As it can be seen that our proposed MDHND framework
outperforms single modality by at least 1.5%. It can be observed that there is an improvement
in performance by using additional biometric features and the multimodality system performs
better than the unimodal systems. We can also observe that there is an improvement in
performance when ECC decoding is used, and that this improvement improves when the
NND decoder is used. For example, for BCH(255,187) and the BLA architecture, the EER
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Table 4.1: EER for different algorithms using different BCH codes.
Algorithm

BCH(63,45)

BCH(127,85)

BCH(255,187)

BCH(511,376)

CNN-Sum

1.71%

1.64%

1.32%

1.29%

CNN-Major

2.11%

2.19%

1.61%

1.53%

Iris-CNN

2.74%

2.34%

2.10%

2.04%

Face-CNN

1.91%

1.72%

1.63%

1.58%

MDH-FCA

1.84%

1.67%

1.48%

1.43%

MDH-BLA

1.76%

1.66%

1.45%

1.42%

MDH-FCA+Ext.Decoder

1.73%

1.64%

1.41%

1.39%

MDH-BLA+Ext.Decoder

1.62%

1.58%

1.32%

1.28%

MDH-FCA+NND

1.39%

1.34%

1.30%

1.23%

MDH-BLA+NND

1.30%

1.26%

1.24%

1.19%

MDHND-FCA

1.05%

0.99%

0.90%

0.86%

MDHND-BLA

1.01%

0.94%

0.84%

0.79%

decreases from 1.45% without ECC decoding to 1.32% when a conventional decoder is used.
The EER further decreases to 1.24% when an unoptimized NND is used (i.e., trained on
AWGN) and to 0.84% when an optimized NND is used (i.e., trained on biometric data) for
a net improvement of about 0.5% relative to the conventional decoder.
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Figure 4.3: ROC curves for face, iris, MDHND-FCA, and MDHND-BLA modalities using
BCH(511,376). FAR and GAR are given in %.
Fig. 4.3 shows the comparison of ROC curves for unimodal and a multimodal system.
It is evident that the multimodal feature-level fusion using BLA integrated with NND and
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Figure 4.4: ROC curves for face, iris, MDHND-FCA, and MDHND-BLA modalities using
BCH(255,187) and BLA architecture. FAR and GAR are given in %.
joint optimization significantly improves unimodal representation accuracy by using a bilinear formulation for exploiting the captured multiplicative interactions of the low-dimensional
modality-dedicated feature representations. Fig. 4.4 shows the comparison of ROC curves
showing the improvement in performance by using an optimized NND (MDHND-BLA) relative to a non-optimized NND (MDH-BLA+NND) and an external decoder (MDH-BLA+Ext.
Decoder). It can clearly be seen that with a FAR of 0.01% we get an improvement in GAR
of about 1.3% by using an optimized NND relative to a conventional external decoder.
We have also evaluated the time/delay required to perform a single authentication. We
have measured the time for 1000 authentications using our trained MDHND-BLA with the
same hardware as described at the end of section 4.3.3 . Based on this evaluation, the total
time required for 1000 authentication is equal to 9.625 secs, which equals to an average of
9.625ms per authentication.

4.4.6

Identification Results

Table 4.2 shows a comparison of our proposed systems with different state of the art
fusion algorithms for identification task. It can clearly be seen that the performance of
our proposed systems (MDHND-FCA and MDHND-BLA shown in the last two rows) in
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Table 4.2: Classification accuracy using different BCH codes.
Algorithm

BCH(63,45)

BCH(127,85)

BCH(255,187)

BCH(511,376)

Serial + PCA + KNN

68.92%

70.47%

70.83%

71.12%

Serial + LDA + KNN

76.11%

78.00%

80.15%

80.52%

Parallel + PCA + KNN

71.2%

73.21%

74.1%

74.69%

Parallel + LDA + KNN

77.4%

80.19%

82.11%

82.53%

CCA + PCA + KNN

84.34%

85.12%

87.45%

87.21%

CCA + LDA + KNN

87.43%

88.65%

88.98%

89.12%

DCA/MDCA + KNN

79.08%

81.67%

82.09%

83.02%

CNN-Sum

95.13%

95.21%

95.54%

96.11%

CNN-Major

93.34%

94.16%

95.23%

95.71%

Iris-CNN

92.03%

92.39%

93.22%

94.91%

Face-CNN

94.19%

94.97%

95.06%

95.65%

MDH-FCA

94.76%

95.45%

95.82%

96.01%

MDH-BLA

94.88%

95.26%

95.98%

96.36%

MDH-FCA+Ext.Decoder

95.16%

95.88%

96.11%

96.23%

MDH-BLA+Ext.Decoder

95.22%

95.34%

96.28%

96.72%

MDH-FCA+NND

96.32%

97.22%

97.28%

97.83%

MDH-BLA+NND

96.98%

97.11%

97.29%

98.12%

MDHND-FCA

98.02%

98.13%

99.10%

99.11%

MDHND-BLA

98.16%

98.94%

99.13%

99.23%

terms of classification accuracy is significantly better than previous fusion approaches. It
can also be observed that using optimized NND (MDHND-BLA) definitely helps to improve
the identification performance and we get an improvement of about 3% when compared to a
conventional external ECC decoder (MDH-BLA+Ext.Decoder) or an improvement of about
3.5% with no decoder (MDH-BLA) being used at all.

4.5

Summary

We have presented a feature-level fusion and binarization framework using deep hashing,
and integrated a neural network decoder into the framework. In this framework, we leveraged
a neural network based decoder to refine the codes generated by the deep hashing network to
improve the authentication performance. We have also implemented multiple architectures
for combining the biometrics at feature-level. The experimental results show that the bilinear
architecture is better than linear concatenation of features. Additionally, the experimental
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results show that the optimized neural network decoder decreases the EER of the multimodal biometric system by 0.7%, relative to not using any decoder at all. Also, optimized
neural network decoder significantly improves the authentication performance (GAR) of the
multimodal biometric system by about 1.3% at an FAR of 0.01%, when compared to using
an external conventional ECC decoder. The current work deals with fusion of two modalities
and we plan to extend our model and use more than two modalities. Also we intend to use
more recent codes such as Turbo and LDPC codes as our error-correcting code.
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Chapter 5
Using Deep Cross Modal Hashing and
Error Correcting Codes for Improving
the Efficiency of Attribute Guided
Facial Image Retrieval
In this chapter, we propose a novel cross-modal hashing architecture — DNDCMH, which
uses a binary vector specifying the presence of certain facial attributes as an input query
to retrieve relevant face images from the database. The DNDCMH network consists of two
separate components: an ADCMH module, which uses a margin (m)-based loss function to
efficiently learn compact binary codes to preserve similarity between modalities (i.e., facial
attribute modality and image modality) in the Hamming space, and a NECD, which is an
error correcting decoder implemented with a neural network. The goal of integrating the
NECD network with the ADCMH network is to error correct the hash codes generated by
ADCMH to improve the retrieval efficiency.

5.1

Introduction

Due to rapid development of internet and social media over the last decade, there has
been tremendous volume of multimedia data, which is generated from different heterogeneous

Veeru Talreja

Chapter 5. Deep Neural Decoder Cross-Modal Hashing

84

sources and includes modalities like images, videos, and texts. Thus, approximate nearest
neighbor (ANN) search has attracted a lot of attention from machine learning and computer
vision research community to guarantee the retrieval quality and computing efficiency for
content based image retrieval (CBIR) in large-scale multimedia datasets. As a fast and an
advantageous solution, hashing has been employed in ANN search for CBIR due to its fast
query speed and low storage cost [19, 20, 108–118]. The goal of hashing is to map highdimensional visual data points into compact binary codes in the Hamming space, where the
semantic similarity in the original space is approximately preserved in the Hamming space.
The key principle in hashing functions is to maintain the semantic similarity by mapping
images of similar content to similar binary codes.

Figure 5.1: Cross modal hashing for facial image retrieval: a bald man wearing sun glass.
Additionally, corresponding data samples from heterogeneous modalities may establish
semantic correlations, which leads to CMH. CMH returns relevant information of one modality in response to a query of another modality (e.g., retrieval of texts/images by using a query
image/text), where similar hash codes in a shared latent Hamming space are generated for
each individual modality. In this chapter, we utilize the cross-modal hashing framework for
facial retrieval biometrics application in which the image are retrieved based solely on semantic attributes. For example, in this model, a user can give a query such as “A bald man
wearing sunglasses” to retrieve relevant face images from a large-scale gallery. The idea of
cross-modal hashing for image retrieval applications is shown in Fig. 5.1. We can note that
the relevant points in the gallery G1, G2 and G3 are closer to the query Q1 in the latent
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hamming space than the points G4 and G5.
There has been a surge in the development of CMH techniques used for ANN search for
retrieval on multi-modal datasets. However, capturing the semantic correlation between the
heterogeneous data from divergent modalities [119], and bridging the semantic gap between
low-level features and high-level semantics for an effective CMH is a challenge. Deep learning
techniques for CMH (or “deep cross-modal hashing (DCMH)”) [37, 38, 120] integrate feature
learning and hash coding into an end-to-end trainable framework. DCMH frameworks minimize the quantization error of hashing from continuous representation to binary codes and
prove the benefit of jointly learning the semantic similarity preserving features.
The main goal in DCMH is to learn a set of hash codes such that the content similarities
between different modalities is preserved in the Hamming space. As such, during the learning,
a likelihood function [38, 121, 122] or margin-based loss function such as the triplet loss
function [123, 124] needs to be incorporated into the DCMH framework to improve retrieval
performance. In triplet based DCMH [123], the inter-modal triplet embedding loss is applied
to model the heterogeneous correlation across different modalities, the intra-modal triplet
loss encodes the discriminative power of the hash codes, and the regularization loss forces
the adjacency consistency to ensure that the hash codes can retain the original cross-modal
similarities in the Hamming space. However, in margin-based loss functions, some of the
instances of different modalities of the same subject may not be close enough in the Hamming
space to guarantee all the correct retrievals. Therefore, it is important to bring the different
modalities of the same subject closer to each other in the Hamming space to improve the
retrieval efficiency.
In this work, we identified that in addition to the regular DCMH techniques [38, 41, 42],
which exploit entropy maximization and quantization losses in the objective function of the
DCMH; an ECC decoder can also be used as an additional component to compensate for
the heterogeneity gap and reduce the distance between the different modalities of the same
subject in the Hamming space in order to improve the cross-modal retrieval efficiency. We
presume that the hash code generated by DCMH is a binary vector that is within a certain
distance from a codeword of an ECC. The hash code generated by DCMH can be passed
through an ECC decoder, then the closest codeword to this hash code is found. which can
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be used as a final hash code for the retrieval process. In this process, the attribute hash code
and image hash code of the same subject are forced to map to the same codeword, thereby
reducing the distance of the corresponding hash codes. This brings more relevant facial
images from the gallery closer to the attribute query, which leads to an improved retrieval
performance.
Recent work has shown that the same kinds of neural network architectures used for
classification can also be used to decode ECC [43–45]. Motivated by this, we have used a
NECD [43] as an ECC decoder to improve the cross-modal retrieval efficiency. The NECD
is a non-fully connected neural network architecture based on the BP algorithm, which is a
notable decoding technique applied in the field of error correcting codes. We have integrated
our “ADCMH” with the NECD to formulate our novel DNDCMH framework for crossmodal retrieval (face image retrieval based on semantic attributes), which performs better
than other state-of-the-art deep cross-modal hashing methods for facial image retrieval in
response to an attribute query.
Specifically, the DNDCMH contains a custom-designed ADCMH network integrated with
the NECD. The goal of ADCMH network is to learn pairwise optimized intermediate hash
codes for both modalities, while the goal of NECD is to refine the intermediate hash codes
generated by ADCMH to improve the cross-modal retrieval efficiency. The entire DNDCMH
network is trained end to end by implementing an alternative minimization algorithm in two
stages. Stage 1 is split into parts 1(a) and 1(b) such that in Stage 1(a) of this algorithm,
we employ a novel cross-modal loss function which uses margin-based distance logistic loss
(DLL) to learn the ADCMH parameters. Stage 1(a) of the algorithm generates intermediate
cross-modal hash codes. In Stage 1(b), we train a NECD network by relating the error
correcting capability e of the ECC used to create the NECD network with the margin m,
which is employed in the distance logistic loss for training the ADCMH parameters in Stage
1 (a). In Stage 2 of the alternative minimization algorithm, we pass the intermediate hash
codes generated by the ADCMH network (i.e., from Stage 1(a)) through the trained NECD
network ((i.e., from Stage 1(b)) to find the closest correct codeword to the intermediate hash
codes. The cross-entropy loss between the correct codeword and the intermediate codes is
then back-propagated only to the ADCMH network to update its parameters. It should be
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noted that during the testing, we use only the ADCMH component of the DNDCMH for
image retrieval and we do not use the NECD component.
To summarize, the main contributions of this chapter include:
1: Attribute guided deep cross-modal hashing (ADCMH): We utilize deep crossmodal hashing based on margin-based distance logistic loss for face image retrieval in response to a facial attribute query.
2: Integrating a NECD: We exploit the error correcting capability of the ECC and relate it to the margin of distance logistic loss to integrate the NECD network into the ADCMH
network to learn error-corrected hash codes using an alternative minimization optimization
algorithm.
3: Scalable cross-modal hash: The proposed DNDCMH architecture performs facial
image retrieval using point-wise data without requiring pairs or triplets of training inputs,
which makes DNDCMH scalable to large scale datasets.

5.2

Proposed Method

In this section, we first formulate the problem; then, we provide the details of our proposed method including the cross-modal hashing framework, training of our proposed scheme,
and how it can be leveraged for out-of-sample data.

5.2.1

Problem Definition

We assume that there are two modalities for each sample, i.e., facial attribute and image.
Define X = {xi }ni=1 to represent the image modality, in which xi is the raw pixels of image
i in a training set of size n. In addition, we use Y = {yi }ni=1 to represent the attribute
modality, in which yi is the annotated facial attributes vector related to image xi . S is a
cross-modal similarity matrix in which Sij = 1 if image xi contains a facial attribute yj , and
Sij = 0 otherwise.
Based on the given training information (i.e., X, Y and S), the goal of our proposed
method is to learn modality-specific hash functions: h(x) (x) ∈ {−1, +1}c for image modality,
and h(y) (y) ∈ {−1, +1}c for attribute modality to map the image x and attribute feature
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Figure 5.2: Schematic illustration of our DNDCMH.
vector y into a compact c-bit hash code. Hash codes need to be learned such that the
cross-modal similarity in S is preserved in the Hamming space. Specifically, if Sij = 1, the
(xi )

Hamming distance between the binary codes ci

(yj )

= h(x) (xi ) and cj

= h(y) (yj ) should be

small and if Sij = 0, the corresponding Hamming distance should be large.

5.2.2

Deep Neural Decoder Cross-Modal Hashing

The schematic of our proposed DNDCMH is shown in Fig. 5.2. The DNDCMH architecture consists of two important components: 1) A “attribute-based deep cross-modal
hashing” (ADCMH) architecture, which contains an Image-CNN, and an Attribute-MLP.
2) A Neural error-correcting decoder (NECD). As shown in Fig. 5.2, the entire DNDCMH
network is trained end to end by implementing an alternative minimization algorithm in two
stages:
Stage 1 is split into parts 1(a) and 1(b) such that in Stage 1(a) of this algorithm, we
employ a novel cross-modal loss function which uses margin-based distance logistic loss
(DLL) to learn the ADCMH parameters. Stage 1(a) of the algorithm generates intermediate
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cross-modal hash codes. In Stage 1(b), we train a NECD by relating the error correcting
capability e of the ECC used to create the NECD with the margin m used in the distance
logistic loss for training the ADCMH parameters in Stage 1(a). Specifically, in Stage 1(b), in
order to force the attribute and image intermediate hash codes of same subject to be pushed
closer and decoded to the same codeword, we chose the ECC used to create the NECD in
such a way that the error correcting capability e is greather than or equal to m, where m is
the margin parameter used in the distance logistic loss for training the ADCMH parameters
in Stage 1(a).
In Stage 2 of the alternative minimization algorithm, we pass the intermediate hash
codes (real-valued vector) generated by the ADCMH network (i.e., from Stage 1(a)) through
the trained NECD network ((i.e., from Stage 1(b)) to find the closest correct codeword
(binary) to the intermediate hash codes. The cross-entropy loss between the correct codeword
and the intermediate codes is back-propagated only to the ADCMH network to update its
parameters. Stage 1(a) and Stage 2 are carried out iteratively until there is not a significant
improvement in retrieval efficiency on the training.
Stage 1(a): Learning Intermediate Hash Codes
Training of ADCMH network to learn the intermediate hash codes: In step
1, we train the ADCMH network, which is a coupled deep neural network (DNN), to learn
the intermediate hash codes. The ADCMH has three main objectives: 1) to learn a coupled DNN using distance-based logistic loss to preserve the cross-modal similarity between
different modalities; 2) to secure a high retrieval efficiency, for each modality, minimize the
quantization error due to the hashing of real-valued continuous output activations of the
network to binary codes; 3) to maximize the entropy corresponding to each bit to obtain the
maximum information provided by the hash codes.
We design the objective function for ADCMH to generate efficient hash codes. Our
objective function for ADCMH comprises of three parts: (1) margin-based distance logistic
loss; (2) quantization loss; and (3) entropy maximization loss. The ADCMH is composed of
two networks: An image convolutional neural network (Image-CNN), which is used to extract
features for image modality and an attribute multi-layer perceptron (Attribute-MLP), which
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is used to extract features for facial attribute modality. A tanh activation is used for the
last layer of both the networks so that the network outputs are in the range of [-1,1]. Let
p(wx , xi ) ∈ Rd denote the learned CNN features for sample xi corresponding to the image
modality, and q(wy , yj ) denote the learned MLP features for sample yj corresponding to the
attribute modality. wx and wy are the CNN network weights and the MLP network weights,
respectively. The total objective function for ADCMH is defined as follows:
J =

n X
n
X
i=1 j=1
n
X

`c (p(P∗i , Q∗j ), Sij )
n

X
θ
||P∗i ||2 +
||Q∗j ||2 )
− (
c i=1
j=1

(5.1)

c
c
X
X
T
2
||(QT )∗f ||2 ),
||(P )∗e || +
+ λ(
e=1

f =1

where P ∈ Rc×n represents the image feature matrix constructed by placing CNN features
of training samples column-wise and P∗i = p(wx , xi ) is the CNN feature corresponding
to sample xi . (PT )∗e is a column vector, which represents the e-th bit of all the training
samples. Likewise, Q ∈ Rc×n represents facial attribute feature matrix and Q∗j = q(wy , yj )
is the MLP feature for attribute modality yj ; (QT )∗f is a column vector, which represents the
f -th bit of all the training samples. The objective function in (5.1) needs to be minimized
with respect to parameters wx , wy .
The first term in the objective function is margin-based distance logistic loss function,
which tries to push modalities referring to the same sample closer to each other, while pushing
the modalities referring to different samples away from each other. The term p(P∗i , Q∗j ) =
1+exp(−m)
1+exp(||P∗i −Q∗j ||−m)

represents the distance-based logistic probability (DBLP) and defines the

probability of the match between the image modality feature vector P∗i and attribute modality feature vector Q∗j , given their squared distance. The margin parameter m determines
the extent to which matched or non-matched samples are attracted or repelled from each
other, respectively. The distance-based logistic loss is then derived from the DBLP by using
the cross entropy loss similar to the classification case: `c (r, s) = −s log(r)+(s−1) log(1−r).
Fig. 5.3 shows an illustration for the margin-based distance logistic-loss for our application. The dotted circle indicates the margin m to the boundary in terms of hamming
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Figure 5.3: Diagram for the first stage showing the importance of margin-based distance
logistic loss.
distance. The anchor (black solid circle) indicates a fixed instance and could either be an
image hash code or an attribute hash code. The green solid circles indicate the matched
instances (i.e., image or attribute hash codes belonging to the same subject as the anchor)
and the magenta solid circles indicate non-matched instances (i.e., image or attribute hash
codes belonging to different subject than the anchor). The function of margin-based DLL
is two-fold. Firstly, it pushes the matched instances (green circles) away from the margin in
the inward direction i.e., the hamming distance between the image and attribute hash codes
of the same subject should be less than the margin m. Secondly, the margin-based DLL also
pushes the non-matched instances (magenta circles) away from the margin in the outward
direction i.e., the hamming distance between the image and attribute hash codes belonging
to different subjects should be larger than the margin m. It has to be noted that after
training the ADCMH network, the image hash codes and the attribute hash codes belonging
to the same subject have a hamming distance less than margin m. This margin is a very
important parameter in this framework and it will also affect the training of the NECD as
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is detailed in the description of Stage 1(b) in Sec. 5.2.2 .
The second term in the objective function is the quantization loss that denotes a constraint to boost the activations of the units in the hashing layer to be closer to -1 or 1. The
value of P∗i is in the range of [−1, 1] because it has been activated by the tanh activation.
To make the codes closer to either -1 or 1, we add a quantization constraint of maximizing
the sum of squared errors between the hashing layer activations and 0, which is given by
Pn
2
i=1 ||P∗i − 0|| , where n is the number of training images in a mini-batch and 0 is the
c-dimensional vector with all elements equal to 0. However, this is equivalent to maximizing the square of the length of the vector formed by the hashing layer activations, that is
Pn
Pn
2
2
i=1 ||P∗i || .
i=1 ||P∗i − 0|| =
The third term, which is the entropy maximization loss, helps to obtain hash codes with
an equal number of -1’s and 1’s, which maximizes the entropy of the discrete distribution
and results in hash codes with better discrimination. Precisely, the number of +1 and -1 for
each bit on all the training samples should be almost the same.
Learning the ADCMH parameters in Stage 1(a): We used an alternating minimization (optimization) algorithm to learn the ADCMH network parameters wx , and wy .
In this algorithm, within each epoch, we learn one parameter with other parameters fixed.
Learning (wx ) parameters for ADCMH : We use the back propagation algorithm to
first optimize the CNN parameters wx for the image modality by fixing the wy , and compute
loss function gradient with respect to the output of image modality network as follows:
n
n
c
X
X
∂`c (p(P∗i , Q∗j ), Sij ) 2θ X
∂J
=
−
(P∗i ) + 2λ
(PT )∗i .
∂P∗i
∂P∗i
c i=1
j=1
i=1

(5.2)

The gradient of the first term in Eq. 5.2 is calculated as:


∂`c (p(P∗i , Q∗j ), Sij )
Sij
−(1 + exp(−m))
1 − Sij
=
×
+
.
∂P∗i
(1 + exp(||P∗i − Q∗j || − m))2
p(P∗i , Q∗j ) 1 − p(P∗i , Q∗j )
(5.3)
Next, we compute

∂J
∂wx

with

∂J
∂P∗i

∂J
by using the chain rule ( ∂w
=
x

∂J
∂P∗i

∗i
× ∂P
), based on which
∂wx

the back propagation is used to update the parameter wx .
Learning (wy ) parameters for ADCMH : Similar to the previous optimization, we
use the back propagation algorithm to optimize the MLP network parameters wy for the
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facial attribute modality by fixing wx , and compute the loss function gradient with respect
to the output of the facial attribute network as follows:
n
n
c
X
X
∂`c (p(P∗i , Q∗j ), Sij ) 2θ X
∂J
=
−
(Q∗j ) + 2λ
(QT )∗j .
∂Q∗j
∂Q∗j
c j=1
i=1
j=1

Next, we compute

∂J
∂wy

with

∂J
∂Q∗j

∂J
by using the chain rule ( ∂w
=
y

∂J
∂Q∗j

×

∂Q∗j
),
∂wy

(5.4)
based on

which the back propagation algorithm is used to update the parameters wy .
(xi )

The intermediate hash codes after training of the ADCMH are obtained by ci
(yi )

sign(p(wx , xi )) and ci

=

= sign(q(wy , yi )) for image xi and attribute yi , respectively for a

new sample outside of the training set.
Stage 1(b): Training Neural Error Correcting Decoder
As mentioned previously, there is room for improvement of cross-modal retrieval efficiency by reducing the Hamming distance between the intermediate hash codes of different
modalities for the same subject. This can be achieved by using an ECC decoder. The
concept of ECC decoder is illustrated in Fig. 5.4(a). It is observed from the figure that if
the received codewords or the corrupted codewords (green solid circles) fall within the error
correcting capability e of the ECC, then the received codeword will be decoded to the correct
codeword (black solid circle) by the ECC decoder.
The image or the attribute intermediate hash codes generated by the ADCMH network
can be considered to be corrupted codewords within a certain distance d of a correct codeword
of an ECC. If this distance d is within the error-correcting capability e of the ECC, then the
ECC decoder will decode the intermediate hash codes to corresponding correct codeword
of the ECC. However, decoding the intermediate hash codes to a correct codeword does
not assure an improvement in cross-modal retrieval efficiency. For improving the retrieval
efficiency, in addition to the intermediate hash codes being decoded to the correct codeword
of the ECC, we also require the face and attribute intermediate hash codes of the same
subject to be decoded to the same codeword.
For fulfilling the above requirement, we exploit the error-correcting capability of the ECC
decoder and relate it to the margin m used in the DLL for training the ADCMH in Stage 1(a).
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Consider the Fig. 5.4(b) which shows the circle representing the margin for the DLL loss in
Stage 1(a). The blue and green circles on the margin represent the image intermediate hash
code and attribute intermediate hash code, respectively of the same subject. Now consider
the Fig. 5.4(c), which shows the margin circle (black dashed line) along with the hamming
sphere of the ECC (red solid line) with error correcting capability of e. We notice that the
blue and green circle (i.e., image intermediate hash code and attribute intermediate hash
code) fall within the error correcting capability of the ECC. Consequently, the image and
attribute intermediate hash codes will be decoded to the same correct codeword (i.e. black
small circle in the center) by the ECC decoder. This scenario is feasible only when error
correcting capability e of the ECC decoder is at-least equal to the margin m used for DLL.
Therefore, we chose an ECC decoder in such a way that the error correcting capability of
the ECC e ≥ m.
Recently, some excellent neural network based ECC decoders have been proposed [43–
45], which have achieved close to the maximum likelihood (ML) performance for an ECC.
These methods can be leveraged to generate high-quality and efficient hash codes. Thus,
we can adapt such a neural network based ECC decoder, train it, and use it as an ancillary
component to refine the intermediate hash codes generated by ADCMH.
Neural error-correcting decoder: The NECD is a non fully-connected neural network
and can be considered to be a trellis representation of the BP decoder in which the nodes
of the hidden layer correspond to the edges in the Tanner graph. Let N be the size of the
codeword (i.e., the number of variable nodes in the Tanner graph) and E be the number of
the edges in the Tanner graph. This implies the input layer of our NECD decoder is a vector
of size N , that consists of the log-likelihood ratios (LLRs) of the channel outputs. All the
hidden layers of the NECD have size E. A node in each hidden layer is associated with the
message transmitted over some edge in the Tanner graph. The output layer of the NECD
contains N nodes that output the final decoded codeword.
The number of hidden layers in the NECD depends upon the number of iterations considered for the BP algorithm. One iteration corresponds to message passing from the variable
node to the check node and again back from check node to the variable node. Let us consider L iterations of the BP decoder. Then the number of hidden layers in the NECD would

Veeru Talreja

Chapter 5. Deep Neural Decoder Cross-Modal Hashing

95

Text

Error Correcting
Capability

margin
(m)

e

Attribute
intermediate
hash code

Image
intermediate
hash code

Correct Codeword

Recieved Codeword

Text

(a)

(b) margin of DLL
Text

e

error correcting
capability

Correct
Codeword
Text

(c) margin and hamming sphere

Figure 5.4: Relating the error-correcting capability of ECC to the margin of DLL.
be equal to 2L. Consider the i-th hidden layer, where i = 1, 2, · · · , 2L. For odd (even,
respectively) values of i, each node in this hidden layer of the NECD corresponds to an
edge e = (v, c) connecting the variable node v (check node c, respectively) to the check
node c (variable node v, respectively) and the output of this node represents the message
transmitted by the BP decoder over that edge in the Tanner graph.
Next, we will discuss the way the NECD node connections are formed. A node in the
first hidden layer (i.e., i = 1) corresponding to the edge e = (v, c) is connected to a single
node in the input layer, which is the variable node v associated with that edge. A processing
node in the hidden layer i, where i > 1 and i is odd (even, respectively), corresponds to
the edge e = (v, c), and is connected to all the nodes in the layer i − 1 associated with the
edges e0 = (v, c0 ) for c0 6= c (e0 = (v 0 , c) for v 0 6= v, respectively). For an odd node i, a
processing node in layer i, corresponding to the edge e = (v, c) is also connected to the vth
input node. We denote by xi,e , the output of a processing node in the hidden layer i. In
terms of the BP decoder, for an odd (even, respectively) i, this is the message produced after
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b(i − 1)/2c iterations, from variable to check (check to variable, respectively) node. For odd
i and e = (v, c), we can use
xi,e=(v,c)

 
1
= tanh  wi,v lv +
2


X

wi,e,e0 xi−1,e0  ,

(5)

e0 =(v,c0 ),c0 6=c

under the initialization, x0,e0 = 0 for all e0 (there is no information in the parity check nodes
in the beginning). The summation in (5) is over all the edges e0 = (v, c0 ) with variable node
v except for the target edge e = (v, c). w corresponds to the weight parameters of the neural
network. Similarly, for even i and e = (v, c), we use

Y
xi,e=(v,c) = 2tanh−1 


xi−1,e0  .

(6)

e0 =(v 0 ,c),v 0 6=v

The final vth output of the network is given by


X
ov = σ w2L+1,v lv +
w2L+1,v,e0 x2L,e0  ,

(7)

e0 =(v,c0 )

where σ(x) = (1 + e−x )−1 is a sigmoid function and is added so that the final network output
is in the range [0, 1].
In Stage 1(b), we build and train the NECD to be useful for correcting the intermediate
hash codes generated by ADCMH in Stage 1(a). In this regard, we select the ECC to build
the NECD is such a way that the error correcting capability e of the ECC is at-least equal
to the margin m. Based on this condition. We then train our NECD using a dataset of zeros
codeword.
Stage 2: Correcting the Intermediate Hash Codes
As shown in Fig. 5.2, the trained ADCMH network and the trained NECD from Stage
1(a) and Stage 1(b), respectively, are utilized in Stage 2 as shown by the red unidirectional
arrows. In Stage 2, we use the same dataset used in Stage 1(a) and generate the realvalued vector output of the trained Image-CNN and trained Attribute-MLP (from Stage
1(a)) without thresholding using sign function. This output from both the networks is then
passed through the trained NECD from Stage 1(b) to generate the corresponding image
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and attribute final binary hash codes. Next, the corresponding image and attribute final
hash codes are used as target outputs (i.e., ground truths) to fine-tune the Image-CNN
and Attribute-MLP, respectively from Stage 1(a). As shown in Fig. 5.2, for fine-tuning
the Image-CNN and Attribute-MLP, we use the intermediate hash codes (real-valued vector
output of the trained Image-CNN and trained Attribute-MLP) as our predicted outputs and
use the corresponding final hash codes (binary) as our ground truths. We use cross-entropy
as loss function to fine-tune the Image-CNN and Attribute-MLP in Stage 2.
N
k
1 X X (i)
(i)
(i)
(i)
LC (y, p) = −
y log(pj ) + (1 − yj )log(1 − pj ),
N i=1 j=1 j

(5.5)

(i)

where yj is the final hash code value for the i-th training sample and j-th element in the
(i)

output layer. Similarly, pj is the intermediate hash code value for the i-th training sample
and j-th element in the output layer. N signifies the number of training samples in a minibatch, k signifies the hash code length, and LC (y, p) defines the cross entropy loss function
between the intermediate hash code vector p and final hash code vector y.
In this stage of the training algorithm, the cross entropy loss between intermediate hash
codes generated by ADCMH and the corrected codewords obtained by NECD, is backpropagated to the ADCMH network to update its parameters (i.e., wx and wy ). As mentioned earlier, intermediate hash codes used in this Stage are real valued for both modalities.
Here, we formulate Stage 2 of the training algorithm, which is used to update the ADCMH
parameters to generate the corrected codes.
As shown in Fig. 5.2, the NECD network is used to correct the intermediate codes
(xi )

generated from both modalities. Assume that ti
(xi )

to correct the intermediate hash code ci

is the output of the NECD network used

associated with the sample xi for image modality.
(xi )

The overall cross-entropy loss on all the samples is calculated as: Hp = LC (ti

(xi )

, ci

). To

back-propagate the loss of the error-corrected code to the ADCMH parameters related to
the image modality (i.e., wx ), we can use the chain rule as discussed in the previous section
∂Hp
=
to update wx , i.e., ( ∂w
x

∂Hp
∂P∗i

×

∂P∗i
).
∂wx

Likewise, the NECD network is used to update the ADCMH network parameters that
are related to the facial attribute modality (i.e., wy ). Therefore, we can formulate it as
(yi )

: Hq = LC (ti

(yi )

, ci

). To back-propagate the loss of the error-corrected code to update
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=
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y

∂Hq
∂Q∗i

×

∂Q∗i
).
∂wy
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Note that before back-propagating the

cross-entropy loss to update the ADCMH parameters, we scale the obtained loss by a hyperparameter γ to create a balance between cross-entropy loss and the cross-modal hashing loss
(i.e., J in (5.1)) that is defined in step 1 of the training algorithm.
Note that we utilize alternative optimization algorithm and perform the Stage 1(a) and
Stage 2 of the training algorithm iteratively until there is not a significant improvement in
retrieval efficiency on the training set. Additionally, note that we use the same trained NECD
from Stage 1(b) in Stage 2 for both the Image-CNN and the Attribute-MLP. Therefore, if
the NECD in Stage 1(b) has been created using ECC with an error-correcting capability of
e ≥ m, where m is the margin used for DLL in Stage 1(a), then the final hash codes would
be the same for both the image and attribute modality at the end of the training of the
alternative optimization algorithm. The complete algorithm is given in Fig. 5.2.
Out-of-Sample Extension
After training DNDCMH to convergence (i.e., no improvement in accuracy on the training
set), for a new instance that is not in the training set, we can easily generate its errorcorrected hash code as long as we can get one of its modalities. Given a query data point
with image modality xi , we directly use it as the input of the Image-CNN part of the trained
DNDCMH, then forward propagate the query through the network to generate its hash code
(xi )

as: ti

= sign(p(wx , xi )). Similarly, for the Attribute-MLP, we generate the hash code of a
(yi )

data point with only attribute modality yi as: ti

5.3

= sign(q(wy , yi )).

Experimental Results

Implementation: As mentioned previously, our proposed ADCMH is composed of two
networks: An image convolutional neural network (Image-CNN), which is used to extract
features for the image modality and an attribute multi-layer perceptron (Attribute-MLP),
which is used to extract features for the facial attribute modality. We initialize our ImageCNN parameters with a VGG-19 [22] network pre-trained on the ImageNet [125] dataset. In
order to help the Image-CNN learn better and specialized set of facial features, we fine-tune
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Figure 5.5: Qualitative results: Retrieved images using DNDCMH and ADCMH by giving
different combinations of facial attributes as a query. Tick and cross symbols indicate the
correct and wrong image retrieval from the testing set, respectively.
it as a classifier by using the CASIA-Web Face dataset, which contains 10,575 subjects and
494,414 images. The original VGG-19 consists of five convolutional layers (conv1 − conv5)
and three fully-connected layers (f c6 − f c8). We discard the f c8 layer and replace the f c7
layer with a new fch layer with c hidden nodes, where c is the required intermediate hash
code length. For the convolutional layers and f c6 layer we have used ReLU activation, for
the fch layer, we have used tanh activation. The size of the intermediate hash length is equal
to the size of the codeword used in the NECD network.
The Attribute-MLP contains three fully connected layers to learn the features for the
facial attribute modality. To perform feature learning from the attributes, we first represent
the attributes of each training sample as a binary vector, which indicates the presence or
absence of corresponding facial attribute. This binary vector serves as a facial attribute
vector and is used as an input to the Attribute-MLP. The first and second layers in the MLP
network contain 512 nodes with ReLU activation and the number of nodes in the last fully
connected layer is equal to the intermediate hash code length c with tanh activation. The

Veeru Talreja

Chapter 5. Deep Neural Decoder Cross-Modal Hashing

100

weights of the MLP network are initialized by sampling randomly from N (0, 0.01) except for
the bias parameters that are initialized with zeros. We use the Adam optimizer [101] with the
default hyper-parameter values ( = 10−3 , λ1 = 0.9, λ2 = 0.999) to train all the parameters
using alternative minimization approach. The batch size in all the experiments is fixed to
128. ADCMH is implemented in TensorFlow with python API and all the experiments are
conducted on two GeForce GTX TITAN X 12GB GPUs.
To train this NECD, it is sufficient to use training database constructed using noisy versions of a single codeword [43]. For convenience, we use noisy versions of zero codeword and
our training database for NECD contains different channel output realization when the zero
codeword is transmitted. The goal is to train NECD to attain N dimensional output word,
which is as close as possible to the zero codeword by train the NECD parameters. We have
trained our NECD on several codes including BCH(31,21), BCH(63,45), and BCH(127,92).
This implies that the intermediate and the target hash code length for our experiments is
equal to 31, 63, and 127. Note that the exact codeword size (N, k) depends on the error correcting capability e required for the NECD. Again, the error correcting capability e depends
on the margin m of the DLL function used to train the ADCMH, such that e ≥ m.
Datasets: We evaluated our proposed DNDCMH framework on two face datasets including the Labeled Faces in the Wild (LFW) [126] and Large-scale CelebFaces Attributes
(CelebA) Dataset [127] annotated by facial attributes. LFW is a notable face database of
more than 13,000 images of faces, created for studying the problem of unconstrained face
recognition. The faces are collected from the web, detected and centered by the Viola Jones
face detector. CelebA is a large-scale face attribute and richly annotated dataset containing more than 200K celebrity images, each of which is annotated with 40 facial attributes.
CelebA has about ten thousand identities with twenty images per identity on average. For
comparison purposes, we have been consistent with the train and test split of these datasets
as given on the dataset webpage.
Baselines: We have compared the retrieval and ranking performance of our system with
some of the other state-of-the-art face image retrieval and ranking approaches including
MARR [128], rankBoost [129], TagProp [130]. For fair comparison, we have exploited the
VGG-19 architecture pretrained on Imagenet dataset, which is the same as the initial CNN
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Table 5.1: MAP comparison tabulating the effect of the error correcting capability e for a
given margin m. The given retrieval performance is for hash code length of 63 bits.
Margin

Code - Word Size

Error Correcting Capability

(m)

(N, K)

(e)

Single

Double

Triple

Single

Double

Triple

(63,51)

2

63.215

61.779

57.349

60.239

58.322

56.115

(63,45)

3

71.831

68.335

66.131

67.117

65.383

64.118

(63,39)

4

72.10

68.11

66.63

65.135

64.446

63.988

(63,36)

5

66.543

64.671

62.156

61.90

57.783

55.9

(63,30)

6

61.10

58.831

54.665

56.35

53.139

50.952

(63,39)

4

70.55

68.116

66.312

67.515

65.213

63.111

(63,36)

5

76.311

74.132

70.877

71.31

69.156

66.932
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77.19

72.066
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62.781
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77.351

75.568
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71.61
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Figure 5.6: Ranking performance on the CelebA dataset. Due to space restriction, the legend
is shown in the box on the left.
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Figure 5.7: Ranking performance on the LFW dataset. Due to space restriction, the legend
is shown in the box on the left.
of the image modality in DNDCMH, to extract CNN features. All the above baselines are
trained based on these CNN features. Additionally, we have also compared our algorithm
with the state-of-the-art deep cross modal hashing algorithms DCMH [38], Pairwise Relationship Guided Deep Hashing for Cross-Modal Retrieval (PRDH) [37], and Triplet-based
Hashing Network (THN) [123]. We have also compared the DNDCMH framework with only
the ADCMH network; i.e., training using only Stage 1(a).
Evaluation Protocols: For hashing-based retrieval, Hamming ranking is a widely used
retrieval protocol and we will also evaluate our DNDCMH method and compare it with
other baselines using this protocol. The Hamming ranking protocol ranks the points in the
database (retrieval set) according to their Hamming distances to a given query point, in an
increasing order. Mean average precision (MAP) is the widely used metric to measure the
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accuracy of the Hamming ranking protocol.
Similarly, for ranking protocol we use normalized discounted cumulative gain (NDCG)
to compare ranking performance of DNDCMH with other baselines. NDCG is a standard
single-number measure of ranking quality that allows non-binary relevance judgments. It is
P 2rel(i) −1
, where rel(i) is the relevance of the ith ranked image
defined as NDCG@k = Z1 ki=1 log(i+1)
and Z is a normalization constant to ensure that the correct ranking results in an NDCG
score of 1.
Effect of relation between margin m and error correcting capability e on the
retrieval performance: Before extensive performance evaluation of the proposed framework, it is very important to understand how the relation between error-correcting capability
e of the NECD used in Stage 1(b) and the margin m of the margin-based distance logistic
loss (DLL) in Stage 1(a) affects the overall retrieval performance for the proposed framework. From Sec. 5.2.2, we know that e ≥ m. For a given value of m we need to analyze the
upper limit of e that will give us a reasonable retrieval performance. We use mean average
precision (MAP) as our performance metric to evaluate the relation between e and m. Table
5.1 provides the MAP results for both the CelebA and the LFW dataset. We have considered
hash code length of 63 bits with margin values as m = 3, 5, 6, 7. Table 5.1 also provides the
different values of error correcting capability e we have used for a given margin m. We have
tried the values of e in the range of m − 1 to m + 6 depending on the error correcting code
word (N, K) possible with hash code length of 63 bits.
We can observe from Table 5.1 that for an given value of m, the best MAP is achieved
when e is equal to or slightly greater than m. For example, when m = 5, we can observe
that the best MAP is achieved when e is either 5 or 6. It is interesting to note that as e
becomes greater and greater than m, the MAP starts reducing. The reason for this reduction
is that as the error correcting capability e increases, more and more impostors will fall within
the Hamming sphere (error correcting capability), leading to more false positives and lower
precision.
Retrieval Performance: MAP results using different number of attributes in the query
for DNDCMH, ADCMH and other baselines for the LFW and FaceTracer datasets is given
in Table 5.2. For this experiment, we have used a margin of m = 6 for margin-based
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Figure 5.8: Influence of Hyper-parameters on P-R curves for CelebA dataset.
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Figure 5.9: Influence of Hyper-parameters on P-R curves for LFW dataset.
DLL. For the best results, we have trained our NECD with BCH(63,30) code, which implies
that the hash code length is equal to 63 bits and the error correcting capability e of the
NECD is equal to 6, which implies e = m. We can clearly see that our DNDCMH method
clearly outperforms all the other baseline methods including the ADCMH. An interesting
observation is that our method ADCMH with no NECD also outperforms DCMH, which
shows that the distance-based logistic loss used in our objective function in (5.1) is better
than the negative log-likelihood loss used in DCMH. Also, the addition of NECD to ADCMH,
which is our proposed DNDCMH improves the retrieval performance and outperforms the
other state-of-the-art deep cross-modal hashing methods PRDH and THN.

Veeru Talreja

Chapter 5. Deep Neural Decoder Cross-Modal Hashing

105

Table 5.2: MAP comparison for DNDCMH with other baselines for LFW and CelebA
datasets using diff. number of attributes in the query. The best MAP is shown in boldface.
CelebA

LFW

M ethod

Single

Double

Triple

Single

Double

Triple

TagProp

52.610

48.494

41.509

51.776

46.556

39.790

RankBoost

55.116

51.354

50.672

53.320

50.198

48.259

MARR

61.334

57.890

56.098

59.343

54.266

55.334

DCMH

67.210

62.664

61.170

62.320

61.200

60.320

PRDH

72.100

68.550

66.110

66.764

65.776

64.37

THN

74.982

71.498

70.498

69.907

69.897

67.297

ADCMH

68.437

64.173

63.993

63.732

63.171

62.689

DNDCMH

79.125

73.167

72.913

74.873

71.242

70.643

Ranking Performance: Comparison of the NDCG scores, as a function of the ranking
truncation level K, using different number of attribute queries are given in Fig. 5.6 and
Fig. 5.7 for the LFW and FaceTracer dataset, respectively using hash code length of 63 and
BCH (63,30) with e = m = 6 for DNDCMH and ADCMH. It is clear from the figures that
our approach (DNDCMH) significantly outperforms all the baseline methods for all three
types of queries, at all values of K. For example, for LFW dataset, at a truncation level of
20 (NDCG@20), for single, double and triple attribute queries, DNDCMH is respectively,
2.1%, 2.1% and 2.0% better than THN, the best deep cross-modal hashing method, and
also DNDCMH is respectively, 11.2%, 7.3% and 8.0% better than MARR, the best shallow
method for attribute-based image retrieval. The ranking performance using intermediate
hash codes generated by only ADCMH with no NECD also outperforms the shallow methods MARR, RankBoost, and Tagprob, and also outperforms DCMH for double and triple
attribute queries and is very close (may be slightly better) to DCMH performance for singleattribute queries. The better performance of DNDCMH when compared to other deep cross
modal hashing method demonstrates the effectiveness of NECD in improving the performance for cross-modal retrieval. We can observe that the NDCG values for the FaceTracer
dataset for all methods are relatively lower when compared to the LFW dataset. This is due
to the difference in the distributions of the two datasets.
Parameter Sensitivity: We explore the influence of the hyper-parameters θ, λ, and
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Table 5.3: MAP comparison for DNDCMH with ADCMH using different # of bits.
T ask

Single Attribute

Double Attribute

Triple Attribute

CelebA

M ethod

LFW

31 bits

63 bits

127 bits

31 bits

63 bits

127 bits

ADCMH

68.158

68.437

68.513

63.325

63.732

63.917

DNDCMH

78.917

79.125

79.565

74.132

74.873

75.032

ADCMH

64.121

64.173

64.395

63.121

63.171

63.532

DNDCMH

74.152

73.167

75.921

71.112

71.242

72.056

ADCMH

34.577

63.993

64.634

62.664

62.689

62.754

DNDCMH

72.152

72.913

73.271

70.216

70.643

70.855

γ. Fig. 5.8 and Fig. 5.9 show the precision-recall results on the LFW and the FaceTracer
datasets, respectively with different values of θ, λ, and γ, where the code length is 63
bits and e = m = 6. We can see that DNDCMH is not sensitive to θ,λ, and γ with
0.1 < θ < 5,0.1 < λ < 5, and 0.1 < γ < 5.
Effectiveness of the NECD for Improving the ADCMH Retrieval Performance: To show the effectiveness of NECD combined with the ADCMH network, we
conducted experiments using two different models: a) ADCMH, which indicates the case
where we train the model only using Stage 1(a) optimization without including NECD in
the training, specifically this case considers cross-modal hashing based on entropy, quantization and distance-based logistic loss; b) DNDCMH indicates our overall model where we
include NECD and use iterative alternate optimization to correct the generated codes by
ADCMH, qualitative results shown in Fig.5.5 indicate that the ADCMH retrieval performance is improved by integrating together NECD and ADCMH.
In addition to the qualitative results, we have also compared our DNDCMH with ADCMH
using MAP by varying the hash code length. Table 5.3 provides the MAP comparison for
DNDCMH and ADCMH for different hash code lengths (31, 63, and 127). For hash code
length of 31, 63, and 127 we have used e = m = 3, e = m = 6, and e = m = 11, respectively.
For ADCMH, we have used the same margin value as DNDCMH. The results in the Table
shows DNDCMH gives much better results than ADCMH, which implies that additional
optimization using NECD improves retrieval performance for ADCMH. Additionally, the
retrieval performance does not change a lot with increase in the hash code length. Consequently, even with low storage capacity of 31 bits, high retrieval performance is achieved.
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Effect of Number of Attributes: From the experimental results, we can see that the
retrieval or the ranking performance for DNDCMH and also ADCMH decreases with the
increase in the number of facial attributes as query. This is evident from the quantitative
results in Fig. 5.5 and also quantitative results in Fig. 5.6, and Fig. 5.7. The reason for
this decrease is that as we increase the number of facial attributes in a query, the number of
constraints to map the facial image modality into the same Hamming space as the attribute
modality, also gets inflated, which leads to lower retrieval performance when compared to
only a small number of facial attribute in the query.

5.4

Summary

In this chapter, we proposed a novel iterative two-step deep cross-modal hashing method
that takes facial attributes as query and returns a list of images based on a Hamming distance similarity. In this framework, we leveraged a neural network based decoder to correct
the codes generated by the facial attribute-based deep cross-modal hashing to improve the
retrieval performance. The experimental results show that the neural network decoder significantly improves the retrieval performance of the attribute-based deep cross-modal hashing
network. Moreover, the results indicate that the proposed framework outperforms most of
the other face image retrieval approaches.
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Chapter 6
Attribute-Guided Coupled GAN for
Cross-Resolution Face Recognition
In this chapter, we propose a novel attribute-guided cross-resolution (low-resolution to
high-resolution) face recognition framework that leverages a coupled GAN structure with
adversarial training to find the hidden relationship between the low-resolution and highresolution images in a latent common embedding subspace.

6.1

Introduction

Facial biometrics is used in a variety of modern recognition and surveillance applications ranging from stand-alone camera applications in banks and supermarkets to multiple
networked closed-circuit televisions in law enforcement applications or even in cloud-based
authentication applications. [49, 51–53, 57, 65]. The large distance between surveillance cameras and the subjects leads to low-resolution (LR) face regions in the captured images.
Usually, the discriminant properties of the face are degraded in the LR images, which leads
to a significant drop in the accuracy of traditional face recognition algorithms developed for
high-resolution (HR) images. An efficient face-recognition algorithm should perform well
even for LR faces without significantly reducing recognition accuracy.
In comparison to HR face images, LR faces have their own unique visual properties.
Although many visual features are missing in LR face images, humans are still able to
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notice similarities between the LR and HR face images of a given subject. This implies
that the neural systems of the human brain is able to recover missing visual properties of
LR faces if the human brain is familiar with the high-resolution image of that subject or
a given identity [131]. Inspired by this fact, several LR face recognition models have been
introduced that can be generally divided into two categories: the hallucination category and
the embedding category. The models in the hallucination category reconstruct HR faces
from LR faces before recognition [132–138]. The hallucination category of super-resolution
is also used for other applications [78].
Methods based on hallucination usually achieve promising results in recognizing the reconstructed HR face images. However, the super-resolution operation in hallucination models
usually requires significant additional computation that often translates to a reduction in the
recognition speed. In contrast to methods based on the hallucination, methods in the embedding category extract features from LR faces by leveraging various external face contexts.
Ren et al. [139] introduce a coupled kernel embedding to implicitly map face images with
different resolutions into an infinite space. The recognition task is then performed in this
new space to minimize the dissimilarities obtained by their kernel Gram matrices in the low
and high-resolution spaces, respectively. Intuitively, the main step in the embedding method
is to transfer knowledge from HR to LR face images. However, in these methods, one must
be careful to transfer only the desired knowledge instead of transferring all knowledge from
a HR domain to a LR domain.
In addition to knowledge sharing between the high and low-resolution images, soft biometric traits such as facial attributes can also be used as complimentary information to
improve the cross-resolution face recognition model. Facial attributes have been previously
used jointly with face biometrics in different face recognition applications [140].
In this chapter, we present an embedding model for cross-resolution face recognition based
on novel attribute-guided deep coupled learning framework using GAN to find the hidden
relationship between the features of high-resolution and low-resolution images in a latent
common embedding subspace. The framework also utilizes CNN weight sharing followed
by dedicated weights for learning the representative features for each specific face attribute.
Specifically, our coupled framework exploits the facial attribute to further maximize the
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correlation between the low-resolution and high-resolution domains, which leads to a more
discriminative embedding subspace to enhance the performance of the main task, which
is the cross-resolution face recognition. Additionally, in our approach, we also predict the
attributes for low-resolution images along with cross-resolution face recognition in a multitasking paradigm. Multi-task learning attempts to solve correlated tasks simultaneously by
leveraging the knowledge sharing between the two tasks [58, 99, 141]. To summarize, our
main contributions of this chapter are:
• A novel attribute guided cross-resolution (low-resolution to high-resolution) face recognition model using coupled GAN and multiple loss functions.
• A mutli-task learning framework to predict facial attributes for low-resolution facial
images.
• Extensive experiments using four different datasets and a comparison of the proposed
method with state-of-the-art methods.

6.2

Generative Adversarial Network

GANs have been widely used in different computer vision application such as style transfer, sketch to photo synthesis, and also in military applications [69, 70, 77, 142–144]. GANs
consist of two competing networks, namely a generator G and discriminator D. The goal of
GAN is to train the generator G to produce samples from training noise distribution pz (z)
such that the discriminator D cannot distinguish the synthesized samples from actual data y
with distribution pdata . Generator G(z; θg ) is a differentiable function which maps the noise
variable z to a data space using the parameters θg . On the other hand, discriminator D(.; θd )
is also a differentiable function, which tries to discriminate using a binary classification between the real data y and G(z). Specifically, the generator and discriminator compete with
each other in a two-player minimax game to minimize the Jenson-Shannon divergence [145].
The loss function L(D, G) for GAN is given as:
L(D, G) = Ey∼Pdata (y) [log D(y)] + Ez∼Pz (z) [log(1 − D(G(z)))]

(6.1)
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The objective (two player minimax game) for GAN is given by:
min max L(D, G) = min max[Ey∼Pdata (y) [log D(y)] + Ez∼Pz (z) [log(1 − D(G(z)))]]
G

D

G

D

(6.2)

Conditional GAN is another variant of GAN where both the generator and the discriminator are conditioned on an additional variable x. This additional variable could be any
kind of auxilary information such as discrete labels [146], text [147], or images [148]. The
loss function for conditional GAN is given as:
Lc (D, G) = Ey∼Pdata (y) [log D(y|x)] + Ez∼Pz (z) [log(1 − D(G(z|x)))].

(6.3)

The objective for the conditional GAN is the same two player minimax game as in (6.2) with
loss function as Lc (D, G) . Hereafter, we will denote the objective for conditional GAN as
OcGAN (D, G, y, x), which is given by:
OcGAN (D, G, y, x) = min max[Ey∼Pdata (y) [log D(y|x)] + Ez∼Pz (z) [log(1 − D(G(z|x)))]]. (6.4)
G

6.3

D

Proposed Method

In this section, we describe the proposed method for cross-resolution face recognition. In
contrast to the hallucination approach, we do not up-sample each low-resolution image to
the high-resolution domain before matching. Instead, we seek to project the high and lowresolution images to a common latent low-dimensional embedding subspace using generative
modeling. Inspired by the success of GANs [145], we explore adversarial networks in a
multi-tasking paradigm to project low and high-resolution images to a common subspace for
recognition, and also predict facial attributes from low recognition images.
As shown in Fig. 6.1, the proposed method consists of a coupled framework made
of two sub-networks, where each sub-network is a GAN architecture made of a generator
and a discriminator. The generators are coupled together using a contrastive loss function.
Each generator is also responsible to predict attributes in a multi-tasking paradigm. In
addition to the adversarial loss, and contrastive loss, we propose to guide the sub-networks
using a perceptual loss based on the VGG 16 architecture and also an L2 reconstruction
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Figure 6.1: Block diagram of the proposed framework.
error. This is because the perceptual loss in optimization helps to achieve a realistic image
reconstruction [149].

6.3.1

Deep Coupled Framework

The objective of our method is the recognition of low-resolution face images with respect
to a gallery of high-resolution images, which have not been seen during the training. The
matching of the low-resolution and the high-resolution images is performed in a common
embedding subspace. For this reason, we use a coupled framework which contains two subnetworks: low-resolution (LR) network and high-resolution (HR) network. The LR network
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consists of a GAN (generator + discriminator), attribute predictor, and a perceptual network
based on VGG-16, while the HR network consists of a GAN (generator + discriminator) and
an attribute predictor.
For the generators, we have used a U-Net network [150] to better capture the low-level
features and overcome the vanishing gradient problem due to deep network. Motivated by
[148], we have used patch-based discriminators, which are trained iteratively along with the
respective generators. Patch-based discriminator ensures preserving of high-frequency details
which are usually lost when only L1 loss is used. The final objective of our proposed method
is to find the global deep latent features in a common embedding subspace representing the
relationship between the low-resolution and their corresponding high-resolution face images.
To find this common subspace between the two domains, we couple the two generators via
a contrastive loss function Lcont [151].
This loss function (Lcont ) is minimized so as to drive the genuine pairs (i.e., a LR image
with its own corresponding HR image) towards each other in a common embedding subspace,
and at the same time, push the impostor pairs (i.e., a LR image of a subject with another
subject’s HR image) away from each other. Let xiLR denote the input LR face image, and
xjHR denote the input HR image. c(i, j) is a binary label, which is equal to 0 if xiLR and xjHR
belong to the same class (i.e., genuine pair), and equal to 1 if xiLR and xjHR belong to the
different class (i.e., impostor pair). Let z1 (.) and z2 (.) denote the deep CNN-based embedding
functions to transform xiLR and xjHR , respectively into a common latent embedding subspace.
Then, contrastive loss function (Lcont ) if c(i, j) = 0 (i.e., genuine pair) is given as:
Lcont (z1 (xiLR ), z2 (xjHR ), c(i, j)) =

1
z1 (xiLR ) − z2 (xjHR )
2

2
2

.

Similarly if c(i, j) = 1 (i.e., impostor pair), then contrastive loss function (Lcont ) is :


1
2
j
j
i
i
Lcont (z1 (xLR ), z2 (xHR ), c(i, j)) = max 0, m − z1 (xLR ) − z2 (xHR ) 2 ,
2

(6.5)

(6.6)

where m is the contrastive margin and is used to “tighten” the constraint. Therefore, the
total loss function for coupling the sub-networks is denoted by Lcpl and is given as:
Lcpl =

N
N
1 XX
Lcont (z1 (xiLR ), z2 (xjHR ), c(i, j)),
N 2 i=1 j=1

(6.7)
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where N is the number of training samples. The main motivation for using the coupling loss
is that it has the capacity to find the discriminative embedding subspace because it uses the
class labels implicitly, which may not be the case with some other metric such as Euclidean
distance. This discriminative embedding subspace would be useful for matching of the LR
images with the HR images and also for attribute prediction task.

6.3.2

Attribute Prediction Task

In addition to cross-resolution face recognition, another important objective of our proposed method is prediction of attributes using a LR or HR face image. However, separating
these two objectives by learning multiple CNNs individually is not optimal since different
objectives may share common features and have hidden relationship, which can be leveraged
to jointly optimize the objectives. This notion of joint optimization has been used in [152],
where they train a CNN for face recognition, and utilize the features for attribute prediction.
Therefore, for this task, we use the respective feature set (i.e., z1 (xiLR ) for LR, or z1 (xjHR )
for HR) from the common embedding subspace to also predict the attributes for a given
image. Also, our network shares a large portion of its parameters among different attribute
prediction tasks in order to enhance the performance of the recognition task in a mutli-task
paradigm.
For the attribute prediction task, a LR or HR image is given as input to the network to
predict a set of attributes. Consider that the input is a LR image denoted by xiLR , where the
class label for the image is given by `i ∈ L for i = 1, · · · , N where N is the number of training
samples. Let’s consider T to be the number of different facial attributes and ai,t denotes
the ground truth attribute label for training sample i and attribute t for t = 1 · · · T . In this
case, using the feature set from the common embedding subspace, the attribute prediction
loss function is given as:
LaLR

N
T
1 XX t
t
l(fLR (z1 (xiLR ) × wLR
), ai,t ),
=
N i=1 t=1

(6.8)

t
where fLR
(.) is a binary classifier for the attribute t operated on the bottle-neck of LR

generator as shown in Fig. 6.1. The classifier is learned by using a loss function l (e.g., cross
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t
entropy) and wLR
represents the weight parameters for the classifier and these parameters

are learned separately for each facial attribute task.
Similarly, we can consider the other sub-network (HR network) and perform the same
procedure with a HR image. The HR network also predicts the set of facial of attributes
using the features z2 (xjHR ) from the common embedding subspace for a given HR image.
Therefore, the loss function for facial attribute prediction for HR image is given as:
LaHR

N
T
1 XX t
t
l(f (z2 (xjHR ) × wHR
), aj,t ),
=
N j=1 t=1 HR

(6.9)

where the notations are similar to (6.8) but correspond to the HR network. The total
attribute prediction loss given as:
La = LaLR + LaHR .

6.3.3

(6.10)

Generative Adversarial Loss

Let GLR and GHR denote the generators that synthesize the corresponding LR and HR
images from the input LR and HR image, respectively. Let DLR and DHR denote the discriminators for LR and HR GANs respectively. We have utilized the GAN loss function [145]
to train the generators and the corresponding discriminators in order to ensure that the
discriminators cannot distinguish the synthesized images by the generators from the corresponding ground truth images. Also, it can be observed from Fig. 6.1, that the generators
GLR and GHR try to generate a LR and HR image with the network conditioned on the
input LR and HR image, respectively. The total loss for the coupled GAN is given by:
LGAN = LLR + LHR ,

(6.11)

where LLR and LHR denote the GAN loss functions for the LR and the HR network, respectively and are given as:
LLR = OcGAN (DLR , GLR , y i , xiLR )

(6.12)

LHR = OcGAN (DHR , GHR , y j , xjHR ),

(6.13)
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where function OcGAN is given by (6.4). xiLR (xjHR ) is the LR (HR) image used as a condition
for the LR (HR) GAN and y i (y j ) denotes the real LR (HR) data. Note that the real LR
(HR) data y i (y j ) and the network condition given by xiLR (xjHR ) are the same.

6.3.4

Perceptual Loss

Perceptual loss function was introduced in [149] for style transfer and super-resolution.
In [149], instead of relying only on L1 or L2 reconstruction error, the network parameters
are learned using errors between high-level image feature representations extracted from a
pre-trained convolutional neural network. Similarly, in our proposed approach, perceptual
loss is added only to the LR network using a pre-trained VGG-16 [22] network to extract
high-level features (ReLU3-3 layer) and the L1 distance between these features of real and
synthesized images is used to guide the generator GLR . The perceptual loss for features for
only the LR network is:
LPLR

Cp Wp Hp
XX
X
1
V (GLR (z|xiLR ))c,w,h − V (y i )c,w,h ,
=
Cp Wp Hp c=1 w=1 h=1

(6.14)

where y i is the ground truth LR image, GLR (z|xiLR ) is the output of the LR generator. V (.)
represents a particular layer of the VGG-16 network, where the layer dimensions are given
by Cp , Wp , and Hp . We have applied the perceptual loss only for the LR network to generate
more sharper LR images helpful for recognition.
Similarly, we utilized perceptual loss for attribute prediction as well to measure the
difference between the facial attributes of the synthesized and the real image. We applied the
perceptual loss for attributes for both the LR and the HR network. To extract the attributes
from a given HR image, we fine-tune the pre-trained VGG-Face [87] on 12 annotated facial
attributes, which are shown in Table 6.2. After this, we utilize this attribute predictor to
measure the attribute perceptual loss for both the LR and HR networks and the respective
losses are given below:
LpaLR = A(GLR (z|xiLR )) − A(y i )

LpaHR = A(GHR (z|xjHR )) − A(y j )

2
2

,

2
2

,

(6.15)

(6.16)
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where A(.) is the fine-tuned VGG-Face attribute predictor network. The total attribute
perceptual loss is the sum of the perceptual attribute loss for the LR network (LpaLR ) and
the HR network (LpaHR ):
Lpa = LpaLR + LpaHR .

6.3.5

(6.17)

L2 Reconstruction Loss

L2 reconstruction loss measures the reconstruction error in terms of Euclidean distance
between the synthesized image and the corresponding real image and is defined for the LR
and the HR network as follows:
L2LR = GLR (z|xiLR ) − y i

2
2

L2HR = GHR (z|xjHR ) − y j

2
2

(6.18)

.

(6.19)

The total L2 reconstruction loss function is given by:
L2 = L2LR + L2HR .

6.3.6

(6.20)

Overall Objective Function

The overall objective function for learning the network parameters in the proposed
method is given as the sum of all the above defined loss functions:
Ltot = Lcpl + λ1 La + λ2 LGAN + λ3 LPLR + λ4 Lpa + λ5 L2 ,

(6.21)

where Lcpl is the coupling loss function, La is the total attribute prediction loss function,
LGAN is the total generative adversarial loss function, LPLR is the perceptual loss for the LR
network, Lpa is the total perceptual attribute loss function and L2 is the total reconstruction
error. λ1 , λ2 , λ3 , λ4 , λ5 are the adjustable hyper-parameters to weigh the different loss terms.

6.4

Experiments and Results

In this section, we demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach by conducting
various experiments on four datasets: Labeled Faces in the Wild-a (LFWA) [153], Celeb-
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Faces Attributes Dataset (CelebA) [154], Surveillance Camera Face (SCFace) [155], and
UnConstrained College Students (UCCS) Dataset [156]. We have compared our proposed
method with six state-of-the-art methods on different datasets: VLRR [157], DCA [158], LRFRW [159], D-align [160], SHSR [135] and SKD [131]. In addition, we conduct an ablation
study to demonstrate the effectiveness of each loss function of our network.

6.4.1

Datasets

CelebA consists of 202,599 images with training, validation and test splits of approximately 162,000, 20,000 and 20,000 images, respectively. The total dataset corresponds to
about 10,000 identities (20 images per identity) with no identity overlap. Images are annotated with 40 facial attributes such as, “wavy hair”, “chubby”, “bald”, “male”, etc. However,
we only use 12 attributes (shown in Table 6.2) for our proposed method. We use the precropped version of the dataset, where the face images aligned using the hand-labeled key
points. The image size in regular HR resolution is equal to 178 × 212. We downsample the
images to low-resolutions of 88 × 108, 68 × 84, 48 × 58.
LFWA has a total of 13,232 images of 5,749 identities with pre-defined train and test
splits dividing the entire dataset into approximately two equal partitions. Each image is
annotated with the same 40 attributes used in CelebA dataset. The images are normalized
to 224 × 224 for HR image and downsampled to 96 × 96, 64 × 64, 32 × 32.
The SCface Dataset consists of 130 subjects, each having one HR frontal face image and
multiple HR images, captured from three distances (4.2m, 2.6m and 1.0m, respectively) using
different quality surveillance cameras. For fair comparison with previous methods [158], 50
subjects are randomly selected for training and the rest 80 subjects for testing. As in [158],
we fix the HR image at 128 × 128 and downsample to 64 × 64, 32 × 32 and 16 × 16 for LR
images.
The UCCS dataset is a very challenging dataset taken under unconstrained conditions.
Following the experimental setting in [157], we perform evaluations on a 180-subject subset,
where each subject has 25 or more images. We get a total of 5,220 images and and use 4,200
images for training, and the remaining 1,020 images for testing. For fair comparison, we
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normalize the cropped face regions to 80 × 80 as HR, and downsample them for LR images
of 16 × 16. For the datasets SCFace and UCCS, which are not annotated with attributes, we
use the state-of-the-art mixed-objective optimization network (MOON) [161] for generating
the ground truth attributes.

6.4.2

Training Details

As mentioned, we have implemented the U-Net network as generators and patch based
discriminators for the LR and HR networks. The entire architecture has been been implemented in Pytorch. For convergence, all the hyper-parameters are set to 1 except λ3 , and
λ4 , which are set to 0.5. We have used a batch size of 6 for Adam optimizer [101] with firstorder momentum of 0.5, and learning at a rate of 0.0004. We have used ReLU activation for
the generator and Leaky ReLU with a slope of 0.25 for the discriminator. For fine-tuning
the attribute predictor network VGG-Face for attribute perceptual loss, we have chosen 12
attributes (shown in Table 6.2 from the LFWA dataset).
The complex loss in (6.21) makes it difficult to train the whole network directly as the
gradient diffusion caused by different tasks will lead to slow network convergence. To address
this issue, we have employed a stage-wise learning strategy, where the information in the
training data is presented to the network gradually. Specifically, we first optimize each task
greedily by not updating the other task simultaneously. After the ‘initialization’ for each
task, we fine-tune the whole network all together by optimizing all the tasks jointly.
For training, we require genuine and impostor pairs. The genuine/impostor pairs are
constructed using LR and HR images of same/different subject. We balance the training set
by using same number of genuine and impostor pairs.

6.4.3

Testing of the Proposed Method

The main objective of our proposed method is to match a test LR image against a
gallery of HR images using the corresponding feature set from the common latent embedding
subspace. During testing, a given probe LR image xpLR is passed through the LR network,
and z1 (xpLR ) is generated from the common embedding subspace. Similarly, the HR images
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Figure 6.2: CMC curves for rank-n recognition accuracy for different low-resolution images
for different datasets.
from the gallery are passed through the HR network and z2 (xjHR ) is measured for each image
xjHR . Eventually, the face recognition is performed by calculating the minimum Euclidean
distance between z1 (xpLR ) and z2 (xjHR ) for all the gallery HR images:
ĵ = arg min z1 (xpLR ) − z2 (xjHR )
j

2
2

.

(6.22)

Therefore, xĵHR is the matching HR image from the gallery for the given probe LR image
xpLR . The ratio of the number of correctly classified probes to the total number of probes is
computed as the identification rate.
Additionally, the LR network can also be used for facial attribute prediction of a given
LR probe image by passing the feature set z1 (xpLR ) through the attribute predictor of the
LR network. The predicted facial attribute can be used to narrow down the search for
identification in a large gallery of HR images.

Veeru Talreja

Chapter 6. cGAN for Cross-Resolution Face Recognition

121

45
40.97
40
35

32.75
29.32

Error Rate

30
25

22.35

20

18.3
16.48

15
10
5
0

Top-1

Top-5

Figure 6.3: Top-1 and Top-5 Error rate comparison for VLLR (blue), SKD (Green), and our
method (Yellow) using the UCCS dataset.
Table 6.1: Rank-1 recognition accuracy (%) on SCFace.

6.4.4

Model

Dist-1

Dist-2

Dist-3

Average

SHSR

14.70

15.70

19.10

16.50

DCA

12.19

18.44

25.53

18.72

LRFRW

20.40

20.80

31.71

18.72

D-Align

34.37

39.38

49.37

24.30

SKD

43.50

48.00

53.50

48.33

Our Method

44.81 ± 0.36

49.60 ± 0.41 54.30 ± 0.23

49.57 ± 0.39

Performance Evaluation

We have evaluated the proposed method and compared with other state-of-the-art methods on four different datasets using different low-resolution images. Fig. 6.2 provides the
recognition accuracy of our proposed method from rank-1 to rank-5 for different resolution
images using the LFWA, CelebA and SCFace dataset. We can clearly see that the proposed
method gives very good performance for the LFWA and CelebA dataset. However, the
SCFace has more challenging face variations than the LFWA and CelebA and the SCFace
images have been taken in a typical commercial surveillance environment, which leads to
lower recognition performance for the SCFace dataset when compared to LFWA and CelebA
as seen in Fig. 6.2.
Table 6.1 tabulates the comparison of Rank-1 recognition rates with different state-of-
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Figure 6.4: Recognition accuracy (%) comparison for SKD (Blue), and our method (Yellow)
using the LFWA dataset for different size of LR image.
Table 6.2: Attribute prediction accuracy (%) comparison using CelebA dataset.
Double Chin

Chubby

Eye Glasses

Male

Pale Skin

Moustache

Mouth Slightly Open

Young

Smiling

Goatee

Bald

Blond Hair

HR Input (Net A)

90.8

90.1

96.5

97.5

89.2

92.8

90.1

85.3

91.3

93.8

97.4

92.7

LR Input (Net A)

51.3

50.1

56.5

55.3

46.4

53.1

51.6

49.2

55.4

56.9

62.8

59.7

LR Input (fine-tuned Net A)

71.6

69.3

74.6

72.9

68.6

71.4

70.3

69.5

75.8

76.0

88.5

81.4

LR Input (Proposed Method)

83.2

82.6

89.3

91

83.3

88.1

86.6

78.9

87.2

88.9

93.6

88.4

the-art methods for the SCFace dataset using different distances from the camera, which
corresponds to different resolution images. We can observe that our proposed method outperforms the state-of-the-art embedded method of cross-resolution face recognition model
SKD [131] by 1.31%,1.60%,0.80%, and 1.22% on Dist-1, Dist-2, Dist-3, and average, respectively. We can also observe that our model even outperforms the state-of-the-art hallucination model SHSR [135] by approximately 33% an average for all the three distances. We
have also compared proposed method with VLRR [157], and SKD [131] using the UCCS
dataset. Top-1 and Top-5 error rate comparison has been shown in Fig. 6.3. UCCS is also
a very challenging dataset, where the faces have been captured in completely unconstrained
conditions. Due to this reason, the error rates for this dataset are very high. However, our
proposed method performs better than the other two compared method by giving a lower
error rate of at least 3.4% and 1.8% for Top-1 and Top-5 recognition. We can also notice
from Fig. 6.4, that our proposed method outperforms SKD even for the LFWA dataset for
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Figure 6.5: ROC curves corresponding to the ablation study.
different resolutions.
From performance evaluation, we observe that our proposed coupled framework with
the contrastive loss function and leveraging facial attributes to transform different domains
(LR and HR) into a common discriminative embedding subspace is superior than the other
embedding techniques such as SKD and D-Align. It also shows the efficacy of exploiting
multiple loss functions for cross-resolution face recognition. The relative importance of the
loss functions has been covered in detail in ablation study (Sec. 6.4.6).

6.4.5

Attribute Prediction for Low-Resolution

One of the advantages of the proposed method is that it can be used for attribute prediction for LR face images. To illustrate the efficacy of our proposed approach for attribute
prediction of LR face images, we have performed attribute prediction for 4 different scenarios: 1) Attribute prediction for HR images with the VGG-Face based attribute predictor,
which is represented as Net A in Sec. 6.3.4. 2) Attribute prediction for LR images using
attribute predictor Net A. 3) In this scenario, we first fine-tune the attribute predictor A
with annotated LR images and then use it for attribute prediction of LR test images. This
will be called “fine-tuned Net A” 4) In this final case, we test our attribute predictor from
LR network for attribute prediction of the LR test images (see Fig. 6.1). We have performed
this experiment for the Celeb-A dataset using 68 × 88 as LR images.
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The attribute prediction results for the above 4 scenarios for 12 attributes using the
Celeb-A have been tabulated in Table 6.2. We can notice from Table 6.2 that our approach
shows the best performance in predicting the attributes of LR images for both datasets. Finetuning the Net A with LR images helps in improving its performance, however it does not
perform as well as our method. Additionally, the performance of our LR network attribute
predictor is comparable to the Net A performance for HR images.

6.4.6

Ablation Study

The objective function defined in (6.21) contains multiple loss functions: coupling loss
(Lcpl ), attribute prediction loss (La ), perceptual loss (LPLR , Lpa ), L2 reconstruction loss (L2 ),
and GAN loss (LGAN ). In this section, we study the relative importance of different loss
functions and the benefit of using them in our proposed method. For this experiment, we use
different variations of our proposed approach and perform the evaluation using the LFWA
dataset (64 × 64 LR images). The variations are: 1) cross-resolution face verification using
the coupled framework with only coupling loss and L2 reconstruction loss (Lcpl +L2 ); 2) crossresolution face verification using the coupled framework with coupling loss, L2 reconstruction
loss, GAN loss and perceptual loss (Lcpl + L2 + LGAN + LPLR + Lpa ); 3) cross-resolution face
verification using our framework with all the loss functions (Lcpl +L2 +LGAN +LPLR +Lpa +La ).
We use the above three variations of our framework and plot the ROC curve for the task
of cross-resolution face verification using the features from the common embedding subspace.
We can see from Fig. 6.5 that the generative adversarial loss and the perceptual loss (red
curve) help in improving the cross-resolution verification performance, and adding the attribute prediction loss (blue curve) helps in more performance improvement. The reason for
this improvement is that using facial attribute loss along with the contrastive loss leads to a
more discriminative embedding subspace leading to a better face recognition performance.
This also shows that multitask learning of attribute prediction and face recognition is useful
and helps in cross-resolution face recognition task.
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Summary

We have proposed a novel framework, which adopts a coupled GAN and exploits facial
attributes for cross-resolution face recognition. The coupled GAN includes two sub-networks
which project the low and high-resolution images into a common embedding subspace, where
the goal of each sub-network is to maximize the pair-wise correlation between low and highresolution images during the projection process. Moreover, we leverage facial attributes to
further maximize the pair-wise correlation by implicitly matching facial attributes of the low
and high-resolution images during the training. We comprehensively evaluated our model on
four standard datasets and the results indicate that our model significantly outperforms other
state-of-the-art models for cross resolution face recognition. Additionally, the enhancement
obtained by different losses in the proposed method has been considered in an ablation study.
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Chapter 7
Profile to Frontal Face Recognition in
the Wild Using Coupled Conditional
GAN
With the advent of deep learning, face recognition has achieved exceptional success.
However, many of these deep face recognition models perform much better in handling frontal
faces compared to profile faces. The major reason for poor performance in handling of profile
faces is that it is inherently difficult to learn pose-invariant deep representations that are
useful for profile face recognition. In this chapter, we hypothesize that the profile face domain
possesses a latent connection with the frontal face domain in a latent feature subspace. We
look to exploit this latent connection by projecting the profile faces and frontal faces into
a common latent subspace and perform verification or retrieval in the latent domain. We
leverage a cpGAN structure similar to Chapter 6 to find the hidden relationship between the
profile and frontal images in a latent common embedding subspace. Specifically, the cpGAN
framework consists of two conditional GAN-based sub-networks, one dedicated to the frontal
domain and the other dedicated to the profile domain. Each sub-network tends to find a
projection that maximizes the pair-wise correlation between the two feature domains in a
common embedding feature subspace. The result is a system that is capable of effectively
matching profile probe images against a gallery of frontal images
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Introduction

In recent past, deep-learning based face recognition models have achieved exceptional
success [162], however, many of these models perform relatively poorly in handling profile
faces compared to frontal faces [163, 164]. When faces are captured in an unconstrained environment, in the wild, they are often in a profile orientation. Thus there is an equivalency
between the challenging problems of unconstrained face recognition and profile face recognition. Pose, expression, and lighting variations are considered to be major obstacles in attaining high unconstrained face recognition performance. Existing methods focus on the pose
variation problem by training separate models for learning pose-invariant features [162,165],
elaborate dense 3D facial landmark detection and warping [166], and synthesizing a frontal,
neutral expression face from a single image [167–171].
Pose-Invariant Feature Representation: Face frontalization may be considered as an
image-level pose invariant representation. However, feature-level pose invariant representations have also been a mainstay for face recognition. Canonical Correlation Analysis (CCA)
was used in earlier works to analyze the commonality among pose-variant samples. Recently, with the advent of deep-learning, deep-learning-based methods have become popular
for pose invariant feature representation. Cao et al. [162] exploit the inherent mapping between profile and frontal faces and transform a deep profile face representation to a canonical
pose by adaptively adding residuals. Additionally, deep-learning methods consider several
aspects, such as multiview perception layers [172], to learn a model separating identity from
viewpoints. In [172], given a single 2D face image, a deep neural net, named Multi-View
Perceptron (MVP) can untangle the identity and view features, and infer a full spectrum
of multi-view images. MVP can also predict images under viewpoints that are unobserved
in the training data. To allow a single network structure for multiple pose inputs, feature
pooling across different poses is proposed in [173]. There have also been methods related to
pose-invariant feature disentanglement [174] or identity preservation [175, 176] that aim to
factorize out the non-identity part with a meticulously designed network. In [176], a new
learning-based face representation, the Face Identity-Preserving (FIP) features, has been
proposed. The FIP features are learned by using a deep neural network that combines the
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feature extraction layers and the reconstruction layer. The former layer generates FIP features from a face image, while the latter layer transforms the FIP features into an image in
the canonical view.
Face Frontalization: Using a single image with large pose variation, it is very challenging to synthesize face with a frontal view with a neutral expression face due to two major
reasons: a) recovering the 3D information from 2D projections is obscure and uncertain
and b) presence of self-occlusion. Seminal works date back to the 3D Morphable Model
(3DMM) [177], which models both the shape and appearance as PCA spaces. Hassner et
al. [178] adopt a 3D shape model combined with input images to register and produce the
frontalized face. Based on 3DMM, Zhu et al. [179] provide a high-fidelity pose and expression
normalization method. However, 3D-based methods often do not provide reasonable results
and suffer from a significant performance drop with large pose variations due to artifacts and
severe texture losses. Some deep-learning-based methods have shown promising performance
in terms of face frontalization [167, 169–171, 180–182]. In [181], a recurrent transform unit is
proposed to incrementally rotate faces in fixed yaw angles and synthesize discrete 3D views.
FF-GAN [169] solves the problem of large-pose face frontalization in the wild by incorporating a 3D face model into a GAN. Considering photo realistic and identity-preserving frontal
view synthesis, a domain adaptation strategy for pose invariant face recognition is discussed
in [182]. Tran et al. [167] propose a GAN framework to rotate a face and disentangle the
identity representation by using a given pose code. In [171], a face normalization model
(FNM) uses a GAN network with three distinct losses for generating canonical-view and
expression-free frontal images. However, there are three major difficulties related to face
frontalization or normalization in unconstrained environments:
• Complicated face-variations besides pose: In comparison to a controlled environment,
there are more complex face variations, e.g., lighting, head pose, expression, in realworld scenarios. It is a difficult task to directly warp the input face to a normalized
view [171].
• Unpaired data: Undoubtedly, obtaining a strictly normalized face is expensive and
time-consuming, but getting an effective pair of images consisting of a target normalized
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face (i.e., frontal-facing, neutral expression) and an input face is difficult due to highly
imbalanced datasets [171].
• Presence of artifacts: Synthesized ‘frontal’ faces contain artifacts caused by occlusions
and non-rigid expressions.
In this chapter, we hypothesize that the profile face domain shares a latent connection
with the frontal face domain in a latent deep feature subspace. We aim to exploit this
connection by projecting the profile faces and frontal faces into a common latent subspace
and perform verification or retrieval in this latent domain. We propose an embedding model
for profile to frontal face verification based on a deep coupled learning framework which
uses a GAN to find the hidden relationship between the profile face features and frontal face
features in a latent common embedding subspace.
Our work is conceptually related to the embedding category of super-resolution [159,
183–185] in that our approach also performs verification of profile and frontal faces in the
latent space but not in the original image space. From our experiments, we observe that
transforming profile and frontal face features into a latent embedding subspace could yield
higher performance than image-level face frontalization, which is susceptible to the negative
influence of artifacts as a result of image synthesis. To our best knowledge, this study is the
first attempt to perform profile-to-frontal face verification in a latent embedding subspace
using generative modeling.
This chapter makes the following contributions:
• The chapter develops of a novel profile to frontal face recognition model using a cpGAN
framework with multiple loss functions.
• The chapter includes comprehensive experiments using different datasets and a comparison of the proposed method with the state-of-the-art methods, indicating the efficacy
of the proposed GAN framework.
• The proposed framework can potentially be used to improve the performance of traditional face recognition methods by integrating it as a preprocessing procedure for a
face-frontalization schema.
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• The chapter includes experiments to evaluate the frontalization performance of the
cpGAN by using a face matcher (verifier) to compare off-pose faces with a gallery
of frontal faces and also compare the frontalized images with the gallery to see if
frontalizing the face would increase the face matcher performance.
• The chapter implements a coupled CNN (cpCNN) and includes experiments to evaluate
the benefits of using the GAN by comparing the performance of a cpCNN with our
proposed approach (cpGAN).
• The chapter implements an ADDA framework for profile to frontal face recognition
and includes experiments to compare the performance of our proposed cpGAN with
an ADDA network.
• The chapter includes generated qualitative results for the VGGFace2 dataset to test
the robustness and reconstruction ability of our proposed coupled GAN framework.

7.2

Proposed Method

Here, we describe our method for profile to frontal face recognition. In contrast to the
face normalization methods, we do not perform pose normalization (i.e., frontalization) on
each profile image before matching. Instead, we seek to project the profile and frontal face
images to a common latent low-dimensional embedding subspace using generative modeling.
Inspired by the success of GANs [145], we explore adversarial networks to project profile and
frontal images to a common subspace for recognition.
The framework of proposed profile to frontal coupled generative adversarial network (PFcpGAN; shown in Fig. 7.1) consists of two modules, where each module contains a GAN
architecture comprised of a generator and a discriminator. The generators that we have used
in both modules are U-net auto-encoders that are coupled together using a contrastive loss
function. In addition to adversarial and contrastive loss, we propose to guide the generators
using the perceptual loss [149] based on the VGG 16 architecture, as well as an L2 reconstruction error. The perceptual loss helps to generate a sharp and realistic reconstruction of
the images.
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Figure 7.1: Block diagram of PF-cpGAN.

7.2.1

Profile to Frontal Coupled GAN

The main objective of PF-cpGAN is the recognition of profile face images with respect to
a gallery of frontal face images, which have not been seen during the training. The matching
of the profile and the frontal face images is performed in a common embedding subspace.
PF-cpGAN consists of two modules: a profile GAN module and a frontal GAN module,
both consisting of a GAN (generator + discriminator), and a perceptual network based on
VGG-16.
For the generators, we use a U-Net [150] auto-encoder architecture (shown in Fig. 7.2(a)).
The primary reason for using U-Net is that the encoder-decoder structure tends to extract
global features and generate images by leveraging this overall information, which is very
useful for global shape transformation tasks such as profile to frontal image conversion.
Moreover, for many image translation problems, there is a significant amount of low-level
information that needs to be shared between the input and output, and it is desirable to
pass this information directly across all the layers including the bottleneck. Therefore, the
use of skip-connections, as in U-net, provides a means for the encoder-decoder structure to
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circumvent the bottleneck and pass the information over to other layers.
For discriminators, we have used patch-based discriminators [148](shown in Fig. 7.2(b)),
which are trained iteratively along with the respective generators. L1 loss performs very well
when trying to preserve the low-frequency details but fails to preserve the high-frequency
details. However, using a patch-based discriminator that penalizes structure at the scale of
the patches ensures the preservation of high-frequency details, which are usually eliminated
when only L1 loss is used.
The final objective of PF-cpGAN is to find the hidden relationship between the profile
face features and frontal face features in a latent common embedding subspace. To find this
common subspace between the two domains, we couple the two generators via a contrastive
loss function, Lcont .
This loss function (Lcont ) is a distance-based loss function, which tries to ensure that
semantically similar examples (genuine pairs, i.e., a profile image of a subject with its corresponding frontal image) are embedded closely in the common embedding subspace, and,
simultaneously, semantic dissimilar examples (impostor pairs, i.e., a profile image of a subject
and a frontal image of a different subject) are pushed away from each other in the common
embedding subspace. The contrastive loss function is defined as:
1
1
Lcont (z1 (xiP R ), z2 (xjF R ), Y ) = (1 − Y ) (Dz )2 + (Y ) (max(0, m − Dz ))2 ,
2
2

(7.1)

where xiP R and xjF R denote the i-th profile and j-th frontal face image, respectively. The
variable Y is a binary label, which is equal to 0 if xiP R and xjF R belong to the same class (i.e.,
genuine pair), and equal to 1 if xiP R and xjF R belong to a different class (i.e., impostor pair).
z1 (.) and z2 (.) denote only the encoding functions of the U-Net auto-encoder to transform
xiP R and xjF R , respectively into a common latent embedding subspace. The value m is
the contrastive margin and is used to “tighten” the constraint. Dz denotes the Euclidean
distance between the outputs of the functions z1 (xiP R ) and z2 (xjF R ) given by:
Dz = z1 (xiP R ) − z2 (xjF R )

2

.

(7.2)

Therefore, if Y = 0 (i.e., genuine pair), then the contrastive loss function (Lcont ) is given as:
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2

2
2
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(7.3)

and if Y = 1 (i.e., impostor pair), then contrastive loss function (Lcont ) is:
Lcont (z1 (xiP R ),z2 (xjF R ), Y

2

1
j
i
) = max 0, m − z1 (xP R ) − z2 (xF R ) 2 .
2

(7.4)

Thus, the total loss for coupling the profile generator and the frontal generator is denoted
by Lcpl and is given as:
Lcpl

N
N
1 XX
= 2
Lcont (z1 (xiP R ), z2 (xjF R ), Y ),
N i=1 j=1

(7.5)

where N is the number of training samples. The contrastive loss in the above equation
can also be replaced by some other distance-based metric, such as the Euclidean distance.
However, the main aim of using the contrastive loss is to be able to use the class labels
implicitly and find the discriminative embedding subspace, which may not be the case with
some other metric such as the Euclidean distance. This discriminative embedding subspace
would be useful for matching of a profile image against a frontal image.

7.2.2

Generative Adversarial Loss

Let the profile and frontal generators that reconstruct the corresponding profile and
frontal image from the input profile and frontal image, be denoted as GP R and GF R , respectively. The patch-based discriminators used for the profile and frontal GANs are denoted as
DP R and DF R , respectively. For the proposed method, we have used the conditional GAN,
where the generator networks GP R and GF R are conditioned on input profile and frontal
face images, respectively. We have used the conditional GAN loss function [146] to train
the generators and the corresponding discriminators in order to ensure that the discriminators cannot distinguish the images reconstructed by the generators from the corresponding
ground truth images. Let LP R and LF R denote the conditional GAN loss functions for the
profile and the frontal GANs, respectively, where LP R and LF R are given as:
LP R = FcGAN (DP R , GP R , yPi R , xiP R ),

(7.6)
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(7.7)

where function FcGAN is the conditional GAN objective defined in (6.4). The term xiP R
denotes the profile image used as a condition for the profile GAN, and yPi R denotes the real
profile image. Note that the real profile image yPi R and the network condition given by xiP R
are the same. Similarly, xjF R denotes the frontal image used as a condition for the frontal
GAN and yFj R denotes the real frontal image. Again, the real frontal image yFj R and the
network condition given by xjF R are the same. The total loss for the coupled conditional
GAN is given by:
LGAN = LP R + LF R .

7.2.3

(7.8)

L2 Reconstruction Loss

We also consider the L2 reconstruction loss for both the profile GAN and frontal GAN.
The L2 reconstruction loss measures the reconstruction error in terms of the Euclidean
distance between the reconstructed image and the corresponding real image. Let L2P R denote
the reconstruction loss for the profile GAN and be defined as:
L2P R = GP R (z|xiP R ) − yPi R

2
2

,

(7.9)

where yPi R is the ground truth profile image GP R (z|xiP R ) is the output of the profile generator.
Similarly, Let L2F R denote the reconstruction loss for the frontal GAN:
L2F R = GF R (z|xjF R ) − yFj R

2
2

,

(7.10)

where yFj R is the ground truth frontal image, GF R (z|xjF R ) is the output of the frontal generator.
The total L2 reconstruction loss function is given by:
N
N
1 XX
L2 = 2
(L2P R + L2F R ).
N i=1 j=1

(7.11)
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Perceptual Loss

In addition to the GAN loss and the reconstruction loss that are used to guide the generators, we have also used the perceptual loss, which was introduced in [149] for style transfer
and super-resolution. The perceptual loss function is used to compare high level differences,
like content and style discrepancies, between images. The perceptual loss function involves
comparing two images based on high-level representations from a pre-trained CNN, such as
VGG-16 [22]. The perceptual loss function is a good alternative to solely using L1 or L2
reconstruction error, as it gives better and sharper high-quality reconstruction images [149].
In our proposed approach, perceptual loss is added to both the profile and the frontal
module using a pre-trained VGG-16 network [22] . We extract the high-level features
(ReLU3-3 layer) of the VGG-16 for both the real input image and the reconstructed output
of the U-Net generator. The L1 distance between these features of real and reconstructed
images is used to guide the generators GP R and GF R . The perceptual loss for the profile
network is defined as:
LPP R

Cp Wp Hp
X
XX
1
V (GP R (z|xiP R ))c,w,h − V (yPi R )c,w,h ,
=
Cp Wp Hp c=1 w=1 h=1

(7.12)

where V (.) denotes a particular layer of the VGG-16, and the layer dimensions are given by
Cp , Wp , and Hp .
Likewise the perceptual loss for the frontal network is:
L PF R

Cp Wp Hp
X
XX
1
V (GF R (z|xjF R ))c,w,h − V (yFj R )c,w,h .
=
Cp Wp Hp c=1 w=1 h=1

(7.13)

The total perceptual loss function is given by:
LP =

7.2.5

N
N
1 XX
(LPP R + LPF R ).
N 2 i=1 j=1

(7.14)

Overall Objective Function

The overall objective function for learning the network parameters in the proposed
method is given as the sum of all the loss functions defined above:
Ltot = Lcpl + λ1 LGAN + λ2 LP + λ3 L2 ,

(7.15)
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Figure 7.2: GAN Architectures
where Lcpl is the coupling loss given by (9), LGAN is the total generative adversarial loss given
by (12), LP is the total perceptual loss given by (18), and L2 is the total reconstruction error
given by (15). Variables λ1 , λ2 , and λ3 are the hyper-parameters to weigh the different loss
terms.

7.3

Experiments

We initially describe our training setup and the datasets that we have used in our experiments. We show the efficiency of our method for the task of frontal to profile face
verification by comparing its performance with state-of the-art face verification methods
across pose-variation. We also explore the effect of face yaw in our algorithm. Additionally,
we have implemented a cpCNN and an ADDA for profile to frontal face recognition. We
have evaluated the performance of cpCNN and ADDA and compared it with the proposed
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PF-cpGAN. We have also evaluated our PF-cpGAN for reconstruction of frontal images from
input profile images. Finally, we conduct an ablation study to investigate the effect of each
term in our total training loss function in (7.16).

7.3.1

Experimental Details

Datasets: The Celebrities in Frontal-Profile (CFP) dataset [163] is a mixture of constrained (i.e., carefully collected under different pose, illumination and expression conditions) and unconstrained (i.e., collected images from the Internet) settings. CFP includes
500 celebrities, averaging ten frontal and four profile face images per each celebrity. Following the standard 10-fold protocol [163], we divide the dataset into 10 folds, each of which
consists of 350 same and 350 different pairs generated from 50 subjects (i.e., 7 same and 7
different pairs for each subject).
The CMU Multi-PIE database [75] contains 750,000 images of 337 subjects. Subjects
were imaged from 15 viewing angles and 19 illumination conditions while exhibiting a range
of facial expressions. It is the largest database for graded evaluation with respect to pose,
illumination, and expression variations. There are four sessions in this database. For fair
comparison, the database setting was made consistent with CAPG-GAN [186], where 250
subjects from Multi-PIE have been used. Consistent with CAPG-GAN, face images with
neutral expression under 20 illuminations and 13 poses within ± 90°are used. We follow the
setting-1 testing protocol provided in CAPG-GAN.
In setting-1, only images from session 1, which contains faces of 250 subjects were used.
First 150 identities were used in the training set and remaining 100 identities were used for
testing. The training set consists of all the images (13 poses and 20 illumination levels) of
150 identities, i.e., 150 × 13 × 20 = 39, 000 images in total. For testing, one gallery image
with frontal view and normal illumination is used for each of the remaining 100 subjects.
The numbers of the probe and gallery sets are 24,000 and 100 respectively
The IARPA Janus Benchmark A (IJB-A) [187] is a challenging dataset collected under
complete unconstrained conditions covering full pose variation (yaw angles −90°to +90°).
IJB-A contains 500 subjects with 5,712 images and 20,414 frames extracted from videos.

Veeru Talreja

Chapter 7. Coupled cGAN for Profile-to-Frontal Face Recognition

138

Following the standard protocol in [187], we evaluate our method on both verification and
identification. The IARPA Janus Benchmark C (IJB-C) dataset [188] builds on IJB-A, and
IJB-B [189] datasets and has a total of 31,334 images for a total number of 3,531 subjects.
We have also evaluated our method on IJB-A and IJB-C datasets.
VGGFace2 is a large-scale face recognition dataset, where the images are downloaded
from Google Image Search and have large variations in pose, age, illumination, and ethnicity.
The dataset contains about 3.3 million images corresponding to more than 9000 identities
with an average of 364 images per subject.
Implementation Details: We have implemented a U-Net autoencoder with a ResNet18 [23] architecture pre-trained on ImageNet. We have added an additional fully-connected
layer after the average pooling layer for the ResNet-18 for our U-Net encoder. The U-Net
decoder has the same number of layers as the encoder. The entire framework has been
implemented in Pytorch. For convergence, λ1 is set to 1, and λ2 , and λ3 are both set to 0.25.
We used a batch size of 128 and an Adam optimizer [101] with first-order momentum of 0.5,
and learning rate of 0.0004. We have used the ReLU activation function for the generator
and Leaky ReLU with a slope of 0.3 for the discriminator.
For training, genuine and impostor pairs were required. The genuine/impostor pairs are
created by frontal and profile images of the same/different subject. During the experiments,
we ensure that the training set are balanced by using the same number of genuine and
impostor pairs.

7.3.2

Evaluation on CFP with Frontal-Profile Setting

We first perform evaluation on the CFP dataset [163], a challenging dataset created
to examine the problem of frontal to profile face verification in the wild. The same 10fold protocol is applied on both the Frontal-Profile and Frontal-Frontal settings. For fair
comparison and as given in [163], we consider different types of feature extraction techniques
like HoG [190], LBP [191], and Fisher Vector [192] along with metric learning techniques
like Sub-SML [193], and the Diagonal metric learning (DML) as reported in [192]. We also
compare against deep-learning techniques, including Deep Features [194], and PR-REM [162].
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Table 7.1: Performance comparison on CFP dataset. Mean Accuracy and equal error rate
(EER) with standard deviation over 10 folds.
Frontal-Profile
EER

Frontal-Frontal

Algorithm

Accuracy

Accuracy

EER

HoG+Sub-SML [163]

77.31 ± 1.61

22.20 ± 1.18 88.34 ± 1.31 11.45 ± 1.35

LBP+Sub-SML [163]

70.02 ± 2.14

29.60 ± 2.11 83.54 ± 2.40 16.00 ± 1.74

FV+Sub-SML [163]

80.63 ± 2.12

19.28 ± 1.60 91.30 ± 0.85

8.85 ± 0.74

FV+DML [163]

58.47 ± 3.51

38.54 ± 1.59 91.18 ± 1.34

8.62 ± 1.19

Deep Features [194]

84.91 ± 1.82

14.97 ± 1.98 96.40 ± 0.69

3.48 ± 0.67

PR-REM [162]

93.25 ± 2.23

7.92 ± 0.98

98.10 ± 2.19

1.10 ± 0.22

PF-cpGAN

93.78 ± 2.46

7.21 ± 0.65

98.88 ± 1.56

0.93 ± 0.14

The results are summarized in Table 7.1.
We can observe from Table 7.1 that our proposed framework, PF-cpGAN, gives much
better performance than the methods that use standard hand-crafted features of HoG, LBP,
or FV, providing minimum of 13% improvement in accuracy with a 12% decrease in EER
for the profile-frontal setting. PF-cpGAN also improves on the performance of the Deep
Features by approximately 9% with a 7.5% decrease in EER for the profile-frontal setting.
Finally, PF-cpGAN performs on-par with the best deep-learning method of PR-REM, and,
in-fact, does slightly better than PR-REM by ≈ 0.5% improvement in accuracy with a 0.7%
decrease in EER for the profile-frontal setting. This performance improvement clearly shows
that usage of a GAN framework for projecting the profile and frontal images in the latent
embedding subspace and maintaining the semantic similarity in the latent space is better
than some other deep-learning techniques such as Deep Features or PR-REM.

7.3.3

Evaluation on IJB-A and IJB-C

Here, we focus on unconstrained face recognition on the IJB-A dataset to quantify the
superiority of our PF-cpGAN for profile to frontal face recognition. Some of the baselines for
comparison on IJB-A are DR-GAN [167], FNM [171], PR-REM [162], and FF-GAN [169].
We have also compared them with other methods as listed in [171] and shown in Table
7.2. As shown in Table 7.2, we perform better than the state-of-the-art methods for both
verification and identification. Specifically, for verification, we improve the GAR by at least
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Table 7.2: Performance comparison on IJB-A benchmark. Results reported are the
’average±standard deviation’ over the 10 folds specified in the IJB-A protocol.
Symbol ’-’ indicates that the metric is not available for that protocol.
Verification
Method

GAR@ FAR= 0.01%

Identification

GAR@ FAR= 0.001%

@ Rank-1

@ Rank-5

OPENBR [195]

23.6 ± 0.9

10.4 ± 1.4

24.6 ± 1.1

37.5 ± 0.8

GOTS [195]

40.6 ± 1.4

19.8 ± 0.8

43.3 ± 2.1

59.5 ± 2.0

PAM [165]

73.3 ± 1.8

55.2 ± 3.2

77.1 ± 1.6 88.7 ± 0.9

DCNN [196]

78.7 ± 4.3

-

DR-GAN [167]

77.4 ± 2.7

53.9 ± 4.3

85.2 ± 1.8

85.5 ± 1.5 94.7 ± 1.1

93.7 ± 1.0

FF-GAN [197]

85.2 ± 1.0

66.3 ± 3.3

90.2 ± 0.6

FNM [171]

93.4 ± 0.9

83.8 ± 2.6

96.0 ± 0.5 98.6 ± 0.3

PR-REM [162]

94.4 ± 0.9

86.8 ± 1.5

94.6 ± 1.1

PF-cpGAN

95.8 ± 0.82

91.2 ± 1.3

97.6 ± 1.0 98.8 ± 0.4

95.4 ± 0.5
96.8 ± 1.0

1.4% compared to other methods. For instance, at the FAR of 0.01%, the best previouslyused method is PR-REM, with an average GAR of 94.4%. PF-cpGAN improves upon PRREM and gives an average GAR of 95.8% at the same FAR. We also show improvement
in identification. Specifically, the rank-1 recognition rate shows an improvement of around
1.6% in comparison to the best state-of-the-art method, FNM [171].
Table 7.3: Performance comparison on IJB-C benchmark. Results reported are the
’average±standard deviation’ over the 10 folds specified in the IJB-C protocol.
Symbol ’-’ indicates that the metric is not available for that protocol.
Verification

Identification

Method

GAR@ FAR= 0.01%

GAR@ FAR= 0.001%

@ Rank-1

@ Rank-5

GOTS [188]

62.1 ± 1.1

36.3 ± 1.2

38.5 ± 1.6

53.8 ± 1.8

FaceNet [85]

82.3 ± 1.18

66.3 ± 1.3

70.4 ± 1.2

78.8 ± 2.3

VGG-CNN [87]

87.2 ± 1.09

74.3 ± 0.9

79.6 ± 1.04

87.8 ± 1.3

FNM [171]

91.2 ± 0.8

80.4 ± 1.8

84.6 ± 0.6

93.7 ± 0.9

PR-REM [162]

92.1 ± 0.8

83.4 ± 1.5

83.1 ± 0.4

92.6 ± 1.1

PF-cpGAN

93.8 ± 0.67

86.1 ± 0.7

88.3 ± 1.2

94.8 ± 0.6

We have also performed the task of verification and identification using the IJB-C dataset
according to the verification and the identification protocol given in that dataset. The results
are provided in Table 7.3, showing that the proposed PF-cpGAN improves on the existing
state-of-the-art methods for both verification and identification. For instance, at the FAR
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of 0.01%, the best previously-used method is PR-REM, with an average GAR of 92.1%.
PF-cpGAN improves upon PR-REM and gives an average GAR of 93.8% at the same FAR.
We also observe that, for identification, specifically, rank-1 recognition, PF-cpGAN shows
an improvement over the previous best state-of-the-art method FNM [171] by about 1.1%.

7.3.4

A Further Analysis on Influences of Face Yaw

In addition to complete profile to frontal face recognition, we also perform a more indepth analysis on the influence of face yaw angle on the performance of face recognition to
better understand the effectiveness of the PF-cpGAN for profile to frontal face recognition.
We perform this experiment for the CMU Multi-PIE dataset [75] under setting-1 for fair comparison with other state-of-the-art methods. As shown in Table 7.4, we achieve comparable
performance with other state-of-the-art methods for different yaw angles. Under extreme
pose, PF-cpGAN achieves significant improvements (i.e., approx. 77% to 88% under ±90°).
Table 7.4: Rank-1 recognition rates (%) across poses and illuminations
under Multi-PIE Setting-1.

7.3.5

Method

±90°

±75°

±60°

±45°

±30°

±15°

HPN [198]

29.82

47.57

61.24

72.77

78.26

84.23

c-CNN [199]

47.26

60.7

74.4

89.0

94.1

97.0

TP-GAN [200]

64.0

84.1

92.9

98.6

99.99

99.8

PIM [182]

75.0

91.2

97.7

98.3

99.4

99.8

CAPG-GAN [186]

77.1

87.4

93.7

98.3

99.4

99.99

FNM+VGG-Face [171]

41.1

67.3

83.6

93.6

97.2

99.0

FNM+Light CNN [171]

55.8

81.3

93.7

98.2

99.5

99.9

PF-cpGAN

88.1

94.2

97.6

98.9

99.9

99.9

Reconstruction of Frontal and Profile Images

As noted in Sec. 1, the PF-cpGAN framework can also be used for reconstruction of
frontal images by using profile images as input and vice versa. The results of reconstructing
frontal images using the profile images as input are given in Fig. 7.3, and the results of
reconstructing profile images using the frontal images as input is given in Fig. 7.4. The
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Figure 7.3: Reconstruction of frontal images at the output of the frontal U-Net generator with
profile images as input to the profile U-Net generator. Every odd number column represent
the input profile image and every even number column represents the output frontal image.
The input images belong to the CMU-MultiPIE dataset.
reconstruction procedure for frontal images is given as follows: The profile image is given as
input to the profile U-Net generator and the feature vector generated at the bottleneck of the
profile generator (i.e., at the output of the encoder of the profile U-Net generator) is passed
through the decoder section of the frontal U-Net generator to reconstruct the frontal image.
Similarly the reconstruction procedure for profile images is given as follows: The frontal
image is given as input to the frontal U-Net generator, and the feature vector generated
at the bottleneck of the frontal generator (i.e., at the output of the encoder of the frontal
U-Net generator) is passed through the decoder section of the profile U-Net generator to
reconstruct the profile image. As we can see from Fig. 7.3 and Fig. 7.4, the PF-cpGAN
can preserve the identity and generate high-fidelity faces from an unconstrained dataset such
as CMU-MultiPIE. These results show the robustness and effectiveness of PF-cpGAN for
multiple use of profile to frontal matching in the latent common embedding subspace, as
well as in the reconstruction of facial images.
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Figure 7.4: Reconstruction of profile images at the output of the profile U-Net generator
with frontal images as input to the frontal U-Net generator. Every odd number column
represents the input frontal image, and every even number column represents the output
profile image. The input images belong to the CMU-MultiPIE dataset.

7.3.6

Evaluation of the Frontalization by CpGAN as a Pre-processing
for Face Matching

As mentioned earlier, our coupled GAN framework can also be used for frontalization,
which can be an important pre-processing step for other face-recognition tasks. Here, we
conducted experiments to indicate the effectiveness of the frontalization performed using
our cpGAN for the face verification task. In this set of experiments, we have used an
Inception [201] based FaceNet [85] model for the face verification task, which is specifically
the NN2 model from [85]. We have performed this set of experiments on the VGGFace2
dataset [202].
The VGGFace2 dataset provides annotation to enable evaluation of face matching across
different poses [202]. In the dataset, six pose templates corresponding to three poses (i.e.,
two templates for a single pose) have been provided for about 300 identities. A template
corresponds to five faces from the same subject with a consistent pose. This pose can be
frontal, three-quarter or profile view. Consequently, for the 300 identities, there are a total of
1.8K templates with 9K images in total [202]. For this set of experiments, we have used only
the profile and the frontal templates, which corresponds to about 6K images corresponding
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Figure 7.5: Performance comparison for (a) Frontalization using cpGAN as a preprocessing.
(b) PF-cpGAN (Coupled-GAN) vs cpCNN (Coupled-CNN) vs PF-ADDA (ADDA). FAR
and GAR are given in %.
to 300 identities.
Here, we perform face verification using FaceNet in three different settings. In the first
setting, we choose about 2.5K frontal images corresponding to 250 identities. Using these
images, we fine-tune the Inception model NN2 from FaceNet for frontal to frontal face verification. Next, using this FaceNet model, we evaluate the frontal to frontal face verification
on the remaining 50 identities. This setting will be called Original Frontal to Frontal. In
the second setting, we choose about 5K images corresponding to 250 identities, which have
both profile and frontal images. Using these images, we fine-tune the Inception model NN2
from FaceNet for profile to frontal face verification. Next, using this FaceNet model, we
evaluate the profile to frontal face verification on the remaining 50 identities. This setting
will be called Profile to Frontal. In the third setting, we used our cpGAN to frontalize the
profile images from the dataset used in second setting (300 subjects with about 3K profile
images) using the method outlined in Sec. 7.3.5. We call this frontalized dataset synthesized
frontal dataset. Next, using the fine-tuned FaceNet model from the first setting, we evaluate
the frontal to frontal face verification on 50 identities from the synthesized frontal dataset.
Specifically, in the third setting we are trying to check how well the proposed cpGAN is
able to frontalize the images by running the frontal to frontal face verification model on
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the synthesized frontal dataset. This setting will be called Synthesized Frontal to Frontal.
Note that we try to keep the 50 identities used for evaluation consistent across all the three
settings.
Using the ROC curve as our performance metric, we have compared the performance
of these three settings to evaluate the effectiveness of frontalization performed using our
proposed cpGAN. The performance curves are provided in Fig. 7.5(a). As expected the
first setting (Original Frontal to Frontal) gives us the best performance and it is the upper
bound as we are using the original frontal dataset for training and evaluation in this setting.
On comparing the curves for the second (Profile to Frontal) and third settings (Synthesized
Frontal to Frontal), it can be observed that the Synthesized Frontal to Frontal outperforms
the Profile to Frontal face recognition model. This shows that the preprocessing in the form
of frontalization performed using the proposed cpGAN framework improves the performance
of a FaceNet model for profile to frontal face verification.

7.3.7

Implementation of Coupled CNN and Domain Adaptation
Network for Profile to Frontal Face Matching

Before the advent of GAN, many deep-learning applications used CNNs for classification,
regression, or reconstruction. To showcase the advantage of using a GAN model in our
proposed approach for profile to frontal face recognition, we have also implemented two
other frameworks that will be explained in this section. The performance comparison of the
proposed PF-cpGAN with these new frameworks will be discussed in the following section.
Coupled CNN: In the literature, it has been shown that GAN is better than CNN for
some deep-learning applications. To confirm this hypothesis for our proposed application,
we have implemented a coupled CNN and compared its performance with our proposed
coupled GAN architecture. The coupled CNN (cpCNN) architecture is shown in Fig. 7.6.
For fair comparison, we have used ResNet18 [23] pre-trained on ImageNet network as our
CNN architecture for both Frontal CNN and Profile CNN. Additionally, we have added
an extra fully-connected layer after the average pooling layer of ResNet18 for our coupled
CNNs.
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Figure 7.6: Block diagram of Coupled CNN.
The frontal and profile CNNs are coupled together at their output layer using a contrastive loss function (Lcont ). This loss function (Lcont ) is a distance-based loss function,
which is similar to the contrastive loss function (7.1) that we have used for PF-cpGAN.
For ease of understanding, we have used the same naming convention for cpCNN as in
PF-cpGAN.
We have used the VGGFace2 dataset for training and testing of the cpGAN. As in
Sec. 7.3.6, we choose about 5K images corresponding to 250 identities, which have both
profile and frontal images for fine-tuning the cpCNN for profile to frontal face verification.
We have tested the cpCNN on the 50 disjoint identities from VGGFace2. The performance
comparison is discussed in the following section.
Domain Adaptation Network: A profile to frontal recognition network could very
well be implemented using deep-learning based domain adaptation techniques. These domain adaptation techniques attempt to alleviate the negative effects of domain shift (frontal
domain to profile domain in our case) by learning deep neural transformations that map
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Figure 7.7: Block diagram of Profile to Frontal Adversarial Domain Adaptation (PF-ADDA).
both domains into a common feature space. Recently, adversarial adaptation methods,
which are based on reconstructing the target domain from the source representation have
become increasingly popular. These adversarial methods seek to reduce an approximate
domain discrepancy distance through an adversarial objective function with respect to a
domain discriminator [203].
Taking a cue from [203], we have implemented an unsupervised discriminative domain
adaption network for profile to frontal face recognition. Hereafter, this network will be
known as PF-ADDA. For this adversarial domain adaptation network, we consider the source
domain as the frontal images and the target domain as the profile images. The architecture
of PF-ADDA is shown in Fig. 7.7. PF-ADDA has been implemented and optimized in two
steps, as described in the next two paragraphs: In the first step of pre-training a frontal
CNN, a discriminative representation is learned using the labels in the frontal image domain
(source domain). This implies we first pre-train a frontal image encoder CNN using labeled
frontal image examples. The optimization for this step is given as:
min Lcls (XF R , YF R ) = −E(xF R ,yF R )∼(XF R ,YF R )
z2 ,C

K
X

1[k=yF R ] log C(z2 (xjF R )),

(7.16)

k=1

where the classification loss Lcls is optimized over z2 , and frontal image classifier, C, by
training using the labeled source data, XF R , and YF R .
In the second step of adversarial adaptation, a separate encoding that maps the profile
image data to the same space as the frontal image domain using an asymmetric mapping
is learned through a combination of domain-adversarial loss and the contrastive loss. In
other words, this implies that we perform adversarial adaptation by learning a profile image
encoder CNN such that a discriminator that sees encoded frontal and profile images cannot
accurately predict their domain label. In addition to the discriminator loss, the frontal and
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Figure 7.8: Reconstruction of frontal images at the output of the frontal U-Net generator
with profile images as input to the profile U-Net generator. Every odd number column
represents the input profile image, and every even number column represents the output
frontal image. The input images belong to the VGGFace2 dataset.
profile domain CNNs are also coupled through a contrastive loss. The optimizations for this
step are given as :
min LadvD (XF R , XP R , z2 , z1 ) =
D

−

ExF R ∼XF R [log D(z2 (xjF R ))]

(7.17)
− ExP R ∼XP R [log(1 −

D(z1 (xiP R )))],

min LadvG (XF R , XP R , D) = −ExP R ∼XP R [log D(z1 (xiP R ))],
z1

(7.18)

and
1
1
Lcont (z1 (xiP R ), z2 (xjF R ), Y ) = (1 − Y ) (Dz )2 + (Y ) (max(0, m − Dz ))2 .
2
2

(7.19)
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As shown in Equations (7.17), and (7.18), frontal image encoder CNN (source CNN) is fixed
during the second stage, we just need to optimize the discriminator loss LadvD and profile
encoder loss LadvG over the profile encoder CNN to generate z1 without revisiting the source
domain encoder. Finally, along with the adversarial losses, we also optimize the contrastive
loss, Lcont , between the output of the Frontal CNN and Profile CNN as shown in (7.19).
This contrastive loss is similar to the loss used for cpCNN and PF-cpGAN.
During testing, profile images (target domain) are mapped with the profile image encoder to the shared feature space, and frontal images (source images) are mapped with the
frontal image encoder to the shared feature space. Finally, the profile to frontal matching
is performed in the shared feature space. Dashed lines in Fig. 7.7 indicate fixed network
parameters.
We have used the VGGFace2 dataset for training and testing of the PF-ADDA. For fair
comparison, the train and test split of the dataset for the PF-ADDA is consistent with the
split for cpCNN.

7.3.8

Performance Comparison of PF-cpGAN vs cpCNN vs PFADDA.

We have performed several experiments to compare the performance of our proposed
PF-cpGAN approach with cpCNN and PF-ADDA. These experiments are performed on the
VGGFace2 dataset [202]. As already mentioned in the previous section 5.7, for implementing
cpCNN and PF-ADDA, we have used a common network architecture as PF-cpGAN. Furthermore, we have been consistent in the training procedure (optimizer, batch-size, learning
rate decay schedule, etc.). The performance comparison is plotted in terms of ROC and
shown in Fig. 7.5(b). The ROC results curves show that the proposed PF-cpGAN method
outperforms other methods and gives much better performance for face verification under
different pose variations. This demonstrates the effectiveness of coupled-GAN compared
to other implementations. The improvement in performance using PF-cpGAN could be attributed to individual discriminators in the PF-cpGAN, which generate more domain specific
features. The improvement can also be attributed to the sharpening of the features due to
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the perceptual loss terms.

7.3.9

Coupled-GAN Qualitative Results on VGGFace2

In this section, we test the robustness of our proposed approach Pf-cpGAN on VGGFace2
dataset by reconstructing frontal images from input profile images. In VGGFace2 [202],
two networks are trained to estimate the pose of images in the dataset. Specifically, a 5way classification ResNet-50 is trained on the large-scale CASIA-WebFace dataset [71] to
estimate head pose (roll, pitch, yaw). This model is then leveraged to predict pose of all
the images in the dataset. As a result, VGGFace2 published different pose templates for
368 identities. Specifically, there are six templates for each subject: two templates each for
frontal view, three-quarter view and profile view. There are five images per template. Here,
we used about 250 identities to construct our pairs for training our coupled-GAN framework.
Next, we test our network for frontalization of profile images. We follow the same procedure
as discussed in Sec. 7.3.5 to frontalize our images. The results for frontalized images are
shown in Fig. 7.8. From these images, it can be observed that PF-cpGAN can preserve the
identity and generate high-fidelity faces from VGGFace2 dataset. These results demonstrate
the robustness and effectiveness of our coupled-GAN framework for frontalizing pose-variant
images in the latent common embedding subspace.

7.3.10

Ablation Study

The objective function defined in (7.16) contains multiple loss functions: coupling loss
(Lcpl ), perceptual loss (LP ), L2 reconstruction loss (L2 ), and GAN loss (LGAN ). It is important to understand the relative importance of different loss functions and the benefit of using
them in our proposed method. For this experiment, we use different variations of PF-cpGAN
and perform the evaluation using the IJB-A dataset. The variations are: 1) PF-cpGAN with
only coupling loss and L2 reconstruction loss (Lcpl + L2 ); 2) PF-cpGAN with coupling loss,
L2 reconstruction loss, and GAN loss (Lcpl + L2 + LGAN ); 3) PF-cpGAN with all the loss
functions (Lcpl + L2 + LGAN + LP ).
We use these three variations of our framework and plot the ROC for profile to frontal
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Figure 7.9: ROC curves showing the importance of different loss functions for ablation study.
face verification using the features from the common embedding subspace. We can see from
Fig. 7.9 that the generative adversarial loss helps to improve the profile to frontal verification
performance, and adding the perceptual loss (blue curve) results in an additional performance
improvement. The reason for this improvement is that using perceptual loss along with the
contrastive loss leads to a more discriminative embedding subspace resulting in better face
recognition performance.

7.4

Summary

We proposed a new framework which uses a coupled GAN for profile to frontal face
recognition. The coupled GAN contains two sub-networks which project the profile and
frontal images into a common embedding subspace, where the goal of each sub-network is to
maximize the pair-wise correlation between profile and frontal images during the process of
projection. We thoroughly evaluated our model on several standard datasets and the results
demonstrate that our model notably outperforms other state-of-the-art algorithms for profile
to frontal face verification. For instance, under extreme pose of ±90°, PF-cpGAN achieves
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improvements of approx. 11% (i.e., 77% to 88%), when compared to the state-of-the-art
methods for CMU-MultiPIE dataset. We have also explored two other similar implementations in the form of coupled CNN (cpCNN) and domain adaptation network (ADDA)
for profile to frontal face recognition. We have compared the performance of the proposed
approach with cpCNN, and ADDA and shown that the proposed approach performs much
better than these two implementations. Moreover, we have also evaluated the frontal image
reconstruction performance of the proposed approach. Finally, the improvement achieved
by different losses including perceptual and GAN losses in our proposed algorithm has been
investigated in an ablation study.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
In this dissertation, the concepts of deep hashing and channel coding have been explored,
along with their various applications in biometric security and biometric retrieval. A deep
hashing model has been integrated with hybrid secure architectures to develop a multimodal
biometric secure system. The deep hashing model has also been integrated with a neural
network decoder to develop a multimodal biometric authentication system. Furthermore,
the deep hashing model has been extended to a deep cross-modal hashing framework and
integrated with a neural network decoder for facial image retrieval using an attribute query.
Finally, the dissertation also explored coupled conditional GAN architectures for application
in profile-to-frontal face recognition and low-resolution to high-resolution face recognition.
This chapter summarizes the major contributions of this dissertation and also presents
ideas for future work, motivated by results achieved in the previously described contributions,
exploring new applications of deep hashing and neural error decoding.

8.1

Summary of Contributions

Chapter 1 provided an introductory framework for this dissertation, Chapter 2 presented
an algorithm that uses a combination of deep hashing and neural network based error correction for face template protection. The proposed architecture improves upon existing face
template protection techniques to provide better matching performance with one-shot and
multi-shot enrollment. The novelty of this algorithm is that it can even be used for zero-shot
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enrollment, where the subject has not been seen during training of the deep CNN yet can
be enrolled.
Chapter 3 presents a feature-level fusion and binarization framework using deep hashing
to design a multimodal template protection scheme that generates a single secure template
from each user’s multiple biometrics. The resulting hybrid secure architecture combines the
secure primitives of cancelable biometrics and secure-sketch and integrates it with a deep
hashing framework, which makes it computationally prohibitive to forge a combination of
multiple biometrics that passes the authentication. Two deep learning based fusion architectures have been developed, fully connected architecture and bilinear architecture that could
be used to combine more than two modalities. Moreover, the matching performance and
the security of the proposed secure multibiometric system have been analyzed. Experiments
using the WVU multimodal dataset, which contain face and iris modalities, demonstrate
that the matching performance does not deteriorate with the proposed protection scheme.
In fact, both the matching performance and the template security are improved when using
the proposed secure multimodal system.
Chapter 4 extends the framework from Chapter 2 for a single biometric template protection to the fusion of multiple modalities and presents a multiomodal biometric authentication
system. This chapter presents a novel multimodal deep hashing neural decoder (MDHND)
architecture. MDHND integrates a deep hashing framework with a neural network decoder
(NND) to create an effective multibiometric authentication system. The MDHND consists
of two separate modules: a multimodal deep hashing (MDH) module, which is used for
feature-level fusion and binarization of multiple biometrics, and a neural network decoder
(NND) module, which is used to refine the intermediate binary codes generated by the MDH
and compensate for the difference between enrollment and probe biometrics (variations in
pose, illumination, etc.)
Chapter 5 presents a novel iterative two-step deep cross-modal hashing method called
Deep Neural Decoder Cross-Modal Hashing (DNDCMH) that takes facial attributes as query
and returns a list of images based on a Hamming distance similarity. The DNDCMH network consists of two separate components: an attribute-based deep cross-modal hashing
(ADCMH) module, which uses a margin (m)-based loss function to efficiently learn com-
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pact binary codes to preserve similarity between modalities (i.e., facial attribute modality
and image modality) in Hamming space, and a neural error correcting decoder (NECD),
which is an error correcting decoder implemented with a neural network. The goal of integrating the NECD network with the ADCMH network is to error correct the hash codes
generated by ADCMH to improve the retrieval efficiency. The experimental results show
that the NECD significantly improves the retrieval performance of the attribute-based deep
cross-modal hashing network. Moreover, the results indicate that the proposed framework
outperforms most of the other face image retrieval approaches.
Chapter 6 presents an embedding model for cross-resolution face recognition based on
novel attribute-guided deep coupled learning framework using generative adversarial networks (GANs) to find the hidden relationship between the high-resolution and low-resolution
images in a latent common embedding subspace. The coupled framework also exploits the
facial attribute to further maximize the correlation between the low-resolution and highresolution domains, which leads to a more discriminative embedding subspace to enhance
the performance of the main task, which is cross-resolution face recognition. Additionally,
in this approach, the attributes for low-resolution images can also be predicted along with
cross-resolution face recognition in a multi-tasking paradigm.
Finally, Chapter 7 presents a coupled GAN architecture, which is similar to the architecture in Chapter 6, but for the application of profile-to-frontal face recognition. The coupled
GAN contains two sub-networks which project the profile and frontal images into a common
embedding subspace, where the goal of each sub-network is to maximize the pair-wise correlation between profile and frontal images during the process of projection. The model has
been thoroughly evaluated on several standard datasets and the results demonstrate that
the model notably outperforms other state-of-the-art algorithms for profile to frontal face
verification.

8.2

Future Work

While this dissertation has advanced the state of the art in multibiometric security and
heterogeneous face recognition, there is still room for additional work. This section provides

Veeru Talreja

Chapter 8. Conclusion

156

ideas for future work for those researchers that are motivated to continue to work in this
area.
Extension of multimodal biometric secure system: The multimodal secure system
presented in Chapter 3 can also be extended to other modalities such as voice, fingerprint,
and gait. It will be interesting to research how well the multimodal secure system is feasible
for other difficult modalities such as voice, and gait. It will also be exciting to extend the
framework to more than two biometric modalities and verify the scalability of such a system.
Extension of multimodal authentication system integrated with a neural network decoder: On the similar lines to the multimodal secure system, the multimodal
authentication system using a neural network decoder from Chapter 4 could very well be
extended for other difficult modalities such as voice and gait. It will be of great research
value to extend the authentication framework to more than 2 biometric modalities and verify
the scalability of the system.
Implementation of multimodal authentication system for real world: The multimodal secure system developed in Chapter 3 is a proof of concept. It will prove to be very
beneficial if the proof of concept is actually implemented in the real world. It can be implemented as a Kiosk system, smartphone-based system or a cloud-based system. it is very
important to understand the time complexity required to actually process a single secure
authentication using this implementation in the real world on a Kiosk or a smartphone and
also important to understand how this time complexity could be improved.
Integration of Deep Hashing and Neural Error Decoding for Profile to Frontal
Face Verification: The problem of profile to frontal face verification can also be defined
in the realm of integration of deep cross modal hashing and neural error decoding. As
opposed to the generative model proposed in Chapter 7, a deep cross modal hashing (DCMH)
architecture can also be implemented for profile to frontal face verification. The motivated
researcher could try to have a similar architecture as in Chapter 5, but for the application
of profile to frontal face verification
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